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Abstract 
 
The role of local government and specifically the concept of community 
governance have been the focus of much attention in recent years. For much of 
its history, local government was typically viewed by governments and citizens 
as a conservative sector, valued for its dependability rather than for innovation 
and its services rather than for its role in promoting community well-being. 
Public sector reform, globalisation and increasing demands by citizens have 
increased awareness of, and appreciation for, the potential for local 
governments to work with other organisations to address complex policy and 
management issues. These pressures have compelled the sector to innovate, 
and venture into areas that were previously considered to be outside its remit. 
 
Local governments the world over have therefore undergone extensive 
programmes of reform, often aiming to reorient councils from service delivery 
roles to broader roles concerned with community well-being, strengthening 
community leadership, and steering local and regional service providers 
towards local goals and strategic objectives. This trend has been characterised 
as a shift from local government to ‘community governance’ (Rhodes 1997, 
Stoker 2000).  
 
Local government in New Zealand is no exception. The Local Government Act 
2002 (LGA 2002) broadened local government’s powers and purposes, 
introducing a collaborative, citizen-centred style of working within a framework 
oriented to securing community well-being and sustainable development.  
This research examines the concept and practice of local and community 
governance, internationally and in New Zealand. Its focus is the local 
government reforms introduced in New Zealand over the last two decades, and 
specifically the role of community governance. It uses several research 
methods to assess options for strengthening community governance in practice.  
 
The primary method is the development of a model which examines 10 
dimensions of the New Zealand system to assess the degree to which they are 
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able to achieve community governance. In addition, the approach to community 
planning undertaken by a sample of local authorities is examined to assess the 
degree to which councils are using this mechanism as an instrument for 
strengthening community governance. Further, a number of local government 
participants were invited to answer a range of questions about three alternative 
governance scenarios designed to test whether or not there is an ‘ideal’ local 
government structure for achieving community governance.  
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Preface 
 
Rapid social, economic and technological change has encouraged governments 
to review their approaches to governance in order to confront new challenges. 
The last few decades have seen many countries shift powers and authority 
previously held by local government to international or community levels. For 
example, policy challenges associated with climate change have resulted in 
upward shifts of power to multilateral organisations, whereas policies of 
decentralising and devolving have led to downward shifts to sub-national 
organisations to cater for diversity and accommodate local solutions to local 
issues. The result is a more plural and diverse governing framework. 
 
This research examines and documents the rise of what has been called 
community governance as governments seek to give more emphasis to the role 
of place in the design and implementation of policy solutions. Community 
governance, as defined in the research, is not understood as an alternative to 
the institutions of local government. Rather, it is seen as an augmented 
approach to, and style of, local government, which requires councils to consider 
the community’s well-being and local outcomes in a collaborative manner, 
whether or not they have primary responsibility for the policies and services that 
contribute towards these outcomes. Councils that adopt a community 
governance role extend their activities beyond traditional service delivery roles 
in order to steer a multiplicity of public and private agencies and communities of 
interest towards common goals and policy settings. 
 
The research topic was developed while I was a core research member of the 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST) Local Futures 
Research Project, based at the School of Government, Victoria University. The 
project examined many aspects of strategic planning and policy, and, in 
particular, the role of councils in implementing the strategic planning and 
management provisions of the LGA 2002. The research topic offered a chance 
to develop a valuable international and local perspective on community 
governance, and my membership in the project facilitated access to councils 
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and information, which was useful to the wider research agenda. The 
examination of community governance also reflected my professional interest 
as a Manager (Governance) for Local Government New Zealand (a national 
membership organisation for local governments) although ‘governance’ in my 
professional role should not be confused with the concept of ‘community 
governance’ as a more engaged form of local government. 
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Introduction 
 
Governance, in the broad sense of how we govern ourselves, is a topic that has 
concerned citizens and those who write about citizens since humans first began 
to form groups and confronted issues regarding the distribution of power. The 
question of how society should govern itself and make collective decisions is as 
relevant and complex today as it was more than 2,000 years ago when Plato 
turned his mind to the issue. While governance deals with universal matters, 
such as the distribution of power and authority, the interpretation of the term is 
always contingent on socio-economic contexts, varying according to culture, 
tradition and circumstances. The Roman Republic, for example, used multiple 
governance models, depending on whether the city was at peace or war; when 
it was at war, the rule of the senate was temporarily suspended, and was 
replaced by two governors with temporary dictatorial powers.  
 
Debates about governance are concerned with the issue of power and, today, 
are often about its distribution across government units at local, regional, 
national and international levels. It is not surprising, therefore, that at times of 
rapid social, cultural, economic and environmental change (such as 
experienced in the latter years of the 20th century) new institutional 
arrangements for collective decision-making are attracting interest. Policy 
challenges, resulting from climate change, globalisation, growing diversity and 
‘wicked issues’ (Roberts 2000), have often proved beyond the capacity and 
capability of a single government to address in isolation. When this happens, a 
loss of confidence in current governance arrangements may occur, including a 
sense that centres of power are outside citizens’ control. The result has been a 
democratic deficit (Giddens 2000) and a loss of legitimacy.1 In addition, citizens’ 
expectations of governments have changed as the post-war welfare state has 
given way to a more market-led approach to governance. Rhodes (1997) 
describes this phenomenon as a differentiated polity, a public sphere which is 
by nature highly fragmented. New forms of governance are emerging at 
                                                 
1
 According to the Social Attitudes survey, conducted annually in the United Kingdom, the percentage of 
people voting as a civic duty has fallen from 76 per cent in 1987 to 56 per cent in 2009 (The Economist, 
30 January 2010, p. 63). 
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international and national levels and also at the local level. However, the reason 
for change is contested.  
 
For example, some commentators regard the new forms of plural democracy as 
related to the growth of networks that emerged in the face of the limitations of 
hierarchies and markets to address contemporary issues (see Stewart & Clarke 
1996, Rhodes 1997, Albrow 2001). A related perspective is that sovereignty has 
leaked down to regional and local governments (due to the state devolving 
responsibilities to sub-national administrations) in response to a desire to 
enhance the quality of governance or address more immediate fiscal 
considerations, such as national budget deficits (Bryson 2004, Oates 1999). 
Also agreeing that traditional models of governance have under-performed, 
writers such as Osborne and Gaebler (1992) explain the changes as a shift to a 
more entrepreneurial form of government which places more emphasis on 
outcomes as opposed to outputs. Other points of view argue that the reforms 
can be explained less by the desire to make government more effective than by 
a range of political and economic factors, such as a loss of legitimacy (Andrew 
and Goldsmith 1998), the triumph of ‘neo-liberalism’ (Kelsey 1994, Mishra 1999, 
Klein 2001) or simply the vulnerability of governments to capture by interest 
groups (Kerr 2003).  
Implications for local government 
 
Regardless of these various interpretations, and of whether change is positive 
or negative, what is clear is that the governance environment is changing and 
has implications for the future role and status of local government. Rhodes 
(1997) describes a ‘hollowing out’ of government, whereby policy and 
operational responsibilities have shifted vertically and horizontally. Vertically, 
the shift has been to pan-national organisations in order to regulate global 
capital, as well as sub-national governments to meet demand for greater 
autonomy. Horizontally, the shift has been to quangos in order to deliver arm’s-
length services, free from political interference. The effect on government 
sovereignty of such vertical and horizontal transfers has been described as a 
process of denationalisation (Sassen 2006).  
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This changing national context has led to a debate about the ultimate role and 
purpose of local government, including the suggestion that the prime business 
of councils is now “the guardianship of difference; the protection of future 
selves; the advancement of positive rights and the provision of civic leadership” 
(Reid 1994, p. 2). Many local governments have expanded their role from an 
exclusive concern with the effective and efficient management of services to a 
new focus on community-wide outcomes, a phenomenon which has been 
described as a move from local government to community governance. 
Community governance is a term coined to describe a trend in the way local 
governments are beginning to operate, such as breaking down the bureaucratic 
and organisational boundaries between councils and their communities, and 
facilitating collaborative strategies for the achievement of local outcomes.  
New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand the debate about the role and potential of local government has 
centred on changes to the sector’s empowering legislation. The most recent 
iteration, the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002), is possibly the most 
comprehensive change to local government since the consolidation of local 
authorities in 1988/89. It is widely regarded as introducing a new paradigm of 
local government in New Zealand (McKinlay 2004, Thomas and Memon 2005, 
Cheyne 2008), although debate continues as to the truth of such claims. The 
question of whether the LGA 2002 represents simply a logical ‘next step’ in the 
reform process or represents a decisive break with tradition which has steered 
local government in a radical new direction (see Kerr 2003) is yet to be 
resolved.  
 
The New Zealand style of local government is something of an outlier by 
international standards, its Australian counterpart being perhaps the most 
similar. Established in the middle of the 19th century to meet the needs of a 
rapidly growing settler population, local government was necessary to build 
local and national infrastructure and provide communities with some capacity 
for self-government. New Zealand local government stands out for its high level 
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of autonomy (90 per cent of its income is self-generated) and low ‘task profile’ 
(the small number and extent of its mandatory functions). Because the major 
social services, such as health and education, are centralised, New Zealand 
local government’s 3.1 per cent (2009) share of gross domestic product is low 
by international standards, as is its share of public expenditure at less than 10 
per cent. 
 
The LGA 2002 was a major revision of New Zealand local government’s 
empowering statute, introducing changes to its powers, purpose, processes and 
decision-making principles, without, however, significantly altering its funding or 
task profile. A debate arose as to whether the legislation was simply a 
modernisation of local government’s powers and purpose, or a new mandate for 
a form of community governance; “the community governance mandate in the 
LGA has opened a window of opportunity for community engagement and 
intergovernmental collaboration to an extent that has not been witnessed before 
in New Zealand” (Leonard and Memon 2008, p. 44). 
 
Leonard and Memon observe strong connections between the New Zealand 
reforms and international change, particularly in the United Kingdom. Some 
commentators (Cheyne 2008, McKinlay 2004) have also drawn parallels 
between the new legislation and the Local Government Act 2000 in the United 
Kingdom, particularly in the focus on community planning and the promotion of 
well-being. Leonard and Memon (2008), noting the Act’s stronger emphasis on 
participation and civic engagement, suggest local reformers were influenced by 
the rise of a Third-Way discourse (which promoted a style of governing that 
drew on both markets and hierarchies in contrast to previous models which 
strongly favoured one or the other).  
 
Although it clearly reflects international influences, the LGA 2002 has been 
regarded internationally as highly innovative and cutting edge, particularly in its 
emphasis on sustainability and community outcomes. This raises interesting 
questions, for example, whether the Act’s emphasis on sustainability, well-being 
and community outcomes is reflective of reforms in other countries or is 
uniquely a ‘down under’ feature. The New Zealand reforms may survive over 
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time to provide guidance for similar reforms elsewhere; or the changes may be 
judged a ‘wrong turn’ on the basis that they fail to take root or are ideologically 
uncomfortable to future governments.  
 
Because of its size and the speed of its parliamentary decision-making 
processes, New Zealand is sometimes regarded as a laboratory for new public-
sector ideas. The country is often an early adopter of new policy approaches 
which can provide information and evidence to inform policy decisions in other 
countries. Examining the New Zealand approach to local government may help 
understand the factors that will lead to success or failure in the implementation 
of community governance. Thus, New Zealand’s experiences may influence 
reforms in other systems.  
Methodology 
 
Designing a methodology to address the research questions involved the 
challenge of defining community governance, a term for which there is no 
precise or widely accepted definition. The challenges included the difficulty of 
measuring changes under dynamic frameworks subject to frequent statutory 
and regulatory adjustment, and determining the extent to which they can be 
attributed to the influence of the legislation. In addition, the term ‘community 
governance’ is seldom used in public discourse in New Zealand. This raises the 
possibility that efforts to determine the opinion of local government 
professionals on this topic may be frustrated by their limited understanding of 
the concept. 
 
To resolve this issue the literature concerning community governance has been 
reviewed and certain core principles isolated – the principles providing the basis 
for the development of an assessment model. The assessment model (see 
Chapter 4) is based on the community governance literature. In order to 
complement this with some ‘on the ground’ research, two other research 
methods were chosen. One involved a questionnaire of selected local 
government personnel (elected members, officials and policy adviser employed 
by Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ)) to ‘test’ three different governance 
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scenarios. Information from this exercise has been used in the discussion of the 
size and structure dimension in Chapter 7. Participants in the research were 
provided with a handout that introduced them to the theory and practice of 
community governance and were asked to read this before answering the 
predetermined questions on each of the scenarios (see Appendix 4 for a copy 
of the information sheet and questionnaire). In addition, an examination was 
undertaken into how a sample of councils undertook their community planning 
obligations as required by the LGA 2002. This was used to identify the degree 
to which councils saw community planning as a way of strengthening 
community governance. 
 
Research paradigm 
The focus of the research is strengthening community governance in New 
Zealand local government. It involves defining community governance, and 
making an assessment of its relative strength in the New Zealand system. 
Multiple research methods were employed to undertake an array of research 
tasks (see Table 1).  
Table 1  Research tasks and methods 
Research tasks Methods 
Analysing the New Zealand local 
government system and the direction 
of recent reform 
Archival analysis 
Literature review 
Case studies 
Assessment model (see below) 
Describing the major schools of local 
government theory 
Literature review 
Reviewing community governance 
theory and defining the concept of 
community governance as well as 
describing its socio-historical context 
Literature review 
Developing a model of community 
governance, with key principles and 
indicators against which to assess the 
New Zealand approach 
Literature review 
Analysis of international practice 
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Assessing aspects of the New 
Zealand approach against the 
principles of community governance 
Comparative analysis 
Questionnaire 
Case studies 
Proposing options for strengthening 
community governance in New 
Zealand local government 
Comparative analysis 
 
 
Identifying options for strengthening community governance does not suit any 
single research paradigm. It is not simply a matter of collecting data, as 
‘strength’ in this context involves subjective judgements and is being applied 
metaphorically to something that is abstract and not quantifiable. The research 
method used in this dissertation sits squarely in the realist paradigm, using 
several different techniques to provide cumulatively an appropriate rigour to the 
resolution of the research question. This research is primarily inductive in that 
general conclusions about strengthening community governance are intended 
to be based on evidence drawn from the case studies, the questionnaire and 
the assessment tool. Conclusions drawn from the information raised by the 
case studies, the questionnaire and the assessment model are subjective and 
reflect a constructivist approach, given that people tend to construct knowledge 
on the basis of their own experience. This was particularly true of the 
questionnaire and discussion groups as participants’ replies were coloured by 
the type of council they represented. In one aspect it uses deductive logic, in 
that the principles of community governance are derived from an analysis of the 
existing theory pertaining to the concept and translated by the researcher. 
 
When selecting research methods the topic presented a number of challenges. 
Community governance is a social construct. It is not measurable in any strict 
sense, and debate continues as to whether or not it reflects a distinct theory and 
model of local government or is simply a political style, for example the local 
government equivalent of the Third Way. Nor is there an accepted benchmark 
of community governance, so an assessment model of community governance 
needed to be developed from the literature. This approach, in which an actual 
system of local government is compared with a model, is only as sound as the 
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information on which the model is based. The overall approach is summarised 
in Table 2.  
Table 2  Research strategy 
Research paradigm Realism 
Research approach Primarily inductive 
Research methods Case study 
 Archival analysis 
 Literature review 
 Comparative analysis 
 Assessment model 
 Questionnaire 
 
Several research methods were selected so the issue could be considered from 
more than one perspective. If two or more research methods suggest a similar 
conclusion, the overall conclusions are likely to be more reliable. The research 
methods include a review of literature to determine what constitutes community 
governance; a literature review of the major schools of local government theory 
to describe the New Zealand system; historical analysis of the origins of local 
government reform to identify what the major drivers were and whether these 
are consistent with community governance theory; comparative analysis of 
dimensions of the New Zealand system of local government; and case studies 
and a questionnaire. 
 
It was felt that relying only on the assessment model would be too one-
dimensional and that some original research should also be used. The 
questionnaire was designed to seek feedback on different governance 
scenarios, with the emphasis on size and structure. It sought to seek the views 
of a range of invited participants who were not selected at random, the 
questionnaire results having no wider validity than representing the views of the 
participants. The second example of new research was the decision to base a 
chapter on the analysis of a sample of councils’ community planning practice 
undertaken by Local Futures, a multi-disciplinary team undertaking a 
longitudinal study of strategic planning in local government. These case studies 
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are based on interviews with council staff and indicate the different approaches 
councils have taken to community planning, an important component of 
community governance. The key components of the research are as follows: 
• case studies of community strategic planning, as introduced by the LGA 
2002, to explore the degree to which councils see this mechanism as a 
way of achieving community governance or regard it as simply another 
expensive central government obligation 
• a questionnaire, answered by invited local government practitioners, to 
elicit their views and opinions about the ability of different governance 
scenarios to achieve community governance. Participants were also 
invited to elaborate on their answers in a series of discussion groups 
• a model of community governance, developed to assess the ability of the 
New Zealand local government system to achieve community 
governance. The model incorporates commonly agreed principles of 
community governance disaggregated into 10 distinct dimensions. Each 
dimension is assessed as being either adequate or needing room for 
improvement. 
 
The case studies and questionnaire both highlighted opportunities and provided 
information about the current ability of local government to adopt a community 
governance approach. The question of which parts of the system need attention 
in order to strengthen community governance is not directly addressed in those 
chapters and is the focus of Chapter 7. This challenge involved designing a 
research method, the assessment model that examines the system against the 
principles of community governance in order to find which aspects or 
dimensions need to be enhanced if the principles are to be realised. 
 
The assessment model examines the New Zealand system of local government 
by breaking it down into 10 dimensions, such as finance, functions and 
democracy, and uses measures which have been identified for each dimension 
to allow judgements to be made about the relative strength or weakness of each 
dimension in the context of relevant community governance principles. These 
are defined in Chapter 3. Working with 10 qualitatively different dimensions 
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posed a methodological challenge as no particular analytic technique worked 
for all dimensions. Some measures were quantitative and allowed international 
comparisons; others were largely discursive, in which the New Zealand 
experience was discussed in relation to accepted theory, and shortfalls or 
synergies noted. Assessment in relation to these dimensions was qualitative 
and reflected the judgement of the writer. The model has been designed to 
inform the concluding chapter and ensure that strengthening proposals will 
address the most problematic dimensions.  
Summary of chapters 
 
Introduction 
This chapter defines the topic of the research. It gives the reason for selecting 
the topic, and briefly notes pertinent trends. The LGA 2002 is introduced, along 
with some basic features of the New Zealand local government system. The 
methodology to be used and the content of the remaining chapters are outlined.  
 
Chapter 1 The New Zealand approach to local government  
This chapter examines the New Zealand local government system, looking in 
particular at its historical development and recent reforms. Emphasis is placed 
on the changes introduced by the LGA 2002 and their relationship to community 
governance. 
 
Chapter 2 Community governance theory 
This chapter explains the concept of community governance. It defines 
governance and community governance and discusses the concepts as they 
are used in the academic literature. The recent history of the terms is recounted 
and the relationship between community governance and local government 
analysed. 
 
Chapter 3 Community governance principles 
This chapter builds on the theory introduced in the previous chapter. It develops 
a series of ‘community governance principles’ and designs a model for 
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assessing the capability of the New Zealand system to achieve a community 
governance approach.  
 
Chapter 4 The role of local government 
This chapter discusses theories and frameworks of local government, including 
recent international trends regarding local government reform and community 
governance. It also examines a range of meta-trends which are used to explain 
the recent growth of interest in ‘governance’ and local government.  
 
Chapter 5 Community planning and governance 
This chapter summarises and analyses research undertaken of a sample of 
local authorities’ approaches to community planning. It concludes with an 
assessment to distinguish those councils which approach community planning 
as primarily a compliance requirement (and interpret the legislation in a 
minimalist manner), and those which regard it as proving a mechanism for 
achieving enhanced community governance.  
 
Chapter 6  Governance scenarios: testing opinion 
This chapter describes and then analyses the responses received to a 
questionnaire that sought feedback on three alternative governance scenarios. 
It concludes with a discussion about whether or not one of the scenarios is 
better placed to achieve community governance than the others. The 
conclusions of this exercise contribute to the discussion on the size and 
structure dimension in Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 7 The assessment model 
This chapter applies the assessment model developed in Chapter 4. It analyses 
each of the dimensions identified in the model by reference to specific 
measures. The dimensions are assessed as being either adequate or showing 
room for improvement in relation to their ability to achieve a community 
governance approach. 
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Chapter 8 Final chapter  
This chapter summarises the research findings and proposes options for 
strengthening the ability of the New Zealand system of local government to 
adopt a community governance approach. Areas for further research are 
identified.  
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Chapter 1 The New Zealand approach to local 
government 
 
This chapter examines the New Zealand local government system, with 
emphasis on its historical development and recent reforms. It pays particular 
attention to the LGA 2002 and the degree to which changes introduced by that 
legislation have ‘set the scene’ for a model of community governance. 
 
On 25 March 2009, the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance presented 
the Governor-General, the Hon. Anand Satyanand, with its recommendations 
for the future governance of Auckland.2 A day later the commission met with the 
Minister of Local Government and the Prime Minister and provided a briefing 
which covered the main points of their nearly 800-page report. It was perhaps 
the most significant event in the recent history of local government in New 
Zealand and dominated the country’s media for days. Media interest was not 
fuelled simply by the prospect of change in the way in which Auckland might be 
governed but also by the radical nature of the commission’s recommendations. 
The commission had offered the Government an innovative model of local 
government, one that differed radically from the approach to local government 
taken since the dissolution of the provinces more than 130 years previously. 
Within days the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. John Key, reconfirmed his 
government’s intention to address the ‘problem’ of Auckland in time for the 2010 
local government elections and he asked his Minister of Local Government, the 
Hon. Rodney Hide, to prepare recommendations for consideration at the next 
cabinet meeting. These were to be recommendations that would not only take 
the commission’s proposals forward but would also address popular concerns 
about the potential loss of representation and community engagement 
contained in those proposals. 
                                                 
2
 The Royal Commission’s website, www.royalcommission.govt.nz, contains not only the final report but 
also copies of the commissioned research papers and analysis of submissions. 
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Auckland: a new focus on metropolitan governance 
 
Before the release of the report there was much speculation about whether the 
commission’s recommendations would be for one large city, on the model of 
Brisbane; for a mix of territorial authorities with a Lord Mayor responsible for 
strategic services, similar to the London Authority; or for something more like 
Vancouver, which has a plurality of local governing arrangements operating 
alongside a separate authority that undertakes metropolitan functions. 
Subsidiary questions concerned the future of community boards and local 
democracy, the appropriate models for running metropolitan utilities, and the 
appropriate borders for the new authority. In the event, the commission went for 
a model of governance that was something of a mixture of international models. 
Consistent with Brisbane, it proposed consolidation and the creation of a large 
unitary council. From London it drew on the idea of a stronger mayor. The idea 
of six subsidiary local councils was largely a unique local suggestion (although 
sub-municipal bodies are relatively common around the world. There is nothing 
quite like the model proposed). 3  
 
The goal of consolidating eight separate local authorities and creating a single 
council was radical in its own right; however, the commission’s 
recommendations on the interface between the new council and central 
government and their proposals for a more local approach to social and 
economic policy signalled a qualitatively different approach to conventional local 
government. As the commission noted: 
 
Effective regional leadership and strategic decision-making by local 
government are required … Achieving this will require the involvement of 
the multiplicity of stakeholders with an interest in the city’s success and 
must be done in active partnership with central government. Local 
government institutions must be capable of bringing together different 
                                                 
3
 Brisbane is not a unitary authority, and some of the functions that will be carried out by the new 
Auckland City (assuming it is implemented as recommended) are undertaken by the State of Queensland. 
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points of view, reaching agreement and ensuring that the resulting 
decisions are implemented (Royal Commission on Auckland Governance 
2008, p. 58). 
 
It was the nature of some of the commission’s recommendations that suggest a 
qualitatively different model of local government, one that puts more emphasis 
on place and governance at the local level. 
 
Key recommendations 
A number of the commission’s proposals were directly relevant, namely, the 
proposal for a more ‘joined-up’ approach to the provision of local services and 
an emphasis on ‘partnership’, which were intended to give Aucklanders a 
greater say in the planning and delivery of central government services in their 
city (for a summary of the commission’s findings see Appendix 3). That this was 
a new approach was particularly signalled in the commission’s 
recommendations that a partnership be developed between central government 
and Auckland’s local government to address long-term economic development. 
It was recommended that the new council include a vision for the region in its 
spatial plan, and that the mayor be required to make a ‘state of the region’ 
address annually, describing progress towards the vision. Other 
recommendations also reflected a new approach to local governance:  
• the establishment of a high level, regional, cross-sectoral advisory board 
(social issues board) comprising representatives of central government, 
local councils, business, education and not-for-profit organisations 
• the development, by the social issues board, of a social well-being 
strategy and implementation/funding plan, as well as the establishment 
of a joint officials group 
• that the Auckland City council focus on providing leadership and 
facilitating better social well-being and other well-being outcomes 
• that the Government consider aligning the geographical boundaries of 
local government and central government agencies responsible for the 
delivery of social services. 
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The commission also recommended that the Government appoint a senior 
minister as Minister for Auckland and establish an Auckland-specific Cabinet 
Committee.4 This committee would set priorities for government spending in 
Auckland and the Minister for Auckland would convene an annual forum, 
consisting of the Auckland Council and relevant interest groups, to provide 
feedback. The commission’s report signalled a different model of local 
government, one which would be explicitly concerned with bringing together the 
different agencies concerned with the governance of Auckland, particularly in 
the economic and social areas. The report, regardless of the Government’s 
response, marked an important stage in the development of local government in 
New Zealand, as it indicated that ideas about the role and purpose of local 
government had changed fundamentally. Its publication highlights an increasing 
interest in the role of local government in achieving national goals while also 
stressing the importance of greater engagement with citizens; and many of the 
recommendations, while radical in the New Zealand context, reflected 
developments that had already occurred in local government systems in other 
countries. Ultimately they represent a different way of thinking about the role 
and character of local government, one that extends beyond the boundaries of 
institutions to focus on the overall well-being of particular places. It is a model 
indebted to the idea of government as a form of governance and in particular 
community governance. The pressing question, however, is whether the Royal 
Commission’s view of local government, as a progressive contributor to 
community well-being, indicates a shift in public and official thinking about the 
role of local government. And if it does, can we take this as indicative of the 
sector’s likely future, especially the nature of future local government reform? 
To answer these questions it is necessary to go back to the start of the modern 
reform period. 
                                                 
4
 Early indications are that the suggestion of a specific Minister for Auckland and cabinet committee will 
not be actioned. In an interview with TV1 news, 7.05 am Monday 30 March 2009, the Prime Minister 
indicated a lack of support for these proposals and stated that he believed all his ministers should be 
sensitive to Auckland concerns. 
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The beginning 
 
The period since the late 1980s has been one of unprecedented change in New 
Zealand local government, which left little of the sector untouched. This flurry of 
legislative activity was intended to improve efficiency, accountability and 
responsiveness to citizens (Bush 1995, Bassett 1996, Reid 2002, Boston et al 
1996). While it is broadly agreed that local government reform paralleled public 
sector modernisation (Kelsey 1994, Boston et al 1996), it has some features 
unique to local government, particularly the desire to give citizens more say in 
the decisions made by their councils. It further diverged from the general 
direction of state sector reform, which favoured the formation of single-purpose 
agencies; in its preference for aggregating independent single-purpose bodies 
(see Appendix 1 for a list of local authorities and their populations). This chapter 
examines the three major periods of reform since 1989 and considers the 
degree to which community governance has been strengthened or weakened 
by this process.  
 
To understand the nature of the local government model that has emerged 
through this reform process, and the ideas underpinning the design, it is useful 
to consider the historical circumstances that shaped the sector’s development, 
and in particular the way which a tension between two distinct conceptions of 
local government has played out over time. According to one conception, local 
government is simply a form of local administration delivering a discrete set of 
services, which are local public goods (Kerr 2003). The other conception treats 
local government as government in the broader sense, providing members of 
communities with an institutional framework to make decisions about their 
collective future, in other words a local polity (Reid 1994, Richardson 
1999a).These two concepts set the boundaries within which local government 
policy has fluctuated over the last two decades. 
 
For most of its history, local government in New Zealand has operated with 
considerable autonomy and minimal engagement with the centre. Much of this 
can be explained by the incremental way in which the sector began, with 
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communities forming and seeking to control aspects of their environments; the 
result was a culture of strong localism characterised by a sense of collective 
self-help. The creation of multiple elected bodies by which citizens sought to 
manage local affairs set the scene for more than a century of reform efforts as 
central government sought (mostly unsuccessfully) to create more effective 
local government units with a capacity to provide a wider range of functions and 
public services.  
 
In the beginning, local government began with the imposition of British rule 
following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. The establishment of a 
network of councils with distinct responsibilities and fund-raising powers took 
some time. The Colonial Office in London was keen to replicate the local 
administrations that had emerged in the home country in its new colonies in the 
South Pacific, and instructed British governors to “divide the land into districts, 
counties, towns and townships and parishes and to promote the establishment 
of local bodies to oversee such matters as drainage” (Bush 1995, p. 11). Early 
governors, however, were not enthusiastic, citing the small number of settlers 
and the cost of such institutions, and eventually settled on a form of provincial 
government. However, in the late 1860s a consistent form of borough and 
county government began to emerge, effectively signalling the end of the 
provinces, which were officially disbanded in the mid 1870s. The 1867 
Municipal Corporations Act, for example, was the first substantial attempt at 
urban governance and provided the first comprehensive framework for 
governing the growing urban centres.  
 
Multiplication 
Despite this reluctant start, within 10 years of the passage of the Municipal 
Corporations Act there had been substantial growth in the number of elected 
forms of local governance, particularly single-purpose boards, such as road 
boards and pest destruction boards. Indeed the nature of the institutional 
framework encouraged fragmentation, with the formation of new councils being 
accelerated by the existence of government start-up grants for each new 
authority (encouraging existing authorities to subdivide in order to receive the 
grants). As a result, attempts at consolidation by the state began as early as 
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1875, but met with little success in the face of local opposition, leaving a local 
government sector in a state of “variegated fragmentation” as “provincial powers 
(were) handed to lilliputian local authorities with the centre assuming 
responsibility for the very minimum” (Bush 1995, p. 20). The extreme 
fragmentation of the sector may explain the reluctance of Parliament over the 
last century to entrust local government with more substantial policy and 
operational responsibilities, resulting in the highly centralised state that currently 
exists, particularly since the introduction of the welfare state.  
 
The failure of the governments to establish a framework for limiting the growth 
of local governments – itself a testimony to the strength of localism – persisted 
until at least the 1930s. By the end of the 19th century, the number of locally 
elected bodies, ranging from borough and county councils to pest destruction 
boards, had mushroomed to 552 (and would continue to grow). Grand plans to 
reform the sector by reducing the number of councils in order to achieve 
economies of scale and scope became common. The governments of both 
Seddon, in the mid 1890s, and Ward, a decade or so later, promoted major 
reform plans but neither secured the support of Parliament. Their lack of 
success has been partly explained by local government’s narrow task profile, 
with Easton noting: “the functions of local government were so limited relative to 
central government that there was little to be gained from a more rational 
structure” (Easton quoted in Dollery and Wallis 2001b, p. 202). “Little to be 
gained” euphemistically describes the feeling that there were few advantages to 
be gained by driving comprehensive reform, given the political pain likely to be 
created by local opposition. Consequently, governments were reluctant to 
devolve major responsibilities, such as hospitals, policing, or social security, to 
local government and progressively centralised functions regarded as nationally 
significant. Bassett explains this by suggesting that “it is very unlikely that a 
local authority that is so small that 10 percentage of its total income goes on the 
town clerk’s salary alone … can do much for its constituents; however, inspired 
the mayor and councillors” (Bassett 1996, p. 30).  
 
It is perhaps time to re-examine the conventional wisdom, by which localism is 
regarded as a problem that delayed the introduction of a more ‘rational’ form of 
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local government, particularly given the new recognition of place in governing 
(see Lyons 2007). The resistance to consolidation and national government 
intervention, which lasted at least until the introduction of the welfare state (and 
is currently found in the opposition of some rural communities at being 
combined with the new Auckland Council), should be seen as more than simply 
a form of reactionary parochialism. The growing appreciation of the value of 
localness has resulted in a new understanding of local government as a 
mechanism for the expression of community preferences, rather than a form of 
local administration delivering services on behalf of the centre. While it was 
inevitable that the state would ultimately triumph in achieving its reform 
objectives, given that it was seen as being in the national interest, consolidation 
took until the election of the fourth Labour Government in 1984 to begin in 
earnest. This was the first of three major reform phases. 
The first phase: consolidation and accountability  
 
The first phase was dominated by the decision to undertake a comprehensive 
programme of consolidation. On coming into office in 1984 the new Labour 
Government found itself forced to confront a number of major policy issues that 
concerned the fundamental character of the public sector and many of its 
macro-economic policy settings. Not only did it have an excuse to examine the 
way in which the public sector worked, it also had the parliamentary majority 
that enabled it to carry through such a mandate.  
 
The reform of local government was undertaken in the government’s second 
term and resulted from a coincidence of the presence of policy entrepreneurs 
and the opening of a policy window (Dollery and Wallis 2001a). The 
entrepreneurs, in this case the Minister of Local Government, the Hon. Michael 
Bassett, and the Chair of the Local Government Commission, Sir Brian Elwood, 
began preparing the ground for reform in the first two years of the Government’s 
first term. However, the policy window was not created until the decision by the 
Government, in its second term, to undertake a broad reform of public 
management – a move also partly driven by the impact of the 1987 sharemarket 
crash.  
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There was also pressure from the community as post-war growth in civic 
participation and activism spread to New Zealand. The apparent political 
consensus of the 1950s and 1960s began to erode in the face of community-
based political campaigns that expressed opposition to particular government 
policy and decisions. Examples included the Save Manapouri campaign 
(against a hydro-electric development with severe ecological effects), the 
Vietnam War, and sporting relations with South Africa. All signalled a resistance 
to particular policies adopted by successive governments that appeared to be 
more responsive to the objectives of their key partners, business, farming and 
organised labour organisations, than the needs of citizens.  
 
The design of the local government system that emerged out of this period of 
reform also reflected a growing disenchantment with the New Zealand 
governance model in general, a highly centralised state with a ‘winner takes all’ 
form of representation. For much of the century the New Zealand form of 
governance was a corporate form of capitalism in which the farming, business 
and labour elites would meet regularly and hammer out a mutually acceptable 
version of the good life – a system unlikely to meet the diverse needs of an 
increasingly pluralist society. It was not a surprise that the new style of local 
government that emerged after 1989 reflected concerns about governments 
that were distant and unresponsive. With its mandatory consultation 
requirements, including the preparation of public annual plans and budgets, as 
well as new neighbourhood-type political structures (community boards), the 
new local governments were required to pay a lot more attention to the needs 
and preferences of their citizens, including political participation.5  
 
The recipe for change 
The reform of local government took two distinct but related forms, the 
rationalisation of local government numbers and the introduction of more 
                                                 
5
 In the Statement on Reform of Local and Regional Government (1988) Michael Bassett, the Minister of 
Local Government, outlined his reform objectives. He envisaged providing councils with a power of 
general competence to enable them to respond flexibly and innovatively to the needs of their 
communities. His loss of office in 1990 meant that this phase was never completed until Labour’s return 
to power in 1999. 
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transparent and accountable decision-making processes – arguably the first 
stage of a process of institutional and procedural modernisation. Rationalisation 
was driven by the failure of voluntary consolidation policies and the continued 
growth in the number of elected bodies, approximately 850 (single- and multi-
purpose bodies). These were consolidated into 86 multi-purpose local 
authorities. The Local Government Commission, set up after the Second World 
War to deal with the issue of local government fragmentation but without the 
necessary ‘teeth’ to do so, was finally empowered to manage the rationalisation. 
It was required to consult councils and communities before adopting its 
schemes and completed the process in time for the 1989 local authority 
elections.6 While the commission addressed the consolidation challenge, the 
Government amended the LGA 1974 to introduce many of the organisational 
design features that were reflected in the reform of the national public sector. Its 
key high level objectives included the following: 
• that objectives should be stated in such a way that all parties providing 
public goods and services are clear about their roles 
• that accountability should be maximised, primarily by measuring and 
assessing performance against objectives 
• that competitive neutrality should minimise costs and provide incentives and 
sanctions to enhance efficiency 
• that managers should be free to manage without undue interference from 
those assigned to represent community values. 
 
The reforms ultimately represented a marriage of the two primary objectives 
driving the reform of the national public sector, efficiency and accountability 
(Boston 1991), with a third objective that had particular salience to local 
government, the enhancement of democratic participation. It also framed the 
policy tensions that would drive subsequent reforms. For example, the new 
framework sought to bolster the quality of democratic leadership while at the 
same time limiting the freedom of elected members to act as their community’s 
                                                 
6
 Set up in 1946, the commission’s powers were reduced in 1953, strengthened in 1961 and again in 1967; 
but amalgamation was left for electors’ polls to finally determine (Bassett 1996). 
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representatives by strengthening the distinction between management and 
governance. It encouraged participation and public deliberation while also 
removing a number of functions, such as ports, airports and trading enterprises, 
from the direct public or democratic domain. Finally, it constrained capacity of 
elected members to make operational decisions through the introduction of new 
planning and consultation requirements which sought to encourage a strategic 
perspective. The new approach operated within a framework which shifted the 
model of local democracy away from a purely representational one to 
something of a hybrid, informed by greater citizen participation. There were 
significant changes: 
• the introduction of formalised annual planning and budgeting  
• the publication of annual reports detailing performance 
• the introduction of formalised consultation procedures for major decisions 
• the removal of employment decisions from councils, apart from those 
regarding their chief executives 
• the separation of regulatory and non-regulatory roles  
• the separation of policy and operational roles 
• the transfer of commercial activities to ’arms-length’ entities  
• the creation of a new form of sub-municipal organisations called 
community boards 
• the creation of a national system of regional councils with responsibility 
for environmental policy and environmental management (with the 
exception of Gisborne District, which combined both territorial and 
regional functions). 
 
In short, the reforms established organisations which, unlike their predecessors, 
had the capacity and capability to think and act strategically. Equally important 
was the subsequent shift to accrual accounting and output budgeting. Both 
were necessary to provide councils with the tools to enable them to take a more 
strategic – understood as ‘steering’ – approach, with more contestability and 
more ex ante performance specification. Modernisation of the institutions and 
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processes employed by local authorities and the creation of more substantial 
local government units were perceived as the means rather than the goal of the 
process. The architect of reform, Michael Bassett, said some years later: 
 
I wanted technically stronger, functionally more efficient and politically 
more accountable local authorities with whom central government could 
discuss meaningful devolution of functions to the local level ... to move to 
the next stage which I saw as enactment of a general power of 
competence… (Bassett 1996, p. 34).  
 
The next general election defeated the Minister’s plans for completing the 
reform process and left plans for general empowerment and devolution 
unfinished. The chair of the Local Government Commission, Sir Brian Elwood, 
was less ambitious than the Minister, commenting four years after the reforms 
were completed that “there is now … a system of governance which allows the 
option of choosing a centralised, regional or local community approach to policy 
making, service delivery and political accountability” (Elwood 1993, p. 2). In the 
event it was left to the incoming National Government to explore these options, 
albeit with a different set of policy objectives.  
 
In terms of community governance, the major contribution of the 1988/89 
changes was enhanced capacity and the introduction of consultation as a way 
of strengthening voice and engagement. One measure was the establishment 
of community boards in more than 40 councils. These boards were composed 
of elected members, elected at the local authority triennial elections, and 
councillors appointed to the boards. The Local Government Commission 
justified the boards on the basis that some councils were likely to be so large 
that former communities of interest might lose representation. However, critics 
saw it as a way of buying the co-operation of small councils that were about to 
be consolidated.7 The legislation set a minimum level of functions for a 
community board which emphasised advocacy and representation; some 
councils regarded them as a useful mechanism for devolving functions so that 
                                                 
7
 Discussions between the author and officials and elected members. 
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they would be undertaken in close proximity to communities. Christchurch City 
Council made use of this opportunity to a greater degree than most other local 
authorities. However, some councils saw the boards as an unnecessary level of 
democracy and sought to remove them. In the early years, community boards 
could vote to disband themselves, and at least one council, Hauraki District 
Council, ensured that each board was allocated enough appointed councillors 
to enable them to form a majority. Within a year, each board had voted to 
disband itself. The LGA 2002 removed this method for disbanding boards and 
allowed such decisions to be appealed to the Local Government Commission, 
which was required to hold public hearings. Very few boards have been 
disbanded since that time, although some consolidation has occurred and new 
boards have also been established by the commission.  
 
The previously fragmented nature of the local system meant that some councils 
lacked the technical skills or resources to undertake an effective governance 
role. Nor were their boundaries coterminous with communities of interest, 
making effective long-term community strategies almost impossible. There was 
one area, however, where the changes might be seen as having a negative 
effect on the potential for community governance, and this was the nature of the 
newly established regional councils. The creation of regional councils, with a 
narrow focus on environmental policy (shortly to be further reduced in 1992), 
limited the ability of the New Zealand local government system to both plan and 
undertake services at a regional level – something that had already begun to 
occur through the emerging united councils. A further change that received no 
critical comment at the time was the overall reduction in the number of elected 
members and the resulting increase in the ‘representation ratio’ (see Chapter 
7). Although councils could in theory have up to 30 councillors, only one council, 
Christchurch City, had anything near that figure, with 24. The trend to reduce 
representation was carried on by decisions made by the Local Government 
Commission when undertaking its triennial representation reviews. 
 
The change of government in 1990 saw a brief halt to reform and some 
decisions were unwound, namely the reintroduction of limits on the Local 
Government Commission’s ability to initiate consolidation and a reduction in the 
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role and number of regional councils. However, it was not long before local 
government reform was once again on Parliament’s legislative agenda.  
The second phase: financial management 
 
The next significant period of local government reform occurred in 1996 with the 
passage of the Local Government Amendment Act (No. 3) 1996 (LGAA3). The 
LGAA3 introduced new and more rigorous financial management provisions. 
The Acting Minister of Local Government at the time explained the purpose of 
the bill as follows:  
 
its predominant objective is to require local authorities to identify explicitly 
the reasons for their funding proposals. This will engender public 
consultation and promote funding decisions that are clearly 
representative of the wishes and values of their communities (Graeme 
Lee MP, Hansard, 28 March 1996).  
 
While the LGAA3 was partly a local government version of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994, which had enhanced the transparency of central 
government’s financial management, it also addressed a wider set of issues 
with its requirement that councils consider the reason for undertaking each 
activity. It introduced some critical changes: 
• a requirement to prepare and adopt Long-Term Financial Strategies 
(LTFS) – 10-year plans outlining expected income and expenditure 
• a requirement to fund depreciation or any reduction in the service 
potential of assets and infrastructure 
• a requirement to develop specific funding policies for each activity based 
on an assessment of the associated public and private benefits 
• a requirement to prepare borrowing and investment strategies. 
 
An important innovation was the requirement that councils develop Long Term 
Financial Strategies. These strategies, which outlined council income and 
expenditure for each major activity for at least 10 years, were the first formal 
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requirements on councils to plan strategically on a functional basis. (They 
formed the basis of the Long Term Council Community Plan (LTCCP), which 
was introduced six years later in the LGA 2002.) While the LGAA3 gave 
councils more freedom to borrow and raise funds from capital markets (it 
abolished the Local Authorities’ Loans Board, allowing councils to raise loans 
directly from banks and financial organisations), the requirement to fund 
depreciation proved to be a major financial challenge, as many councils were 
obliged to address a backlog of deferred maintenance. The primary mechanism 
for meeting this requirement was the development of detailed asset 
management plans, a requirement few councils were able to meet at the time. 
Preparing accurate plans detailing the existing and future state of their 
infrastructure required explicit assumptions about future demand and 
development over the medium and long term. 
 
The LGAA3 continued the drive for more economic efficiency that was present 
in the earlier period of reform (Reid 2002). Two of the primary mechanisms, the 
funding policy and the LTFS, required councils to subject all activities to an 
economic analysis in order to justify continued public provision and to determine 
what form of funding or mix of funding instruments would provide the best 
match between those who funded and those who benefited from services. 
Underlying the process was the assumption that councils would gradually focus 
on those services for which public provision is most appropriate and leave those 
for which public provision was not necessary to the private or voluntary sectors.  
 
This proved a highly contentious approach as councils publicly assessed their 
roles and reasons for undertaking them, particularly traditional services such as 
libraries. The assumption behind the reforms appeared to be that the process of 
rational analysis and public scrutiny would over time reduce the range of ‘non- 
core’ council activities and increase efficiency. And that funding would shift 
progressively from ratepayers to users. The requirement created considerable 
angst as councils debated the relative public and private benefits resulting from 
each activity, deciding sometimes on wildly divergent proportions of benefit for 
the same functions. Some councils operated on the assumption that the level of 
private benefit created by an activity should also reflect the level of funding 
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sourced from user charges. Proposals to increase user charges were inevitably 
contentious and a number of councils made highly public retreats from such 
proposals, such as charges for library books. However, despite popular 
perceptions, no significant increase in user charges resulted from the LGAA3, 
although there was a notable move away from general rates towards uniform 
charges for specific services, such as water supply, libraries or waste treatment.  
 
The LGAA3 effectively built on and enhanced many of the changes introduced 
in the previous reforms, such as accrual accounting and established processes 
that would provide councils with the information to make strategic decisions 
about role and scope. It promoted the idea of the local state as an enabling 
organisation, sufficiently free of historical and political constraints to be able to 
rationally analyse its functions in terms of economic principles and determine 
how they should be funded. The new financial management provisions were 
intended to give elected members and managers the information necessary to 
encourage more strategic decisions. As a result, some councils sought to 
reinvent themselves as ‘smart purchasers’, the idea that councils should be free 
from operational commitments and ‘steer’ their communities without the 
distraction of ‘rowing’. Indeed a number of councils, such as Papakura District 
Council, became well known for their vigorous approach to contracting out their 
services to the private sector, driven by the way in which the legislation 
encouraged them to think smarter.  
 
The focus on transparency and efficiency failed to address the fundamental 
question of what objectives the councils were trying to achieve for their 
communities. Without any legislative requirement to develop strategic plans, 
councils were driven by the funding and financial needs of their asset and 
infrastructure investments. The overriding financial imperatives, of funding their 
asset management plans and dealing with historic under-investment, took 
precedence over any serious questions about the degree to which assets and 
services fulfilled broader community outcomes. In terms of any contribution to 
community governance, the LGAA3 was largely neutral, although the 
introduction of the LTFS built up a capacity and information base that placed 
councils in a much better position when it came to undertaking community 
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planning when it was introduced six years later. The Long Term Financial 
Strategy required councils to think, if not explicitly then implicitly, about the type 
of community they wished to have in the future as they debated issues around 
future levels of service. The LTFS built a capacity for long-term planning which 
is one of the preconditions for effective community governance. 
The third phase: empowerment 
 
Within four years of the enactment of the LGAA3, although less than two years 
after the date of compliance,8 a new Labour-Alliance Government had been 
elected to the Treasury benches with a manifesto promise to rewrite local 
government’s empowering legislation. It also agreed to complete the review of 
local government’s rating legislation undertaken by its predecessor and rewrite 
its electoral statute. Although the push for a substantial rewrite of the LGA 1974 
can be dated back to the 1996 Local Government Association conference,9 it 
did not achieve momentum and political endorsement until both the Labour and 
Alliance parties adopted it in their manifestos, three years later. Both supported 
a power of general competence for local government, although the Alliance was 
perhaps closer to a localist agenda than Labour. Labour stuck with the familiar 
public policy themes of transparency and responsiveness, wanting “local bodies 
to operate with autonomy and freedom within a collaborative framework that 
allows levels of government to work for the best outcomes for communities” 
(Labour Party Election Manifesto 1999). In contrast the Alliance went to the 
heart of the matter, arguing the need to: 
 
restore the autonomy, minimise central government control over local 
government affairs, and put the local back into local government [and] 
that local government functions best when local democracy and 
community self-determination are given the greatest scope (ibid).  
 
                                                 
8
 The size of the information needs required to fulfil the LGAA3 led the Government to give councils 
until July 1998 to fully comply. 
9
 The Conference resolved to ask the government to “rewrite the tablets” – the three core statutes 
governing councils’ powers, funding and electoral processes. 
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While the formation of a Labour-Alliance coalition government and their 
separate manifesto commitments provided the preconditions for another wave 
of local government reform, it took the active intervention of the Prime Minister 
to make reform one of the government’s priorities. Despite competing demands 
for time and resources, the Government agreed to hold a ‘roundtable’ meeting 
with representatives of the local government sector within three months of 
achieving office. That first meeting, branded as a central-local government 
forum and subsequently repeated every six months, resulted in a public 
commitment by the government to rewrite the Local Government Act and 
provide the necessary resources. Creating a modern, flexible statutory 
framework sat comfortably with the new government’s call to rebuild the 
capacity of the public sector generally, and especially its desire to move 
towards more collaborative and holistic (in the sense of taking into account 
social, economic and environmental matters) forms of governing.10 In its own 
words, the Government acknowledged that: 
 
the challenges facing New Zealand in areas such as sustainable 
development cannot be met by central government making decisions and 
acting on its own. They require a partnership approach within which 
central government, local government and the voluntary and business 
sectors can work together (Lee 2001, p. 13).  
 
Very quickly the review came to be situated in the post-modern discourse of 
diversity and partnership – themes consistent with the Government’s approach 
to public service as a whole and which were also reflected in the way the review 
itself was undertaken (see SSC 2001). 
 
The Government’s objectives 
While local government sought the modernisation of its primary statute in order 
to reduce complexities created by its age and history of incremental reform, the 
Government’s objectives for the review of the LGA 1974 were to enact a new 
statute which: 
                                                 
10
 See The Review of the Centre, 2001, State Services Commission, Parliament (www.ssc.govt.nz). 
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• reflected a coherent overall strategy on local government 
• involved a move to a more broadly empowering legislative framework 
under which local authorities could meet the needs of their 
communities 
• involved the development of a partnership relationship between 
central and local government 
• clarified local government’s relationship with the Treaty of Waitangi 
(ibid, p. 6). 
 
The objectives provide a useful insight into the resulting framework. The 
reference to empowering councils to meet the needs of their communities 
reinforces the long tradition of bottom-up accountability in the New Zealand 
model of local government and moves away from any perception that councils 
are an arm of national administration. The reference to a partnership between 
central and local government also appears to acknowledge that local 
government has, or should have, a capacity for independent or autonomous 
decision-making and that partnerships, by definition, can only exist when both 
partners can exercise free will. While it was not developed in the early literature 
on reform, the idea of local-central partnerships invokes the Third Way ideology 
of New Labour in the United Kingdom and the idea of ‘joined-up government’ 
(JUG). It is also one of the fundamental tenets of community governance 
theory. 
 
The idea of partnership was reflected in the review process itself. The 
Government invited local authority officials to work alongside its own officials in 
the policy development phase of the review, in which a number of joint project 
teams worked on different aspects of the draft legislation. In a further innovation 
Local Government New Zealand (the association of local authorities) was 
allowed to express its views on relevant cabinet papers on the same basis as 
government departments. This occurred in all aspects of the review, except the 
development of policy in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi, a precedent 
replicated in other policy areas, such as amendments to the Resource 
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Management Act, transport reform and the ill-fated attempt to merge the 
volunteer and professional fire services. 
 
The result of the process was the Local Government Act 2002, enacted in a 
parliamentary environment of vigorous debate, during which it was described by 
the parliamentary opposition, the National Party, as the “biggest constitutional 
change for New Zealand since the introduction of MMP” (The Independent, 27 
November 2002, p. 8).11 The Independent, a business weekly, referred to it as 
part of the Government’s “socialistic agenda” while the Northern Employers and 
Manufacturers Association speculated that “business could be faced with 
miniature Kiwibanks competing with private business” (ibid, p. 8). Geoffrey 
Palmer, a former Prime Minister and constitutional lawyer, favourably located 
the new Act in the same tradition as the “third way philosophy espoused by Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair” (ibid, p. 8). Adding to the diverse interpretations the 
legislation received, Local Government New Zealand referred to the statute as 
bringing long-awaited modernisation to the local government sector. As noted 
above, many credited it with introducing a new paradigm for local government 
(Leonard and Memon 2008, Cheyne 2008) and the changes it brought about 
were widely regarded as extensive:12 
• the replacement of a highly prescriptive statute based on ultra vires 
principles with a general empowering clause, extended to both territorial 
(district and city) councils and regional councils13 
• new purpose statement 
o to promote the social, economic, environmental and cultural well-
being of communities, in the present and for the future 
o to enable democratic decision-making and action by, and on behalf 
of, communities (s12, LGA 2002) 
                                                 
11
 MMP is the Mixed Member Proportional voting system introduced for New Zealand’s Parliament after 
a referendum in the mid 1990s. 
12
 Unlike many jurisdictions, the New Zealand practice has been to separate funding powers and general 
powers into different statutes. A new Rating Act was also enacted in 2002. 
13
 Regional councils were created in the 1989 reforms, with primary responsibilities for regional 
environmental policy and planning. Their empowerment through the LGA 2002 was greeted with dismay 
by most districts and cities, which were concerned about the possibilities of duplication and competition. 
In response, the legislation contains various checks and balances to delay/prevent an increase in regional 
functions without the agreement of cities and districts. 
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• the introduction of a set of principles including an obligation to take a 
sustainable development approach 
• a requirement to identify community outcomes in collaboration with other 
agencies, including government departments 
• more emphasis on long-term planning (a requirement to prepare a Long 
Term Council Community Plan at least every three years) and a 
corresponding diminution of annual planning 
• requirements to consider options, costs, benefits and impacts before 
making decisions, relative to the significance of the issue 
• a requirement to report every three years on the achievement of 
community outcomes 
• more emphasis on providing opportunities for citizens to participate in 
decision-making processes 
• the codification and publication of core policy documents and information 
to increase transparency 
• a requirement to build capacity and provide opportunities for Maori to 
participate in decision-making processes 
• the ability to levy developers to pay for the cost of infrastructure 
• enhanced bylaw-making powers 
• provisions to prevent the privatisation of water-related services, including 
limitations on councils’ freedom to contract out the management of water 
service networks. 
 
Many of the new provisions, such as the focus on community defined outcomes, 
well-being and collaboration, reflect themes also promoted by community 
governance theorists, particularly in the United Kingdom and codified in that 
country’s local government reforms in 2000. However, the scope of the changes 
was also influenced by historically determined factors unique to New Zealand. 
The legislation sought to marry a much broader range of policy objectives than 
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previous reforms attempted14 and has been interpreted as weakening the 
previous decade’s emphasis on efficiency (Kerr 2003). The focus on 
accountability that has infused reform since 1988/89, however, continued to be 
prominent. The Government declared in an early discussion document that:  
 
the approach being taken to the review is that the likelihood of a broader 
range of permitted activities for local government will require rigorous 
provisions for mandate and accountability to local communities. …. 
Further work being undertaken includes: 
• the potential for a strategic planning focus that articulates the 
outcomes sought from involvement in particular activities 
• the design of decision-making frameworks that focus on the 
consideration of relevant information and on high levels of 
transparency 
• the provision of understandable information to members of the 
public 
• the identification of appropriate provisions requiring public 
consultation and participation in decision-making processes that 
reflect the significance of the issue or activity concerned 
• ways of enhancing participation by and accountability to citizens 
(DIA 2000, p. 12). 
 
The Statement of Policy Direction for the Review of the Local Government Act 
1974 (DIA 2000) was the first public document of the reform process and was 
published primarily to inform the national community of the Government’s 
intentions. The statement set out the high level principles and the Government’s 
overall direction for the future shape of local government. It also explicitly 
highlighted the importance of councils having to secure a greater community 
mandate for their decisions than previously existed.  
 
                                                 
14
 For example, despite the much-heralded ‘power of general competence’ (since rebranded as ‘general 
empowerment’), the Act contains considerably more prescription – in some areas, such as water and 
water services – than in the previous ‘prescriptive’ legislation.  
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Sound processes will be required to enable councils to identify the social, 
economic and environmental outcomes that their communities want them 
to pursue. Those processes will involve councils securing a community 
mandate for activities that are intended to advance the achievement of 
particular outcomes (DIA 2000, p. 7). 
 
The emphasis on mandate reflected a widely held view, particularly among 
members of the newly elected government, that the previous decade with its 
minimalist political philosophy had diminished the efficacy of the public sphere 
and that there was a need to reinvest in the state sector. It was believed that the 
same was true of local government, particularly given some councils’ 
enthusiastic embrace of privatisation, a matter of considerable interest to the 
Minister of Local Government when she was in opposition. The example of 
Papakura District, which, as noted above, had developed a governance model 
based on the management of contracts (and was viewed as a model of good 
practice by some national business groups), simply reinforced the Minister’s 
concern that local government had been captured by the political right. The 
result was a decision by the Government to legislate to prevent councils from 
privatising their water services. The Minister’s views were also influenced by her 
experience as an Alliance councillor (a left leaning coalition of smaller parties) 
on Auckland City Council during a period when the council was dominated by a 
conservative political grouping. As a member of a left wing political group that 
was suspicious of the modernisation reforms of the 1980s, Lee found the 
Auckland City Council’s right-of-centre approach confirmation that the sector 
had lost touch with the interest of its communities. This shaped her approach to 
reform in 2002.  
 
Greater accountability to communities was reinforced with the publication of the 
Government’s second consultation document (DIA 2001), although little 
attention was given to the nature of ‘community’ and the problem of defining 
collective interests. This document, which attracted a wide range of 
submissions, provided for the first time a detailed set of proposals for the future 
     36 
shape of local government.15 It promoted an ambitious vision of an empowered 
local government system able to respond effectively to the community’s 
aspirations, in which “citizen involvement is essential to defining community 
goals and taking action to advance these” (ibid, p. 3). The emphasis on 
community outcomes was both a reference to the council’s role in setting future 
directions based on community preferences as well as a mechanism to ensure 
accountability. In fact the accountability emphasis was perhaps stronger in the 
early unpublished drafts of the Government’s discussion document, namely the 
statement:  
 
the community needs certainty about the elected council’s use of broad 
empowerment and adherence to the principles of local government. The 
community needs a minimum level of assurance about ... delivery 
intentions and what they actually deliver (Unpublished draft Discussion 
Document, April 2001).  
 
The weight the Government placed on the notion of councils providing 
assurance to the community about their intentions captures the Minister’s 
general view of councils’ performance during the 1990s, a view that was quite 
critical. 
Tracking the origins of the LGA 2002 
 
Local government reform never occurs in a vacuum. The history of local 
government reform in New Zealand has been the result of a combination of 
economic pressures, political ideology and sheer luck. It is also strongly path- 
dependent with changes constrained by existing historical influences and 
circumstances (Dollery and Robotti 2008). While the themes of accountability 
and transparency dominated the first and second phases of reform, and 
continued to influence phase three, new influences were also apparent, 
particularly the idea that local government had a role in the wider project of 
community governance (as opposed to organisational governance). While such 
                                                 
15
 In contrast to the Statement of Direction, which received relatively little publicity, over 20,000 copies 
of the Consultation Document were distributed, 26 public meetings were held and 650 submissions were 
received. 
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notions of local government’s role were widely discussed internationally, they 
were also, by the late 1990s, being openly debated in New Zealand. 
 
One such influence was a conference hosted by Christchurch City Council in 
June 1999 entitled ‘Community Governance: the Christchurch Forum’. 
Participation in the forum was by invitation only; approximately 150 attended 
made up of a cross-section of mayors, chief executives, officials and community 
representatives. The overall focus of the forum was to look at the challenges 
facing government in Christchurch, Canterbury and New Zealand; and a 
background paper, ‘Taking the Canterbury Communities into the New 
Millennium’, was prepared by the Christchurch City Council and circulated to 
participants in advance of the forum. Participants were provided with a mix of 
local and international speakers and a considerable part of the forum consisted 
of workshops based around a number of key questions. International speakers 
included Professor Michael Clarke, from Birmingham University, and Professor 
Robin Hambleton, who, more recently, has been advising the Royal 
Commission on Auckland Governance and prepared one of their background 
papers (see Hambleton 2008). Also provided to participants was a Community 
Governance Kit (Richardson 1999b), which described a new style of local 
government, one more focused on the outcomes the community wants rather 
than its traditional role as service provider.  
 
In achieving community governance the key skills lie with facilitation, 
networking, dialoguing and participation in ways that recognise that 
decision-making is spread across a range of groups and individuals 
(Richardson 1999b, p. 3).  
 
The forum focused on the pace of social change, the complexity of the issues 
facing governments at the end of the millennium and, with more than a little 
reference to the new approach to public policy being espoused by the recently 
elected Labour Government in the United Kingdom, argued that addressing 
these issues was beyond governments and markets acting independently 
(Giddens 1999). Ownership of these issues was seen to belong to the 
community as a whole. Reference was made to the need for governments, 
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local, regional and national, to provide a strategic leadership role as well as to 
acknowledge their unique mandate, derived from their democratic status. 
Interestingly, it was suggested that councils should adopt this new style of 
governance voluntarily rather than having it imposed by legislative reform, 
although providing councils with either general competence or the status of a 
legal person was recommended as helpful. Specific recommendations were 
made, such as promoting the sharing and exchange of ideas and good practice, 
providing peer support, and promoting and explaining the concept of community 
governance to groups and individuals. In addition, emphasis was given to 
facilitating a change to the relationship with central government.  While a 
proposed community governance network to promote and pursue the forum’s 
recommendations never eventuated, the momentum created by the forum can 
be seen in some of the provisions included in the LGA 2002 and ultimately the 
proposals put forward by the Royal Commission on the Governance of 
Auckland.  
 
The Christchurch forum was one of a series of influences that are likely to have 
contributed to the design and final shape of the LGA 2002, yet despite this the 
place occupied by the LGA 2002 in the history of local government legislation is 
still a matter of contention. Some writers (see Reid 2002, McKinlay 2004, 
Cheyne 2002) argue that it represents the final stage of a relatively coherent 
process of local government reform and is best understood from the overall 
perspective of public sector modernisation (see Chapter 4). Other 
commentators (see Kerr 2003) find less coherence and more often see the 
statute as diversionary and threatening to reverse what they see as advances 
achieved in the first two phases of reform. While the new statute has a level of 
coherence which was missing in its predecessors, the question relevant to this 
thesis is to determine the degree to which the theories of community 
governance might have contributed to this coherence, and whether the new 
statute has strengthened the potential for community governance.  
 
The legislation changed the purpose, principles, process and powers of local 
authorities, although not as extensively as some commentators have 
suggested, particularly those who argued it represented a major constitutional 
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change. The explicit reference to promoting well-being in the purpose 
statement, the recognition of sustainability in the principles and the requirement 
to identify community outcomes – a form of community strategic planning –
suggest an awareness of the instruments commonly associated with community 
governance. This shift in emphasis, which had been signalled in the election 
manifestos of both the Labour and Alliance parties, was subsequently 
reinforced by the proposals contained in the Government’s Statement of Policy 
Direction (DIA 2000) and Consultation Document (DIA 2001). Both reflected a 
number of key narratives, namely increasing opportunities for community 
participation, increasing councils’ accountability to communities, and 
strengthening co-ordination among public agencies. For example, the 
Government’s Consultation Document (DIA 2001) highlighted the importance of 
encouraging more engagement and participation by citizens in local government 
and flagged for the first time the concept of desired community outcomes. 
 
One of the underlying objects of the review of the LGA is to encourage 
increased participation of citizens and communities in local government. 
… Citizens and communities want to tell councils what their aspirations 
are and seek information from their councils about how these aspirations 
can be met. It is proposed that long-term council plans will include the 
identification of desired community outcomes (DIA 2001, p. 8).  
 
The rationale for such objectives was to be found in the Government’s view of 
its predecessor’s approach to local government reform. In particular it was 
convinced that the additional consultation and planning requirements, 
particularly those introduced by the LGAA3, had failed to deliver the optimal 
level of democratic responsiveness. The Minister of Local Government, the 
Hon. Sandra Lee, expressed this view in a number of speeches that were 
critical of the level of community participation in council affairs.  
 
Way back in 1995 my Department surveyed local authorities and it found 
that a significant amount (sic) of councils were still receiving fewer than 
20 submissions … I had a hunch that 5 years later many people are still 
not getting involved in local government. A quick ring around some 
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regional councils confirmed my suspicions. Only a small number of 
people are still participating in the annual planning process (Local 
Government Regional Communications Conference, Wellington, March 
2000).16  
 
The LGA 2002 sought to address the Minister’s concerns by introducing 
requirements for community-driven processes, such as establishing what 
outcomes the communities sought from their local governments and creating 
opportunities for Maori to participate in decision-making. Specifically, S82 of the 
LGA 2002, which sets out consultation principles, extends the judicial definition 
of consultation by requiring councils to be proactive in enabling affected and 
interested parties to express their views on decisions that potentially affect 
them. Higher level principles are also expressed through s14, which includes 
references to community diversity, the interests of future generations and the 
need to consider the views of communities. These provisions reflected a new 
approach to thinking about the role of local government as more than simply the 
provider of a range of discrete services. 
Redefining the concept of local government 
 
Four aspects of the new statute are particularly salient to the discussion on the 
degree to which it redesigned local government as a form of community 
governance. These are the new emphasis on well-being; broader powers; the 
LTCCP; and community outcomes. Each is discussed below. 
 
The focus on well-being  
The LGA 2002 provided councils with a new statement of purpose to promote 
their community’s social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being, now 
and for the future.17 This was a somewhat broader brief than that given to 
councils in the United Kingdom, a power of well-being that provided a 
mechanism for councils to act outside their delegated authority in order to 
                                                 
16While the Minister’s brief survey revealed that regional council annual plans received relatively few 
submissions, it was a big step to conclude that this experience was typical of the sector as a whole. Even 
at this stage the average number of submissions territorial authorities were receiving on their annual plans 
was more than 300. 
17
 Colloquially referred to as the ‘four well-beings’. 
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promote social, economic and environmental well-being. The new purpose 
introduced by the LGA 2002 applied not only to the present but also to the 
future. Although ‘well-being’ is not defined in statute the common approach 
appears to treat the phrase as representing a state of secure livelihood, health, 
safety, happiness and fulfilment in practice. Such approaches are largely 
utilitarian, taking into account how citizens feel about their communities and 
how they compare with similar jurisdictions across a number of domains, such 
as environmental quality and personal safety. 
 
In making decisions about promoting well-being and fulfilling their purpose, 
councils are expected to either contribute to enhancing all four well-being 
dimensions or make explicit trade-offs between them. For example, a decision 
to increase social well-being by increasing residential housing so as to reduce 
overcrowding is likely to have potential environmental costs, such as the loss of 
open space, natural habitats and amenity. Such trade-offs were to be 
recognised and made in an explicit and transparent way. They were also to be 
made in a manner that ensured affected communities have an opportunity to 
have their views on the matter considered, appropriate to the significance of the 
decision in question. There are frequent references to enhancing well-being 
throughout the LGA 2002, especially in relation to decision-making: 
• Section 62(1)(b) requires councils, when making decisions, to assess 
options in terms of their effects on the four well-beings. 
• Section 73(2)(a) requires councils as part of their community outcomes 
process to provide opportunities for communities to discuss their 
outcomes in terms of the four well-beings. 
• Section 82(1)(b) requires that councils include in their LTCCPs any 
significant negative effects that activities might have on the four well-
beings (LGA 2002). 
 
Promoting social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being and 
advancing community outcomes are two of the key drivers of councils’ strategic 
decision-making processes. Clarity about community preferences – ‘outcomes’ 
– is meant to ensure that councils are aware of the community’s needs and 
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preferences and provide a mechanism for aligning policies and priorities with 
resources. They do not, however, diminish the responsibility of the local 
authority to consider the impact of its activities on well-being. Councils are also 
required to use their judgement as to whether or not the outcomes specified by 
their communities are compatible with sustainable development, another 
objective of the legislation.  
 
Broader powers 
The Government’s broad vision for reform is reflected in the sweeping changes 
to local government’s powers, purpose, principles and decision-making 
processes with the new empowerment clause being particularly contentious. 
Despite local government’s status as a creature of statute, the new powers are 
widely drawn: 
 
s12(2) For the purpose of performing its role, a local authority has 
–  
(a) full capacity to carry on or undertake any activity or 
business, do any act, or enter into any transaction 
 and 
(b) for the purposes of paragraph (a) full rights, powers 
and privileges (LGA 2002) 
 
The shift from an ultra vires regime to one of general empowerment reflects a 
general reduction in legal supervision of local government by the state, of both 
an ex ante and ex post nature. Banner (2002) suggests that this decline in 
direct supervision reflects both the increasing capacity of local governments, as 
a direct consequence of consolidation, and a greater willingness by citizens 
themselves to use official mechanisms, such as judicial review, to complain if 
they feel their rights have been violated. Protecting the rights of citizens and 
ensuring councils use their ‘new’ powers wisely has been an overt consideration 
of all phases of local reform since 1988/89, but was particularly influential in the 
design of the accountability provisions in the LGA 2002, which put in place a 
framework that emphasised accountability to citizens and communities rather 
than to higher levels of government.  
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The Government’s decision to provide councils with general powers created 
concerns about accountability and mandate and whether or not local authorities 
could be trusted to use the powers wisely. Concerns about accountability, and 
in particular the potential risks that might be created by the removal of the 
doctrine of ultra vires, influenced much of the Minister of Local Government’s 
approach to the review. The Government’s first discussion paper on the review 
and the power of general competence in particular (DIA 2000), discussed the 
need to identify areas of activity from which local government should be 
excluded, suggesting areas such as the funding of core social services and the 
“conduct of New Zealand’s international relationships” (ibid, p. 8). However, the 
proposed proscriptions failed to advance as far as the publication of the second 
discussion paper, the imaginatively entitled Consultation Document (2001), and 
were not incorporated in the final statute. In the face of sector concerns that any 
list might be interpreted in a way to prevent reasonable local government 
activity, the Government relented. Yet the perception that strong checks and 
balances on the use of local government’s new powers were still needed did not 
diminish.  
 
The parliamentary opposition, along with various interest groups, vigorously 
opposed any power of general competence for councils. For example, Gerry 
Eckhoff MP, speaking on behalf of the ACT Party, began a critical press release 
with the statement, “Powers of competence damnify citizens’ rights,” and went 
on to lambaste the Government for the foolishness of giving local politicians 
such powers (ACT press release 16 July 2001).18 These views were backed up 
by interest groups like Federated Farmers and some national business lobbies 
which argued, wrongly, that business paid half the rates and should have been 
given greater opportunity to influence the final design of the legislation.  
 
The proposed power of general competence posed a dilemma for the 
Government and its officials. The prospect of such legislation increasing the 
power of local government politicians provoked critics to raise fears about 
                                                 
18
 In a possible irony, the same MP, having lost his seat in the 2002 general elections, stood for, and was 
elected onto, the Otago Regional Council in October 2007. 
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councils crowding out the private sector and acting irresponsibly with 
ratepayers’ funds.19 The Government’s challenge was to assure the public that 
councils would not ‘misuse’ their new powers, and that with power would go 
responsibility. As noted above, the Government placed great importance on 
strengthening accountability, or at least on being seen to have listened to critics. 
Consistent with this, the Minister, the Hon. Sandra Lee, stated strongly in her 
First Reading Speech that the Bill was about:  
 
the empowerment of New Zealanders within their local communities to 
exercise even greater control over their elected representatives and 
councils, and over the environments and communities in which they live 
(Lee 2001, p. 3).  
 
The point was reiterated in the Minister’s speech to Federated Farmers in 
November 2001 when she said that “transparency and accountability issues 
have formed an integral part of the review. As I have stated very clearly in the 
past …. with power must go responsibility and more accountability back to the 
community” (Hon. Sandra Lee, Novotel Hotel, Wellington, 21 November 2001, 
p. 3). The Minister’s various public statements suggested the legislation was 
primarily designed to ensure that councils were accountable to their 
communities for delivering the goods and services that their communities 
wanted, rather than allowing them to do whatever they liked. An important 
mechanism for determining their wants and preferences was the new 
requirement to identify community outcomes, providing councils with knowledge 
about the outcomes citizens aspired to. 
While the suggestion that councils should do what their communities want, as 
revealed by negotiated outcomes, had a simplistic appeal, it made a number of 
assumptions about the ability of councils to forge consensus within frequently 
very diverse places. While the final shape of the legislation avoided such crude 
linkages, the idea of the community outcomes process as an instrument of 
‘accountability’ (see below) became embedded in the resulting framework. The 
                                                 
19
 Leading those concerns was the Local Government Forum, a consortium of national business and 
farming organisations. 
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Long Term Council Community Plan (LTCCP) was to be the mechanism for its 
delivery and councils were required to show the degree to which council 
activities contributed to the achievement of community outcomes within each 
LTCCP. This accountability concept rests on the assumption that if a council 
acts in a manner contrary to the will of the community (as expressed in 
statements of desired outcomes) sufficient information will be available for the 
discrepancy to be apparent, subject to local debate, and ultimately resolved in 
the next election.  
 
While the new powers provide a more empowering environment for councils in 
New Zealand, it is important not to overstate the limitations of the previous 
statute, which, despite its highly prescriptive nature, contained clauses that 
gave councils wide discretion. Although councils had won additional freedoms 
with the LGA 2002 (at the cost of new procedural requirements), some things 
had not changed. Their range of policy and functional responsibilities remained 
the same and there was little promotion of devolution – indeed centralising 
pressures to standardise the delivery of local services continued to increase. 
Faced with more complex and expensive procedural requirements, many rural 
councils, quite comfortable with their historical role, wondered what they had 
gained other than more compliance. For many, the more limited framework of 
the LGA 1974 was entirely sufficient, particularly given their emphasis on local 
infrastructure, and they saw little reason to congratulate the reformers. To such 
councils many of the new LGA 2002 requirements, such as community strategic 
planning and taking a sustainable approach, presented an unwelcome 
change.20  
 
The Long Term Council Community Plan 
The key mechanism for promoting well-being and sustainable development 
under the LGA 2002 is the LTCCP and its particular approach towards 
organisational and community strategic planning. The LTCCP is an 
enhancement of the Long Term Financial Strategy (LTFS) introduced by the 
National Government in 1996 (the LGAA3). It incorporates the key features of 
                                                 
20
 Conversations between the author and a number of rural mayors. 
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the LTFS, on which were grafted greater process and information requirements. 
It is now the primary driver of local government strategy, in the sense of longer-
term planning, and there is a statutory obligation for councils to review and 
adopt an LTCCP at least once every three years. The stated purpose of the 
LTCCP is to: 
• set out the community outcomes and the local authority’s intended 
contribution to those outcomes 
• set out the things the local authority will be doing over the life of the plan 
• co-ordinate the activities of the local authority 
• provide a long-term focus for the local authority 
• provide a means for communities to hold the local authority accountable 
• provide an opportunity (potentially the primary opportunity) for the public 
to participate in local decision-making (LGNZ 2003, p. 32). 
 
The LTCCP must also be adopted in accordance with the special consultative 
procedure, with consultation required during each stage of its preparation.21 
This last requirement ensures that citizens’ input will be more extensive in the 
early stages of development than occurred under the previous long-term 
planning framework, the LTFS. The LTCCP can be seen as a kind of proxy 
contract between a council and its community – outlining in detail where a 
council is heading, how it will get there, how it will fund the journey, and the 
rules and processes that will apply. It was also meant to address a weakness in 
the previous framework which was seen to overemphasise short-term planning 
due to the dominant role played by the annual plan in council business.22 Under 
the new framework annual planning was intended to become little more than 
consultation over the annual budget, as no major change can be undertaken 
without triggering a full LTCCP review.  
 
                                                 
21
 The Special Consultative Procedure was introduced in 1989 as a statutory consultative process that 
must be used when councils adopt their annual plan or other major and significant decisions. 
22
 Indeed one local authority, New Plymouth District, has recommended to the government that the 
requirement to consult on the annual plan be dropped, as consulting raises expectations in communities 
that they will be able to make changes, which is unrealistic within the LTCCP framework. 
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The LTCCP is, in short, something of a hybrid, part corporate plan and part 
strategic plan, while also providing a snapshot of the council’s strategy and 
policy development at a point in time. An innovative measure introduced by the 
LGA 2002 required each draft LTCCP to be reviewed by the Office of the 
Controller and Auditor-General and to contain a statement about the degree to 
which the assumptions the plan is based on are reasonable. However, the 
administrative demands involved in its preparation and the cost of audit 
clearance have been major financial issues for many councils and threaten to 
overshadow the audit’s intended strategic focus. As well as the core strategic 
document for the district/region, it is also the primary document for a number of 
other objectives:  
• financial accountability 
• political accountability 
• transparency 
• meeting obligations to Maori  
• stewardship of public assets and infrastructure  
• co-ordinating service providers to contribute to community outcomes. 
 
Once a plan has been adopted, the ability to change course is very limited 
unless a council is prepared to undertake the expense of reviewing its LTCCP 
before the statutory review deadline of three years has passed.23 Its 
comprehensive nature reflects the importance the Government has placed on 
long-term planning and greater certainty of investment intentions, particularly 
with regard to investment and maintenance of infrastructure and the state of 
local public assets. A critical aspect of the new planning model, however, is the 
requirement to identify community outcomes, state and describe how they were 
identified in the LTCCP, and show how council activities will contribute to the 
achievement of the outcomes. It represents a strongly rationalist conception of 
public decision-making involving the articulation of ends (outcomes) and 
                                                 
23
 In what was probably an oversight the LGA 2002 requires a full audit of the LTCCP whenever an 
amendment is made, however minor. This has since been removed with the passage of the LGA 2002 
Amendment Act No. 3.  
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ensuring the ability to debate and make meaningful choices between different 
strategies for achieving those ends. 
 
Community outcomes  
The need to provide communities with better information so as to hold their 
councils to account and plan for the future was a frequent theme in the 
development and promotion of the new legislation. For example, in her first 
reading speech the Minister of Local Government, Sandra Lee, claimed that: 
 
to be successful councils must in the future be driven less by a need for 
strict compliance with a detailed statute, and more by the need to deliver 
results that local communities demand (First Reading Speech, December 
2001).  
 
The requirement itself is written in broad terms and requires councils to conduct 
a process, not to produce a particular document or plan (see Figure 1). The 
purpose of undertaking the outcomes process can be traced back to many of 
the themes that surrounded the Government’s rationale for the review of the 
LGA 1974. It is to: 
• provide opportunities for communities to discuss their desired 
outcomes in terms of the present and future social, economic, 
environmental and cultural well-being of the community 
• allow communities to discuss the relative importance and priorities of 
identified outcomes to the present and future social, economic, 
environmental and cultural well-being of the community 
• provide scope to measure progress towards the achievement of 
community outcomes 
• promote better co-ordination and application of community resources 
• inform and guide the setting of priorities in relation to the activities of 
the local authority and other organisations (s73, LGA 2002). 
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The legislation is quite specific in describing the role councils should play in the 
outcome identification process. Councils must identify, and then invite, other 
organisations, those able to influence outcomes, to assist in the design of the 
process for outcomes identification. The process must be undertaken at least 
once every six years. The way in which the legislation attempts to place the 
community (as represented by, for example, the not-for-profit and business 
sectors) in the decision-making role ahead of councils and elected members 
raised immediate questions about the relative merits of representative and 
participatory democracy. 
Figure 1 Long Term Council Community Planning framework  
 
(Source: adapted from Local Futures’ unpublished Local Futures Working 
Paper) 
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The decision to incorporate community outcomes into councils’ long-term 
planning processes was intended to address a perceived weakness in the Long 
Term Financial Strategy (LTFS) framework. Advice to Cabinet’s Policy 
Committee described the LTFS as providing: 
 
(c) a financial context for particular council activities but not 
recognis(ing) and integrat(ing) the Council’s social, cultural 
and environmental reasons for undertaking activities. As a 
result, the way that these social, cultural and environmental 
plans and activities fit into the whole Council programme is 
not clear. This approach does not provide elected 
representatives with the information they need … (Council 
Planning and Decision-Making Processes, POL Min (01) 
12/17, 18 May 2001). 
 
In the cabinet’s mind the shortcoming of the LTFS was its failure to provide a 
strategic context, such as the desired outcomes, for which council assets are 
held and which would allow decision-makers and the public to make informed 
judgements about the levels of service that such assets should provide. The 
Cabinet Policy Committee was concerned that the LTFS placed too much 
reliance on fiscal considerations and that there was a need for balance with 
social, cultural and environmental considerations. It believed that councils 
should be engaging in dialogue with their communities and that local 
government was a crucial leader in determining how community assets should 
be used. In their view elected representatives should be able to decide between 
doing things because it is the most efficient way of resolving an issue and doing 
them because the community has other values, such as cultural concerns or a 
focus on jobs. The Long Term Council Plan (LTCP)24 was proposed so that 
councils could group together all of the things they currently do, or plan to do, to 
improve the future of the community and manage the assets of that community 
in an integrated way.  
 
                                                 
24
 The Long Term Council Plan evolved into the Long Term Council Community Plan. 
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Having established a broad empowering framework and requiring councils to 
facilitate a process to discover their various communities’ outcomes, the 
Government then appears to have had a failure of nerve. Despite the prescribed 
processes and frameworks, the outcomes are given little status other than a 
requirement that councils must show how their activities contribute to them. It 
begs the question as to which agency should now be responsible for achieving 
these outcomes – it was not clear that it should be local government. 
 
The Government’s Consultation Document (DIA 2001) expressed the idea of 
desired community outcomes in the context of council planning, consultation 
and reporting. Unlike the earlier publication, the Statement of Policy Direction 
(DIA 2000), it clearly states the purpose of the review as “to encourage 
increased participation of citizens and communities in local government” (DIA 
2001, p. 37). If participation was to increase, the community would need 
information from councils about what they intended to do and deliver. It is 
interesting to note that over the two-year period during which the LGA 2002 was 
developed, the proposition that the process of identifying desired community 
outcomes will increase community engagement and consultation became 
increasingly more prominent in the Government’s policy documents. From an 
initial focus on steering and accountability the Government’s agenda expanded 
to include the desirability of greater citizen participation.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the wording of s91 of the LGA 2002 is framed so as to 
require the creation of opportunities to actively participate rather than consult. 
While the statute contains a detailed set of consultation principles (s82, LGA 
2002) the legislation does not specifically refer to consultation when addressing 
the role of the public in the process of identifying community outcomes – 
preferring a more discretionary and ultimately less compliance-orientated 
framework. Between the introduction of the requirement to consult on specific 
types of decisions in the first phase of reform in 1988/89 and the emergence of 
a legal definition of consultation, concerns had arisen that council approaches 
to consultation were more concerned with statutory compliance and meeting the 
legal definition than with the spirit of the legislation. By avoiding the language of 
consultation and settling for a more general requirement that the process should 
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allow communities to contribute to the identification of outcomes, the legislators 
sought to encourage a process that would be more responsive to community 
diversity and less likely to be compliance focused. 
 
A critical reason for the Government’s decision that councils identify community 
outcomes was to enable communities, as well as elected members and 
stakeholders, to assess the council’s performance towards enhancing well-
being and achieving outcomes. This objective fulfils a number of familiar 
purposes such as enhancing transparency, strengthening accountability and 
enabling communities and others to make informed judgements about progress 
towards a future which, if the purpose of local government according to the Act 
is met, should be sustainable. In this way the accountability theme represents a 
continuation of the changes introduced in 1988/89, and in particular the 
influence of New Public Management (NPM) theory, which sought to bring 
private sector management techniques into the public realm. 
 
The focus on identifying outcomes and reporting on progress towards their 
achievement is consistent with the objectives of greater transparency and 
accountability. It is also, and this reflects one of the tensions in the legislation, 
indebted to community governance theory, much of which was a reaction to the 
managerialism of NPM. This tension partly explains the range of experiences 
identified in the case studies of community planning (see Chapter 5) with some 
councils looking to exploit the community governance potential and others 
treating community outcomes as only a compliance requirement. The LGA 2002 
approach mirrors the requirement placed on councils in the United Kingdom to 
participate in Local Strategic Partnerships and develop sustainable community 
strategies, a core feature of community governance. Yet in both countries the 
multi-faceted nature of outcomes means that councils cannot achieve outcomes 
by themselves. The contribution of many agencies, as well as individual volition, 
is required. 
 
The requirement to identify community outcomes in order to strengthen 
accountability also fits clearly with what might be described as the strong 
localist tradition of New Zealand local government, which emphasises 
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accountability to communities rather than to the Crown. This is in stark 
comparison with local government in the United Kingdom, which is strongly 
accountable to Whitehall-based officials.25 In early advice to the New Zealand 
government on the local government review, officials described accountability 
as involving the availability of information about what is being done and its 
expected consequences and noted that participation and consultation are 
important elements of increasing community capacity to influence decision-
making (Working Paper ‘Local Government Act Review – An Overview of Key 
Issues’, DIA, 18 December 2000). If the idea of accountability to communities 
was to work, even in an environment in which councils have been given greater 
freedoms, then transparency, participation and process would need to be 
enhanced, particularly if the overall outcome was better quality of life for 
communities.  
 
A different form of accountability was also introduced by the requirement that 
draft LTCCPs be subject to audit in order to review the reliability of the 
information on which the plans were based. The audit of the LTCCPs – each 
draft LTCCP receives an audit clearance or qualification – was justified as a 
form of accountability as it was expected to contribute to citizen confidence in 
local governments’ decision-making processes. The external audit process has 
been controversial from the moment it was introduced, primarily for the cost, 
which, for a small council, can represent the equivalent of a 2 per cent rise in 
the rates bill for that year. Yet the process of subjecting draft plans to close 
inspection by auditors, who check that assumptions are reasonable and that 
statutory provisions, particularly in financial management, performance 
management and asset management, are met has resulted in a substantial 
improvement in the quality of the plans (OAG 2010). 
 
The requirement to identify community outcomes is also one of the primary 
mechanisms for realising the government’s objectives for enhancing co-
ordination, addressing fragmentation and improving collaboration between 
                                                 
25
 In contrast, the performance of local government in the United Kingdom is assessed against a suite of 
nationally determined indicators – the comprehensive performance assessment, on which basis all 
councils are ranked from low to excellent. 
     54 
agencies. It is perhaps the most important feature to those who argue that the 
LGA 2002 represents a model of community governance. The legislation places 
emphasis on the need for councils to provide opportunities for other agencies, 
such as non-governmental organisations, public agencies, and business 
organisations, to influence the design of the process by which they intend to 
identify outcomes. The concept was explicitly endorsed by the then Minister for 
Social Development, Steve Maharey, who described the community outcomes 
process as “strengthening the whole of government collaborative activity”, and 
said that “this is already happening in many local authority areas” (quoted in 
McKinlay 2004, p. 79).  
 
Addressing the significance of the new outcomes’ requirement, McKinlay (2004) 
argues that the outcomes process is a whole-of-community strategic planning 
approach and represents a “fundamental shift from conventional local authority 
planning and consultation” (ibid, p. 13). In his view the new Act, underpinned by 
the community outcomes process, is a departure from previous regimes, in 
which the core business of councils was the provision of infrastructure, arts, 
culture and recreation facilities. He argues that, in order to achieve this model, 
councils would need to become actors in the broad range of issues affecting 
their communities, including those where they currently have a minor or no role 
as a service provider. While the provision was undoubtedly a new requirement 
(an impost in the view of many) for most councils, it can also be seen as simply 
formalising what had become best practice, particularly the innovative multi-
agency approaches to strategic planning undertaken by councils such as 
Manukau and Porirua.26 The LGA 2002 framework built on their experience and 
sought to encourage councils to work with other public and non-public agencies 
on the resolution of local and regional issues, whether they wanted to or not.27  
                                                 
26
 During the review process government officials sought a briefing from officials from both councils 
about their approach to strategic planning. 
27
 The LGA 2002 was passed in an environment of increasing awareness of the value of networks and 
joined-up government (Ryan 2003) and this new emphasis can also be seen as part of an historical 
pattern. Gill (2008), for example, argues that the election of the Labour Government in 1999 signalled a 
third phase in the nature of public administration in New Zealand. Phase one, 1912-1984, represented 
governance by hierarchies; 1984-1999, governance by markets and contracts; 1999-2008, governance by 
networks, hierarchies and communities. 
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The impact of reform on intergovernmental relationships  
 
The concept of governance (see Chapter 2) highlights the importance of 
collaboration, agencies working in alignment to achieve common objectives. It 
has relevance to the relationship between local and central government. This is 
not an issue that received much, if any, attention in the first two phases of local 
government reform. That focus was primarily concerned with the performance 
of the sector and, despite radical change, the way in which local and central 
government related was left largely untouched. The LGA 2002 changed this, not 
dramatically but enough to make the issue of intergovernment relationships an 
ongoing matter of policy interest in both spheres of government. The result was 
a series of initiatives and institutional arrangements that, despite criticism that 
they did not go far enough (see Thomas and Memon 2007, Local Futures 
2006), were quite unique for the New Zealand constitutional arrangement. 
 
The historical relationship between local and central government in New 
Zealand, from its emergence in the mid 19th century to radical reform at the end 
of the 20th century, can be summed up as one of benign neglect or resigned 
failure. The difficulties faced by successive governments since the late 19th 
century to implement a systemic programme of reform is well documented; 
however, following the major reforms of 1988/89 Parliament has been unusually 
focused on local government and its activities, as has also occurred throughout 
much of the OECD (Sullivan et al 2006). Unlike the European model, the New 
Zealand state, particularly since the 1930s, has been strongly centrist, with a 
preference for national solutions to social and economic problems. With the ‘big’ 
issues like welfare, education and justice firmly in the hands of the centre, there 
has been little national interest in the specifics of local government activity (Reid 
1999). The big local government expenditure items were largely underground 
and relatively inelastic – roads, drainage, water supply systems – which meant 
that Parliament generally left councils to get on with the business of their 
operation with little interference, which perhaps explains the high level of 
financial and functional autonomy of the New Zealand local government model. 
Had New Zealand councils been responsible for the provision of social services, 
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which are more likely to attract the interest of rent-seeking groups, arguably 
parliamentary interest would have been that much greater. 
 
Whose outcomes? 
One of the challenges faced in any alignment process involves articulation of 
goals. How well do the participating sectors articulate their desired outcomes? 
The modernisation of the New Zealand public sector achieved considerable 
clarity around output specification and accountability for delivery; it was less 
successful when it came to providing a whole-of-government response to 
issues. As early as 1991 Basil Logan diagnosed a lack of effective strategy 
formulation as a problem for the new approach to public management (Boston 
et al 1996). The government’s initial response to this challenge was a document 
entitled ‘The Path to 2010’, adopted in 1993, which contained a strategic vision 
for New Zealand organised around a number of Strategic Result Areas (SRAs). 
SRAs were in effect outcomes and one of their effects was to provide officials 
with a clear indication of the government’s priorities. These areas were 
subsequently elaborated to translate the vision into a focus for departmental 
activity by adding Key Result Areas (KRAs); these were incorporated in 
departmental Statements of Intent (SOIs). KRAs had a three-year focus and 
were designed to correspond with the life of chief executives’ performance 
agreements. The SRAs, despite their national focus, anticipated many of the 
outcomes that have since emerged in councils’ community outcomes 
processes, nearly a decade later. SRAs covered economic growth, enterprise 
and innovation; external linkages; education and training; community security; 
social assistance; health and disability services; Treaty settlement claims; and 
the environment. Each also contained a description of desired outcomes and a 
list of related activities for the following three years.  
 
The adoption of SRAs was a response to concerns about a lack of a strategic 
focus, fragmented government and consequential policy risk. At about the same 
time, councils were starting to comply with the requirement to produce a Long 
Term Financial Strategy (LTFS). Introduced by the LGAA3, it was largely asset-
driven with little obvious fit with the Government’s SRA framework; however, 
enterprising councils, such as Manukau City Council, attempted to use SRAs as 
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a statement of government policy and endeavoured to make explicit links with 
their own strategy documents, such as in the area of economic development. 
However, other than Manukau City’s innovative response, the strategic planning 
approaches of the two spheres of government operated largely independently, 
contributing to a perception that public services lacked strategic co-ordination. It 
also raised the question of whether or not, and if so how, local and central 
government should be working in alignment. 
 
While government agencies were developing their internal strategies for 
engaging with local authorities and ways to relate to 85 diverse and 
autonomous bodies (the amalgamation of Banks Peninsula District and 
Christchurch City in 2005 reducing the total to 84), the local government sector 
was more concerned with how to determine which government departments 
and agencies were appropriate to approach as participants in the community 
outcomes identification process and whether or not there were relevant national 
outcomes or strategies that they should take into account.  
 
While both central and local government use outcome-based planning models, 
the approaches are quite different (the incoming Labour-led Government in 
1999 decided not to continue the SRA/KRA framework of its predecessor). 
Central government has no overriding obligation to promote the four well-
beings, and to the degree which these objectives are shared between local and 
central governments is a matter for the political preferences of the government 
of the day. Questions also arose about which sector’s outcomes or objectives 
should take precedence. In those policy areas where central government has 
clearly defined outcomes and strategies there is no necessary assumption that 
they should override locally determined versions, particularly if they conflict. 
However, in the first few years following the passage of the LGA 2002 the 
immediate challenge was finding the right agency to engage with around the 
community outcomes process. 
 
Community outcomes set the context for intergovernmental collaboration and, in 
theory at least, the process provided a basis for government agencies and 
councils to establish dialogue on priorities and roles. Yet co-operation was 
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ultimately contingent on the political commitment of the institutions and their 
institutional capacity and capability – the success of any collaboration reflecting 
the willingness of agencies to subordinate their own agency’s goals to the goals 
of the community, or in some cases the nation. Clarification came in June 2004 
when cabinet agreed on the level and nature by which central government 
agencies were to engage in the community outcomes process – an essentially 
voluntary basis, as cabinet noted: 
• There is no specific level or type of engagement required by 
departments, rather departments who engage in community outcomes 
processes will determine their appropriate level of participation. 
• Ministers will still retain responsibility for the government’s policy goals 
and priority outcomes, and decision-making authority over the allocation 
of public resources in relation to those goals and priorities (POL Min (04) 
12/15, CAB Min (04)18/4). 
 
While government departments continued to worry about how to relate to 
numerous local authorities, councils were puzzling about how to recognise the 
Labour-Alliance Government’s own strategic goals. Without an explicit 
statement of Strategic Result Areas such as those employed by their 
predecessors, where should they look? Are departmental objectives the 
equivalent of government objectives? What constitutes a high level whole-of-
government objective anyway? Apart from a brief list of election commitments 
(the pledge card), the first few years of the Labour-led Government were 
characterised more by pragmatism than explicit high level policy direction. The 
vacuum came to be populated by the development of what might be termed 
‘meso-strategies’ in that they sought to achieve mid level, medium-term policy 
goals or outcomes.  
 
Meso-strategies represent an attempt to build a whole-of-government 
commitment to an intermediate purpose and to the degree that they are broadly 
focused and properly mandated they can provide public signposts to the 
government’s middle-term aspirations. Meso-strategies adopted by the Labour-
led Government that had some relevance to local government included the 
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Sustainable Development Plan of Action, the Growth and Innovation 
Framework, the Transport Strategy and, in the social domain, Opportunity for all 
New Zealanders. Given the emphasis on taking a sustainable development 
approach within the LGA 2002, the Sustainable Development Programme of 
Action (POA) also provided a good example of government strategy-making 
that had the capacity to influence local outcomes. The POA was an umbrella 
strategy with four discrete areas – sustainable cities, energy, child and youth 
development, and water. In each of these areas the role of local government 
and the importance of working collaboratively were acknowledged, although 
with varying degrees of commitment. For example, in respect of water the POA 
states: 
 
There are a significant number of stakeholders at the local, regional and 
national levels with an interest in water issues. … There is a need for 
robust decision-making, particularly by regional councils, who are 
responsible for the key resource management decisions and 
consideration of the values of the different stakeholder groups. Strong 
partnerships with local government, central government agencies, 
industry, Maori, and the community are therefore desirable to create 
innovative and enduring approaches to managing our water resources 
(POA 2003, p. 14). 
 
The sustainable cities strand was also relevant to local government and 
advanced, for a time, under the leadership of the Ministry for the Environment. 
The POA set out two overarching outcomes in this area: 
• cities as centres of innovation and economic growth 
• liveable cities that support social well-being, quality of life and cultural 
identities. 
 
Under this umbrella the strategy addressed a wide range of urban issues, such 
as migrant settlement, urban form, design and development, Auckland’s 
regional economic development, and sustainable communities. Unfortunately, 
the Ministry for the Environment’s intention to develop a statement of strategic 
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priorities was not completed in time to influence councils’ 2006-16 LTCCPs, 
thus diminishing the potential of the strategy to achieve more effective 
alignment.  
 
The Ministry of Social Development leads the child and youth development 
strand, and although councils are only providers of services at the margin, they 
are recognised throughout. In bringing together previous strategies, such as the 
Agenda for Children and the Youth Development Strategy, the department’s 
new meso-strategy, ‘Opportunity for all New Zealanders’, made specific 
reference to the role of councils. The strategy provided a mandate for Ministry 
of Social Development officials to promote child and youth issues in community 
outcomes processes facilitated by councils throughout New Zealand. 
 
Departmental initiatives 
Intergovernmental collaboration was signalled early in the local government 
reform process. One of its review objectives was “The development of a 
partnership relationship between central and local government” (DIA 2001). The 
idea of a partnership relationship contrasted sharply with the practice of its 
predecessor during the 1990s. Following enactment of the LGA 2002, the 
Government adopted a number of measures to facilitate engagement between 
its own agencies – primarily departments and Crown entities – and councils. Its 
approach gave departments and agencies the right to negotiate relationships 
relevant to their briefs. Four departments were each given the authority to take 
the lead in the four well-being areas; these were the Ministry for Culture and 
Heritage, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Social 
Development and the Ministry for the Environment. Each was allocated the well-
being corresponding with their portfolios. 
 
The nature of the engagement between government departments and local 
governments reflected a range of styles from active to largely passive (see 
Table 3). For example, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, which has no 
regional presence, held a series of regional workshops for councils attended by 
its chief executive; the Ministry for the Environment held a travelling roadshow, 
while the Ministry of Economic Development, which was similarly mandated, 
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simply provided additional information designed for local authorities on its 
website. In contrast the Ministry of Social Development established a series of 
regionally based offices with considerable delegated authority and 
encouragement to work with councils on collaborations to address social issues. 
A number of other departments and Crown entities have also sought to build 
relationships with councils, particularly since the passage of the LGA 2002, for 
example, the Human Rights Commission, which regards local government as 
an important/useful mechanism for strengthening commitment to gender and 
racial equality. Individual departments and ministries were left to decide for 
themselves the degree to which collaborating with councils would assist in 
meeting their outcomes and agencies were encouraged to adopt innovative and 
entrepreneurial engagement strategies. Initially there were concerns about the 
capacity of departments and agencies to engage with all 85 local authorities 
and the cost of doing so. In order to address such concerns councils were 
encouraged to either cluster together to facilitate co-operation or work under the 
umbrella of their regional councils. In fact, at least one of the lead government 
ministries – the Ministry of Economic Development – decided to limit its 
engagement to the regional sphere of local government. 
 
Table 3 Examples of engagement initiatives 
• DIA local government interface facilitation team 
• Deputy Secretaries Group 
• Ministry for Culture and Heritage roadshows 
• Ministry of Social Development (MSD) regional policy advisers 
• Publication by MSD of a Good Practice Guide for Working with Local 
Government 
• Whole-of-government strategies such as the Growth and Innovation 
Framework 
• Ministry of Economic Development’s web-based tool kit 
• MSD’s Good Practice Guide for Working with Local Government 
• Human Rights Commission workshops for local authorities 
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Despite the lack of a coherent whole-of-government approach, a number of 
departments appear to have recognised opportunities for creating synergies 
with local authorities. The Ministry of Social Development, the Police and Fire 
Service have all been among the more active, exploring the potential for 
councils to contribute towards achieving their departmental outcomes and 
working with councils to achieve community outcomes.  
 
Encouraging collaboration 
In practice, engagement arose from councils’ requests and government 
initiatives, despite the institutional difficulties, which were substantial. For 
example, central government agencies are organised very differently from 
councils; the process of responding to council requests stretched some 
agencies, and their cultures can also be very different, with a less clear 
boundary between the political and administrative spheres in local government. 
To assist collaboration cabinet established a Deputy Secretaries Group (see 
Figure 2) as a mechanism for achieving a whole-of-government agreement 
towards the mechanics of central-local collaboration. In addition the Department 
of Internal Affairs established a regional team of officials, the local government 
interface facilitation team, which was given responsibility for promoting better 
engagement between the two sectors.28 
 
                                                 
28
 The interface group was disbanded within the first year of the National-led Government in 2009 as part 
of its cost-cutting strategy. 
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Figure 2 Structure of inter-agency initiatives 
 
The framework described in Figure 2 highlights the significance of the Central 
Local Government Forum, a six-monthly meeting between the cabinet and the 
board of Local Government New Zealand, representing the local government 
sector. The forum is relatively unique by international standards in that it creates 
a space in which representatives of the two sectors can meet and engage in 
dialogue as equals.29 Historically, local government concerns have been (and 
still are throughout most of the year) dealt with by the Minister of Local 
Government, a position that is normally lowly ranked in terms of cabinet 
seniority and which in practice is concerned with the management of the 
relationship in order to reduce political risk.30 With the establishment of the first 
forum in March 2000 the local government sector discovered a mechanism for 
bypassing the institutional filters that operate within departments and was able 
to raise concerns directly with appropriate ministers, who, under the watchful 
gaze of the Prime Minister, were frequently tasked with finding solutions.  
 
One of the results of the forum has been a tendency to refer issues to joint 
officials’ groups in an explicit recognition that many of the problems faced by 
local government require a joined-up approach. Two examples are worth noting, 
                                                 
29
 The National-led Government has reduced the frequency of the forum to one a year. 
30
 After the 2008 elections the post of Minister of Local Government was given to a minor party in the 
coalition and placed outside cabinet. 
Central Local Government Forum 
Deputy Secretaries Group 
Central Local Officials Group on Sustainability 
(CLOGS) 
Other regional forums e.g. 
COBOP, Northland Inter-
sectoral Forum, Hutt 
Governance Group 
Central Government Inter-
Agency Group (CGIG) 
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the Central Local Officials Group on Sustainability (CLOGS) and the Social 
Sector Forum, the latter being a bi-monthly meeting involving representatives of 
the major urban councils and social policy ministries that share practice on 
topical social issues, such as family violence, tagging, alcohol and social 
housing (the forum was discontinued by the National-led Government in late 
2009). Another example of joint working occurred at the 2005 forum. Following 
concerns raised by local government presenters at the financial pressures faced 
by councils it was agreed to establish a joint officials’ group to examine the 
sustainability of local government funding. Though the group reported back in 
2006, its work was soon overtaken by the Local Government Rates Inquiry, 
which was undertaken by an independent task force established that same year 
(DIA 2007). The importance placed on better engagement also led to the 
Deputy Secretaries Group agreeing to a series of regional meetings with local 
government chief executives to enable better communication. As of the 
beginning of May 2008 two such regional meetings had been held, in Otago and 
Canterbury. 
 
Innovative approaches to alignment 
A number of city, district and regional councils found innovative ways to align 
their various planning and strategic documents, some of the most innovative 
involving regional clusters of councils. The Taranaki region, for example, sought 
to use the community outcomes process as a mechanism for aligning public 
providers. Using various techniques, including surveys, public meetings and hui 
(normally used to describe meetings held in marae, traditional meeting places 
for Maori, the consortium of councils involved in the outcomes process set 10 
outcomes, which were ranked for priority and analysed to determine which 
public agencies in the region should have lead responsibility for achieving them. 
The Taranaki model (see Table 4) can be thought of as a network with 
individual agencies pursuing their own goals within a collaborative framework. 
The decision to build the collaboration around agreed community outcomes and 
defined lead agency status provides an effective illustration of the model of 
community planning as it has emerged under the LGA 2002, including the 
facilitative nature of the local government role.
     65 
Table 4 Taranaki outcomes and lead agency 
 Outcomes ranked by importance Lead agency 
1 Acceptable level of/access to local 
health services 
District Health Board 
2 People feel safe in Taranaki Police 
3 Quality of streams, rivers and lakes Taranaki Regional Council (TRC) 
4 Education/training opportunities Education Taranaki (cluster) 
5 Road access to/from Taranaki Transit/Land Transport NZ 
6 Protect quality of water around 
coast 
TRC 
7 Higher levels of employment Venture Taranaki, the Economic 
Development Agency (EDA) 
8 Natural character of coastline New Plymouth District Council with 
TRC and Dept of Conservation 
(DOC) 
9 More prosperous regional economy Venture Taranaki (EDA) 
10 Protect native bush and wildlife TRC with DOC 
 
(Source: New Plymouth District Council, 2006, 
www.communityoutcomes.govt.nz)  
 
More than 200 agencies were involved in the process of determining outcomes 
in the Taranaki region. A core group was established to supervise the 
identification process and promote their achievement. The core group, Future 
Taranaki, involved major public agencies, such as the Department of 
Conservation and the Ministry of Social Development, the local authorities, and 
representatives of voluntary and not-for-profit organisations, tertiary education 
providers and Federated Farmers. Having identified a set of regional outcomes, 
Future Taranaki next focused on monitoring the degree to which they were 
being achieved, and monitoring reports have been published annually (see 
http://www.trc.govt.nz/Future-Taranaki/). 
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The Taranaki example indicates that collaboration based around local and 
nationally agreed outcomes is possible, although there is no necessarily correct 
formula for their design. In contrast little progress appears to have been made 
towards developing new institutional models that would enable joint purchasing 
or access greater levels of funding from the state, in order to achieve the 
outcomes. Neither is it clear how much influence the collaboration has had on 
setting national departmental priorities and targets – there has been little or no 
evidence of outcomes information being used to influence or inform national 
programmes or priorities. More recently the election of a National-led 
Government in 2008, with a commitment to focus more on ‘doing’ rather than 
‘strategy’, has seen the dismantling of many of the Labour Government’s 
collaborative initiatives, such as the Deputy Secretaries Group and the Interface 
Team. The result has been a different environment for central-local 
collaboration; just how different might be indicated by the government’s 
approach to the consolidation and reform of Auckland, its biggest metropolitan 
area. 
The Auckland governance report – the outcome 
 
The report of the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance (2009) was 
notable not just for the degree to which it drew on concepts of community 
governance in its proposed design for the new city but also for the way in which 
the government quickly dismissed many of its key recommendations.31 For 
example, gone were the explicit partnership mechanisms around economic 
development and social well-being (although both Ministries have been asked 
to look at the question of how to achieve better alignment and report back to the 
government). Gone also were the proposed Minister for Auckland and Cabinet 
Committee on Auckland. In its response to the Commission’s recommendations 
the government undermined many of the proposals for ensuring the new 
council, which will be responsible for over one million residents, would take a 
holistic approach to the region’s governance. 
 
                                                 
31
 Making Auckland Greater: The Government’s Decisions on Auckland Governance, April 2009, New 
Zealand Government. 
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Despite the government’s response, it is significant for this project that three 
highly experienced former public servants, with minimal local government 
experience,32 came to conclude after 18 months’ consideration that the 
Auckland metropolitan area needed a radically different governance model – a 
model that departed from the traditional local government approach and drew 
heavily on new ideas of community governance. The failure of the commission 
to convince the government to endorse its overall concept for Auckland, 
particularly the elements which stressed collaboration and governance, also 
highlights the degree to which urban policy has historically been lacking in 
government policy in recent decades. While the Labour-led Government gave 
the topic at least lip service (it appointed a Minister for Urban Affairs in the 
2002-2005 Parliament and established various officials’ groups to advise on 
urban sustainability),33 neither of the two main political parties has a 
comprehensive urban policy able to address the specific needs of cities, 
although the new government is developing a national standard on urban 
design, which may address some of the gaps.  
 
Given the lack of an existing urban framework, consideration of the 
commission’s report appears heavily influenced by what, in reality, are policy 
slogans, such as ‘Getting Auckland moving’; ‘Keeping the rates down’; 
‘Reducing the number of politicians’ and the Minister’s goal of “One city, one 
mayor, one rates bill” (the Hon. Rodney Hide 2/4/2009).34 While the commission 
worked hard in the two weeks after the release of its report to convince the 
government to implement it in its totality, it is difficult to see how they could have 
been surprised at the government’s response – a response that does not 
appear to be convinced of the merits of collaborative governance as a way of 
governing the country’s urban areas. Despite this, the government has placed 
considerable store on citizen engagement in the new city by rejecting the 
commission’s recommended six local councils with its own proposals for 
between 20 and 30 local boards, each with extensive decision-making 
                                                 
32
 One Commissioner had been an elected member more than two decades earlier. 
33
 CLOGS, Committee for Local Government Sustainability. 
34
 www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectsid=10564788. 
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powers.35 While the new model for Auckland governance falls short of the 
somewhat more radical vision put forward by the Royal Commission, it will 
continue to exist within the framework of the LGA 2002, its principles, processes 
and purpose.  
Conclusion 
 
Like many local government systems, the New Zealand system has been 
subject to ongoing reform, which, with the looming reform of Auckland’s 
governance arrangements, is unlikely to come to an end any time soon (the 
government has also signalled an intention to change to the LGA 2002 and the 
RMA 1991). In effect, reform itself has become the norm. This creates major 
difficulties for councils’ planning and delivery of long-run infrastructural services 
as the willingness of successive Parliaments to amend their governing 
legislation can only result in an unstable and uncertain environment. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to determine why local government in Zealand 
has been the target of so much legislative interest since 1989 (major reform 
seems to occur every seven years or so), but the increasing politicisation of the 
localcentral government relationship and incentives on political and 
bureaucratic actors to be seen to be ‘doing something’ must be factors. 
Although arguments for reform tend to be framed as necessary for efficiency 
and accountability, change is seldom based on an agreed problem definition or 
accompanied by an estimate of costs and benefits (see Table 5 for a summary 
of the major reform initiatives). With reference to local government, the 
traditional disciplines governing cabinet decision-making appear to be relaxed, 
with slogans replacing analysis, and a pattern of ignoring international research 
that recommends caution (see McKinlay 2006). 
 
                                                 
35
 For example, local board chairs have been given the right to conduct citizenship ceremonies. 
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Table 5 The story of local government reform 
Dimensions Phase 1: 1989 Phase 2: 1996 Phase 3: 2002 
Size and 
structure 
Consolidation and 
capacity growth 
Limitation on the 
role of regional 
councils 
N/A More ability to 
transfer services 
between TAs and 
RCs 
Empowerment N/A N/A General 
empowerment 
Finance N/A Long-Term 
Financial 
Strategies 
improve public 
confidence in 
council finances 
and decision-
making 
N/A 
Central 
government 
supervision 
N/A N/A Introduction of the 
Central Local 
Government Forum 
Increase in national 
policy statements 
Functions Devolution of 
environmental 
management 
N/A New statement of 
purpose and 
principles 
Strategy Greater 
transparency and 
requirement to 
consult 
Long-term 
financial 
strategies 
Community 
outcomes 
Leadership Elected members 
refocused on 
N/A No reference to 
leadership in 
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matters of strategy 
rather than 
operation 
government 
rhetoric 
Collaboration N/A N/A Requirement to 
collaborate over 
outcomes 
Discretionary for 
government 
agencies 
Decision-
making 
Mandatory 
consultation 
N/A Principles to 
involve citizens in 
process of 
decision-making 
Local 
democracy 
Reduced levels of 
representation 
N/A Reduced levels of 
representation 
 
(Factors that may potentially weaken the ability to achieve community 
governance are noted in italics.) 
 
Despite the politicised nature of the reform process and its frequency, the LGA 
2002 signalled a new style of governing based on an arguably more 
constructive relationship with central government and its agents, more 
opportunity for citizens to influence decision-making, and more opportunities for 
inter-agency approaches at the local level. In summary, the model of local 
government that has emerged in New Zealand has managed to balance 
traditional concerns, such as accountability, transparency and fiscal 
management, with a sprinkling of concepts drawn from broader governance 
theories, particularly those associated with local government reform in the 
United Kingdom. Some of the basics were unchanged; powers were clarified; 
some additional funding tools were provided, but they were of marginal utility to 
only a few councils;36 and the constitutional relationship was left unchanged. 
The question remains, however, whether or not these changes were sufficient 
                                                 
36Reform provided councils with the ability to levy development contributions and targeted rates.  
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to enable local government in New Zealand to respond to the challenges of the 
new millennium and deliver enhanced well-being and quality of life to their 
citizens. These are challenges that are likely to require a broader range of skills 
and policy interventions than possessed by traditional forms of government; 
they require the co-ordinated efforts of numerous local, regional and national 
organisations working together – governance as well as government. 
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Chapter 2 Community governance theory 
 
This chapter explains the concept of community governance with reference to 
definitions of governance and community governance used in the academic 
literature. The recent history of the concept ‘community governance’ is 
recounted and the relationship between community governance and local 
government analysed. 
 
The concept of governance has received considerable scholarly attention in 
recent years. Initially it was seen as a synonym for government (Dent et al 
2007) but as the role of informal actors in public decision-making became more 
widely recognised the concept began to attract attention from a broader 
academic church, including people with interests as diverse as public 
administration, international relations, overseas aid and more responsive forms 
of service delivery (Rhodes 1997, Schout and Jordan 2005, Bovaird and Loffler 
2007, Kjaer 2004). In her seminal work on the topic Kjaer identifies five major 
theoretical approaches to the concept; these are outlined in Table 6. 
 
Kjaer suggests that concepts of governance are defined in terms of the rules by 
which institutions operate as well as the enforcement of those rules. 
‘Governance’ focuses on both the input side, concerned with democratic 
procedures, and the output side, which is concerned with efficient and effective 
institutions. In the field of public administration, for example, governance has 
both a narrow and expansive use. In its narrow sense governance represents 
the task of managing networks while in its broad sense it is concerned with the 
process by which the rules of public policy are set. Legitimacy draws from both 
the output side, arising from effective performance, and the input side, arising 
from the democratic nature of process. At the international level, ‘governance’ is 
concerned with managing globalisation and the issue of whether or not national 
states can be bound by international rules. In the European context 
‘governance’ is often used to describe multi-level governance and systems 
which recognise both hierarchies and networks.  
 
  
Table 6  Summarising governance theory 
 Public 
administration 
and public policy 
International 
relations 
European 
governance 
Comparative 
politics 1 
Comparative 
politics 2 
Legitimacy  Output Output (and input) Output  Output Input 
Focus Efficiency Efficiency (and 
democracy) 
Efficiency Efficiency Democracy 
Policy sector Institutions of 
service delivery 
Institutions of 
international co-
operation 
Institutions of 
structural policy 
(and regulatory 
policy) 
Institutions of 
economic 
development 
(mainly industrial 
policy) 
Institutions of the 
political regime 
Main concepts Policy networks, 
steering 
International and 
transnational 
networks, 
globalisation 
Networks, multi-
level governance 
Networks, state-
society synergy 
Networks, trust, 
reciprocity, public 
realm 
 
 
(Source: Kjaer 2004, p. 190)
  
Definitions of governance vary, although two are particularly relevant to the 
objective of this thesis. The first is the World Bank’s definition, namely “the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
economic and social resources for development” (World Bank 1991, p. 1). The 
other is the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) definition, 
which describes governance as: 
 
the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to 
manage a nation’s affairs. It is the complex mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, 
exercise their legal rights and obligations, and mediate their differences 
(UNDP 2005).  
 
By focusing on the exercise of authority in the public interest, definitions of 
governance tend to be concerned with processes that extend beyond the realm 
of government. In fact, the concept arose partly in response to the recognition 
that there are a range of problems that are simply beyond the scope of 
governments acting by themselves. As Daniel Bell eloquently quipped more 
than 30 years ago, “the national state has become too small for the big 
problems of life, and too big for the small problems” (Bell 1973, p. xxxi). 
Whether the issue concerns inner city crime or climate change, solutions 
require the participation of multiple agencies, public as well as private, in other 
words effective governance. A number of writers have noted an association 
between ‘governance’ and the idea of New Public Management (NPM) (Rhodes 
1997). NPM is used to describe how, in the last few decades of the 20th 
century, private sector approaches to management have been introduced into 
the public sector. These can be broken into seven distinct themes: 
• rational management through strategic management 
• separating policy from administration and delegating service delivery 
responsibilities 
• individualising performance 
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• applying human resource management techniques and an emphasis on 
the economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
• focusing on consumers, customers and citizens in a way not dominated 
by professionals 
• demand rather than supply-led organisations 
• shifting to more market-focused values (Sullivan et al 2006). 
 
Used in a public sector context, references to the governance role are 
frequently shorthand for the list of attributes identified above as well as making 
the distinction between ‘steering’, which involves setting direction, and ‘rowing’, 
the implementation role (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Osborne and Gaebler’s 
picture of governance in action envisages decentralised public agencies co-
operating with business, community and voluntary groups to improve public 
service delivery and meet new or urgent demands, which they describe as 
‘steering’. In relation to this particular use of the term, more recent debate exists 
as to whether governance should be seen as a form of NPM or as a 
consequence of NPM. These commentators argue that the NPM phenomenon 
has become increasingly preoccupied with surveillance and regulation and that 
the governance paradigm is, in fact, a reaction to NPM, developed in order to 
be less dependent on external directives (Dent et al 2007). Other arguments 
similarly reinforce the reaction perspective and note that NPM emphasises 
efficiency and outputs, whereas governance emphasises quality of life and the 
application of agreed governance principles (see Bovaird and Loffler 2007). 
This more recent interpretation approaches governance as a response to 
managerialism which has resulted in diminished citizenship (Gallop 2006). 
Governance is regarded as a way of providing a more equitable political 
process which allows communities to “accommodate diverse points of views, 
determine collective values and create a distinct sense of locality and identity” 
(Marshall and Sproats 2000, p. 25).  
 
The fact that governance has received such wide and varied interpretations has 
undermined its operational utility, yet despite this most definitions of governance 
contain the following features in common: 
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• that governance involves multiple stakeholders and is frequently 
applied to collective problems that cannot be solved by the public 
sector working by itself but require the co-operation of other players 
(for example, citizens, business, voluntary not-for-profit sector and 
media) 
• that governance concerns both formal rules (such as constitutions, 
laws and regulations) and informal rules (such as codes of ethics, 
customs and traditions)  
• that governance focuses on market structures (as steering 
mechanisms), hierarchies (for example, bureaucracies) and co-
operative networks (as possible structures for facilitating change in 
some situations) (see Loffler 2003). 
 
Governance then is concerned with the behaviour of multiple actors. This 
involves the formation and stewardship of rules, both formal and informal, that 
control the public space in which economic and social actors interact to make 
decisions. This process is important. Kjaer, for example, highlights the role of 
negotiation as a component of governance which she describes as “the means 
for achieving direction, control, and co-ordination of individuals and 
organisations with varying degrees of autonomy to advance joint objectives” 
(Kjaer 2004, p. 282). Simply put, if governance involves operating across 
institutional boundaries then traditional coercive steering instruments will no 
longer suffice, requiring a new set of governing skills, skills that recognise the 
autonomy of agents and are more concerned with persuasion and negotiation. 
Governance, consequently, is not confined to the national or international 
sphere; it applies at all levels of public and private life, including local 
government and the way communities are governed. 
From government to governance 
 
The growing use of the governance lexicon has forced writers to consider its 
relationship to the concept of government. If governance is a wider concept 
than government, how do the two relate and is it a separate phenomenon from 
     77 
government or simply a particular style of government? If by its nature 
governance is concerned with the interplay of stakeholders seeking to exercise 
power over each other in order to further their own interests, then it cannot be 
left to purely managerialist or professional decision-making elites (see Bovaird 
and Loffler 2003). Logically it must represent the interplay of both governmental 
and non-governmental actors. Government, in contrast, reflects more 
standardisation and the “formal procedures and institutions societies have 
created to express their interests, to resolve disputes and to implement public 
choices” (John 2001, p. 4).  
 
There are two senses in which governance is used in relation to public 
administration, narrow and broad. In the narrow sense, governance is used to 
describe the tasks governments face in managing networks (networks being a 
specific response to the reality of a more fragmented and differentiated polity). 
In this sense, governance describes the way governors influence or direct 
networks in order to ensure the implementation of policies and programmes. It 
involves a menu of techniques, from consensus-building to co-ordination and 
influencing. In contrast, when used in its broader sense governance refers to 
the overall process of managing the rules through which public policy occurs, as 
well as describing the overall co-ordination and management of not only 
networks but also hierarchies and markets. When used in this sense, 
governance encompasses the broadest range of institutions, formal and 
informal, as well as the shared goals of citizens.  
 
Ultimately governance is used to emphasise the complex nature of governing in 
an environment in which governments cannot work alone and where policy 
outcomes are the result of interdependent action by a range of actors, societal 
as well as public. This notion of governance involves shared goals, blurred 
boundaries and numerous interactions and “highlights the limits to government 
by a central actor, claiming there is no longer a single sovereign authority” 
(Rhodes 1997, p. 51). In a related but diminished sense, governance is used to 
describe self-governing networks, the environment in which public services are 
provided by any combination of public, private and community providers. Such 
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networks are regarded as largely self-organising and sit alongside markets and 
hierarchies as options for providing services.  
 
They are not controlled by any supranational actor, not even the 
government. They largely control themselves … De-regulation, 
government withdrawal and steering at a distance … are all notions of 
less government regulation and control, which lead to more autonomy 
and self-governance for social institutions (Kickert, quoted in Rhodes 
1997, p. 52). 
 
These interpretations of governance highlight the involvement of state and non-
state actors and suggest “a new approach to the study of politics” (Kjaer 2004, 
p. 189). Some of the differences between governments as institutions and 
governments concerned with governance are highlighted in Table 7, which 
compares stereotypical local government to a similarly stereotypical notion of 
community governance. 
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Table 7  Characteristics of government and governance 
Government Governance 
Few institutions Many institutions 
Hierarchical structure Decentred/fragmented 
Closed networks Extensive networks 
Few linkages Extensive linkages 
Representatives Representative plus 
experimenting in new forms 
of participation 
Routine policy-making Innovative policy-making 
due to a greater range of 
participants 
 
(Source: adapted from John 2001) 
 
Key differences between governance and government are the amount of 
formality, hierarchy, networks, linkages and innovation involved, as well as 
different forms of democratic participation (John 2001, Rhodes 1997, Kjaer 
2004). Working in a governance environment involves working outside 
institutional boundaries, making less use of traditional hierarchies and 
command-control mechanisms and having less formality. It involves greater 
levels of democratic participation and engagement with policy networks than 
would normally occur in government, with its reliance on hierarchies and 
command-control methodologies. Critical are the emphasis on well-being and 
the recognition that this involves multi-faceted and interdependent interventions. 
 
The problem of networks 
One of the challenges facing governments that choose to take a governance 
approach is managing inter-organisational approaches, in which groups of 
public and private organisations operate in a resource-dependent manner (see 
Considine 2006). These cross-jurisdictional networks create unique challenges 
for setting direction and maintaining accountability, even though the potential for 
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networks has been strengthened by the emergence of new technologies that 
improve communication and increase transparency. For example, technology 
enables different groups which are united by shared interests (as opposed to 
just geography) to carry out international policy-making (see Florini 2005). In 
fact one theorist points to a perceived erosion of state capacity (the hollowing-
out thesis) and argues that the rise of networks has resulted in “no centre but 
multiple centres (in which?) there is no sovereign authority because networks 
have considerable autonomy” (Rhodes 1997, p. 109). In the view of these 
theorists the result has limited governments to the co-ordination and steering of 
networks – a governance role. They argue that the mobility of capital, firms and 
citizens, as well as the privatisation and fragmentation of services, has 
restricted the range of policy tools open to governments, forcing them to adopt 
new approaches to governance which might not be compatible with democracy.  
 
Despite the concern that governance may weaken democracy, promoters of 
government as governance argue that it allows more participation by political 
actors than traditional government, prompting suggestions that governance 
rather than government can actually strengthen democratic accountability (Kjaer 
2004). For these theorists governance is seen as a way of addressing 
democratic deficits and loss of legitimacy which can arise when attempts to 
resolve complex and intractable problems fail (Giddens 2000, Gaventa 2004,). 
Loss of legitimacy arises when citizens perceive that governments have 
become unresponsive and disconnected from their citizens, leading to 
disillusionment with large institutions, which are likely to be regarded as “distant, 
unaccountable and corrupt” (Gaventa 2004, p. 17). The result of disillusionment 
is a democratic deficit which occurs when citizens stop taking part in democratic 
processes, such as voting, and no longer employ legitimate means of 
democratic participation (Giddens 2000).  
 
Governance is promoted as a way of addressing such democratic deficits by 
providing an opportunity for a greater range of actors to take part in the policy-
making and decision-making process. The virtues, however, have a down-side. 
While governance appears to provide new opportunities for democratic 
engagement outside the hierarchical structures of government, it can be 
     81 
criticised for being less transparent and less accountable. Unlike government 
decisions, those made in the less formal world of relationships characteristic of 
governance are less likely to be recorded, less likely to be subject to rules which 
guarantee freedom of information and absence of interest, and less accessible 
to the public. 
 
The different ways in which governance is used in the academic literature 
highlight some common characteristics, particularly the idea that governance is 
a process that occurs when governments actively work to influence multiple 
agencies and organisations to achieve collective goals. In this conception it 
represents a process in which governments play a leading, but not solitary, role 
in the exercise of public authority and power. This is how the concept will be 
referenced in the remainder of the thesis and it is just as relevant to the local or 
community sphere as the national. 
Community governance 
 
In its most literal sense, community governance means governance exercised 
by communities themselves, such as community self-management or citizen 
governance. It is concerned with policies and practices that empower citizens to 
make and influence decisions that affect them and their communities (see 
Stewart and Clarke 1996, Richardson 1999a, Rhodes 2007). For practical 
purposes, governance is understood as occurring at four levels: international, 
national, regional, and local/community. Community governance encompasses 
both local and community prefixes, which are used interchangeably in the 
relevant literatures.  
 
Background 
The idea of community governance as a style of local government began to 
surface in the late 1980s as writers, particularly in Britain, began to consider the 
implications of public sector reform on the local state. One of the earliest 
references to the concept comes from Stewart and Stoker, who, writing in 1988, 
suggested that political and institutional change was forcing local government to 
become what they termed “community government” (see Rhodes 1997). For 
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them, community government meant that councils formed partnerships with 
local citizens, with strong local accountability and responsive service delivery. It 
meant local government by and for the community, in which councils’ primary 
role was to recognise issues rather than manage services; services were to be 
provided by independent and quasi-independent agencies, and councils were to 
be primarily enabling agencies.37  
 
The concept of community government failed to find wide academic support at 
the time, perhaps because it failed to reflect the nature of the new relationships 
that were evolving and which extended beyond the traditional boundaries of 
‘governments’. It soon transformed into the concept of community governance. 
As early as 1994 Stewart and Clarke began to refer to a changing pattern of 
local government which could not be understood without examining the 
“disposition of other players in the … wider system of community governance” 
(ibid, p. 201). The trigger for much of this discourse was the fragmentation that 
arose from the public sector restructuring undertaken by the British 
Conservative government of the period. Fragmentation was perhaps 
predictable, as the British experience of public sector reform favoured the 
establishment of arms’-length bodies focused on single objectives, many of 
them in private ownership. They included such organisations as urban 
development corporations; compulsorily formed local-government-owned 
companies such as bus companies; publicprivate partnerships; user 
organisations; intergovernmental committees; and private sector companies 
funded to provide public services (Rhodes 1997).  
 
The creation of stand-alone agencies was an essential part of the United 
Kingdom’s public sector reform initiative and, while it also occurred as a result 
of modernisation initiatives elsewhere, the Conservative Government was one 
of its loudest cheerleaders. Legislation privatised key local government 
functions, such as the provision of potable water, and required councils to 
competitively tender an increasing proportion of their activities. (Australia sought 
                                                 
37
 It is interesting that the discourse on community governance in the United Kingdom developed at the 
same time that local government reform, driven by the Thatcher-led Conservatives, was being described 
as creating an ‘enabling’ state. This involved the notion that councils should be concerned with enabling 
others, rather than doing things themselves. 
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similar results in a less heavy-handed way through its Productivity 
Commission.) Reformers considered that disaggregating public services into 
more discrete units focused on single objectives brought a number of 
advantages, such as better alignment with service users, more capacity for 
innovation, and more accountability for performance. Single-purpose 
organisations were regarded as less likely to be distracted by competing 
objectives and, because such agencies had more freedom and clearer 
objectives, they could be more innovative (see Schick 2001, SSC 2001, Scott 
2001).  
 
Balancing these apparent advantages, however, were a number of problems, 
such as the difficulty of defining agency tasks in the face of changing needs. For 
example, single-purpose agencies tend to have a narrow focus and may find it 
difficult to refocus and adapt their services in response to rapidly changing 
environments. This lack of flexibility and responsiveness can be exacerbated by 
the trend of national governments to impose national standards, which further 
locks agencies into the production of a single service, less able to adapt and 
reflect local circumstances (see Stewart and Clarke 1994). Single-purpose 
agencies also tend to strengthen vertical accountabilities at the expense of 
horizontal ones, making it difficult to achieve a whole-of-government and place-
based approach to addressing local issues. As Pierre (quoted in Stoker 2000) 
argues:  
 
It is in some respects ironic that the pressures unleashed by New 
Management have encouraged local authorities to rethink and redefine 
their role. The vision of the New Management reformers aimed at more 
efficient and customer oriented service delivery by local authorities has 
been challenged by a broader vision of a new community governance 
(Pierre, quoted in Stoker 2000, p. 145). 
 
In a policy environment where councils were not only encouraged, but forced, to 
disaggregate services and focus on a narrower range of activities, local 
authorities in the United Kingdom found themselves the most knowledgeable 
agencies in their localities, better placed to make the connections between local 
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service providers than any other single organisations. It was somewhat ironic as 
councils, having been the target of the Government’s modernisation project, 
also provided the solution for bringing the pieces back together. They did this by 
focusing on the locality as a whole, rather than specific sectors. As noted 
above, stand-alone agencies designed on largely managerialist principles, while 
more efficient in a technical sense, were found to be poorly suited for 
addressing issues of allocational efficiency, that is, determining the most 
effective mix of services. Allocational efficiency requires trade-offs involving the 
consideration of community values and the question arises: Which agencies are 
best suited to make trade-offs involving community values? The answer 
involves organisations which have a democratic mandate and are bound by 
processes that reinvent and reinforce that mandate, such as regular elections 
and requirements to consult. In response to the problem of fragmentation 
created by the United Kingdom’s modernisation programme, local government 
offered an institutional response to the problem that could accommodate the 
efficiency gains of stand-alone organisations with the allocation benefit of more 
co-ordination and alignment.  
 
Local government’s contribution 
As democratic organisations with universal franchise, councils provided an 
avenue for voice and choice through which local issues could be identified, 
aspirations recognised and diversity fostered. In addition they were still multi-
purpose organisations, even though many of their traditional activities had been 
corporatised or privatised and they had a history of taking integrated 
approaches to problem solving. In short, local government’s key attributes for 
this task were seen as: 
 
• being multi-purpose, with a wide range of functions 
• having the right to tax and allocate public resources being directly 
controlled by elected representatives 
• having the right and responsibility to speak out on issues of concern to its 
area (Stewart and Clarke 1994). 
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In the United Kingdom councils began to undertake the role through necessity, 
despite financial constraints created by reduced funding, competitive tendering 
and more prescriptive performance measures (Stoker 2000). The role had an 
inherent focus on community leadership, which was picked up and reinforced by 
New Labour after its election in 1997 (see DETR 1998). The new focus on 
leadership added a dimension to the argument in support of a broader 
governance role for local authorities. One of the argued advantages of such 
decision-making systems, which might be described as governance as opposed 
to traditional governmental approaches, is their better capacity for dealing with 
an emerging range of very difficult problems commonly referred to as “wicked 
issues”.38 These are issues that Roberts (2000) argues have the following 
characteristics: 
• There is no definitive statement of the problem (and there may be 
disagreement on the nature of the problem). 
• Without a definition the search for solutions is open ended, with a 
tendency for people to frame “problems” to better connect with their 
preferred solutions. 
• The problem-solving process is complex because constraints, such as 
resources and political ramifications, are constantly changing. 
• Constraints change, because they are generated by numerous interested 
parties which selectively choose to share information and may change 
the rules by which the problem must be solved. 
 
In summary, these are problems about which there is a lack of consensus with 
regard to their definition, the prevailing rules and processes by which they 
should be solved, and a lack of clarity with regard to available resources for 
addressing them. Traditional linear problem-solving techniques, that is, scope 
the problem, undertake research and develop options, are no longer regarded 
as sufficient or successful. Roberts speculates that recent interest in the idea of 
wicked problems may have to do with the technological and information 
revolutions and the increasing diversity of society, with corresponding less 
                                                 
38
 The Germans refer to these as “malignant problems” (see Naschold 1997). 
     86 
homogeneity of values. Addressing wicked issues involves collaborative forms 
of working as “we learn to take care in attempting to tame wicked problems by 
turning them over to experts or some centre of power for definition and solution” 
(Roberts 2000, p. 16). Solving these problems appears to require a process of 
social learning, through self-organising, complex and adaptive systems, that co-
evolves as stakeholders interact and inform on another’s actions. Problems and 
issues frequently referred to as “wicked” include climate change, unemployment 
and family violence. 
 
Defining community governance 
The emergence of a group of theories which treated local government as a form 
of community governance signalled a shift in thinking from a focus on governing 
organisations to governing communities, not necessarily defined within 
historical boundaries or service delivery jurisdictions (Stewart and Clarke 1996). 
It represented a change in emphasis for local authorities in that it encouraged 
them to think about the well-being of their community rather than the traditional 
practice of focusing on the delivery of a prescribed number of local public 
goods. While implying that councils had previously turned a blind eye to the 
welfare of their citizens by focusing on outcomes rather than the efficient 
delivery of services, a new dynamic in the governing process is created, a 
process that requires an additional set of skills and competencies to those 
traditionally held and practised by councils (see Table 8). 
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 Table 8  From local government to community governance 
 Focus Orientation Technique 
Local 
government 
Delivery of 
services 
addressing social 
problems, 
regarded as 
separate and 
discrete 
Unilateral 
interventions by 
single agencies 
Rigid dependence on 
hierarchical/bureaucratic 
or (quasi) market 
mechanisms 
Community 
governance 
Managing the 
problems of 
citizens’ well-
being’, regarded 
as multi-faceted 
and 
interdependent 
Multi-lateral 
interventions by 
public-private 
partnerships 
Flexible deployment of 
bureaucratic (quasi) 
markets and networking 
mechanisms 
 
(Source: Kjaer 2004, p. 38) 
 
The differences between local government and community governance can be 
approached along three dimensions – focus, orientation and technique. As 
Table 8 describes, councils that have adopted a community governance 
orientation focus on the broad concept of citizens’ well-being rather than limiting 
their focus to the provision of discrete services. This requires that councils take 
an interest in the outcomes created by other service providers, whether they are 
central government, a higher tier of government or another sector altogether. 
Given that the well-being is multi-faceted, and characterised by 
interdependencies, strategies to enhance it will need to be similarly approached 
and involve greater use of partnerships and other forms of collaboration, 
particularly multi-lateral interventions (Kjaer 2004). In the United Kingdom, for 
example, the government has introduced the concept of Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs) to provide a mechanism for agencies to align their services with local 
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outcomes. In another example, Kjaer (2004) cites British research on social 
housing which shows that councils have moved from traditional bilateral 
approaches to housing provision to approaches that are multilateral, involving 
multiple agencies. Similarly, the way councils deal with crime has shifted from a 
focus on individual criminals to multi-agency partnerships focused on problems 
of community safety. Perhaps the most visible change concerns the issue of 
technique. Councils that adopt a community governance approach will need to 
learn to work in an environment which is less hierarchical than they are used to. 
This has implications for the competencies and skills of both elected members 
and their officials involving greater use of facilitation, mediation and convening 
competencies. It also changes the nature of leadership. 
 
Local governments that exercise community governance operate in such a way 
that they break down the bureaucratic and organisational boundaries between 
themselves as institutions and the multiplicity of organisations, agencies and 
citizen groups that make up their communities. These are councils which:  
• focus on outcomes for the complete jurisdiction over which the authority 
has responsibility 
• reflect a commitment to steering the multiple organisations that 
contribute towards the achievement of those outcomes and take 
participatory and inclusive approaches to decision-making  
• have a willingness to take on roles other than that of service provider, 
such as convenor, leader or facilitator. 
 
In short, councils that practise community governance are more concerned with 
securing the outcomes desired by their citizens than the delivery of specified 
outputs. This involves working outside their institutional boundaries and forming 
partnerships with central government agencies and other organisations, where 
these can address local problems and consciously seek to enhance citizen 
engagement. An important aspect of this style of operation is an agreed vision 
or sense of direction. 
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Organisational leadership is concerned with the culture, direction and 
performance of an organisation and its efficacy at fulfilling its purpose. 
Leadership under a community governance framework operates beyond the 
confines of a single organisation, an environment in which authority is more 
symbolic than legislated. In this approach the purely representative model of 
local democracy is combined with more participatory techniques to secure 
community buy-in to the goals sought by the local authority, goals which are 
largely dictated by citizens working with their councils. This also involves 
attempting to align their services with the services of other organisations in 
order to achieve outcomes (see Stewart and Clarke 1996).  
 
After beginning as a necessary response to fragmentation at the local level 
community governance came to be seen not only as instrumental in dealing 
with the effect of public sector reform but also as desirable in itself. Stewart and 
Clarke (1996) articulate this more positive view of community governance as 
improving co-ordination and aligning public service providers and thus 
revitalising local democracy. They argue that local authorities, as the form of 
elected authority closest to citizens, should be primarily responsible for 
community governance and contend that councils’ democratic mandate gives 
them a historical responsibility to legitimise the actions and decisions of other 
agencies and organisations. In order to achieve this, they emphasise councils’ 
role in providing voice and a process of local accountability. 
The literature on local government and community governance 
 
Much of the discussion on community governance reflects a strong 
indebtedness to the experience of the United Kingdom (see Rhodes 1997, 
Stoker 2000, Stewart and Clarke 1994). However, it begs the question whether 
or not these experiences can be generalised outside a British context. Is 
community governance a bona fide new model of local government or is it 
simply a necessary survival strategy adopted by councils in the United Kingdom 
to deal with a relatively unique set of challenges? Is community governance a 
new fashion contingent on the particular government in power?  
 
     90 
Community governance encompasses a range of related theories about local 
government, connected by the way in which they approach key concepts, such 
as leadership and engagement. This can be approached as a family of related 
theories (see Figure 3), most of which have emerged in the last few decades 
and build on the critiques developed by the early community governance 
advocates, such as Rhodes and Stewart and Clarke. These new theories of 
local governance are a combination of ex post rationalising of institutional and 
policy shifts associated with public sector reform and normative theories, 
designed to promote particular value propositions. Common features are 
identified which are then used in the development of the assessment model 
(see Chapter 3). 
 
Figure 3 A family of community governance theories 
 
 
 
Urban governance 
From its emergence in the fragmented localities of late 20th century Britain, the 
literature on community governance has moved from being largely reactive and 
problem-focused to proactive and opportunity-focused. This is also reflected in 
the literature on urban or metropolitan governance. Gootman (1998) argues that 
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Governance 
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Governance 
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New 
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shaping 
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the concept of metropolitan governance arose in response to increasing 
fragmentation of metropolitan regions, particularly in the United States, where 
there is little public acceptance of top-down consolidation measures found in 
places like the United Kingdom and New Zealand.39 According to the National 
League of Cities in the United States, metropolitan governance encompasses: 
(1) all community interests affected by challenges and necessary to their 
resolution, not just government institutions, and (2) the collaborative problem-
solving mechanisms needed to design timely strategies as well as the 
government institutions and other service delivery mechanisms needed to 
implement them (see Gootman 1998). These are collaborative arrangements 
through which councils and non-council actors actually exercise city authority 
(Matkin and Frederickson 2009).  
 
Underpinning much of the urban governance literature is a view of cities as 
centres of innovation and growth, such as the recent focus on the ability of cities 
to attract the creative class, which is viewed as a generator of innovation 
(Florida 2002). To achieve this, policy-makers have been forced to consider 
how to empower councils to participate in effective city governance and to 
ensure that well-run cities contribute to the achievement of national economic 
and social goals. This objective is often framed in terms of well-being or good 
governance of the locality, and policy-makers have been experimenting with 
legislative frameworks to allow not only the provision of appropriate local public 
services but also new approaches to sub-national governing. The concept is 
captured in the concept of the entrepreneurial city which is: 
 
a proactive city which aims to mobilise social, political and economic 
resources in a coherent institutional framework to develop – and sustain 
long term support for – a clear social and economic development 
strategy (OECD 2000, p. 3).  
 
                                                 
39
 In both countries, central government imposed consolidation or amalgamation programmes without 
questioning to any extent the right of central government to impose such programmes. Both the 
constitution and public views with regard to the limits of government would make such interventions 
highly unlikely in the United States. 
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The rise of urban theory is ultimately associated with the growth of urbanisation 
and recognition that metropolitan areas have become the engines of prosperity 
and “drivers of environmental sustainability and social progress” (Katz 2007, p. 
1). Urban governance theorists are not only concerned with raising the 
recognition of urban issues in higher level governments but also with ensuring 
urban governments, that is councils, have the policy tools and institutional 
levers to promote innovation and growth while operating within defined 
ecological footprints and providing for citizen participation and autonomy. Such 
measures tend to be characterised by a preference for more independent local 
polities, greater decentralisation, more use of networks and the creation of an 
urban strategic capacity. As Coaffee notes:  
 
centralised power and bureaucracy is morphing, albeit slowly, into a 
system of greater decentralised decision-making, collaboration between 
service sectors and wider participatory structures. This has been related 
to wider transformative processes that have sought to refashion and 
recast the political and managerial linkages between national, 
regional/provincial and local states. Furthermore, such processes have 
increasingly attempted to draw the private sector and local communities 
into decision-making processes about creating sustainable 
neighbourhoods, cities and regions (Coaffee 2005, p. 108). 
 
Urban governance contributes to the overall conceptualisation of community 
governance by its emphasis on place and the necessary relationships that are 
required for a city to prosper. This involves an aggregation of interests, not only 
as individuals but of the plurality of collective interests, from business to the 
non-governmental sector, frequently captured in support for city development 
strategies recommended by the World Bank in its work on urban and local 
government strategy (World Bank 2000). Such strategies mobilise “city 
stakeholders to identify local strengths, bottlenecks, and market opportunities 
and to commit to appropriate joint actions” (ibid, p. 49). City strategies can be 
understood as a process of local or community strategic planning, involving 
participation by all city stakeholders, such as firms, workers, officials, financiers, 
voluntary organisations, universities, research centres and infrastructure 
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providers. Apart from identifying impediments to development, participants are 
expected to articulate their contributions to the process.  
 
This new art of governing involves cities which have adopted and adapted the 
tools of the corporate world to maximise their competitiveness (Katz 2007). It is 
strongly strategic, requiring cities to diagnose the context in which they operate, 
explore the dynamics of their urban demographics and economies, and 
understand their assets and liabilities (ibid). In the view of its advocates, 
councils embracing the new art of governing focus on both the “soft and hard 
infrastructures and services that help to make a competitive environment for 
firms, and an attractive place to live for their employees” (Gurria 2007, p. 1).  
 
Local government as strategic leaders 
The concept of urban governance and community governance in general posits 
a different approach to the role of local government, an approach which places 
as much emphasis on councils’ roles in their social and economic environments 
as it does on their roles as providers of local services. Advocates for this view 
tend to highlight issues of globalisation and the ease by which capital and 
skilled labour shift between places and across state boundaries (see Albrechts 
1991), changing production practices and citizens’ expectations of having a 
greater say in the way in which their communities operate.40 Critical to 
considering the role of local government in these processes is the concept of 
leadership as noted by Hambleton (2008) in his work on urban governance: 
 
The legitimacy needed to exercise bold and effective metropolitan 
leadership in modern times is likely to flow from an approach that 
combines multiple actors drawn from local government and civil society, 
from the public, private and non-profit sectors (Hambleton 2008, p. 18). 
 
Hambleton’s work disaggregates the notion of civic leadership into a number of 
overlapping roles: political leadership, managerial leadership and community 
leadership. Political leadership describes the role mayors and senior politicians 
                                                 
40
 This creates a paradox, given that participation in traditional and formal democratic processes, such as 
voting, is declining (see Giddens 1999). 
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play in leading the elected arm of councils. Managerial leadership deals with the 
role of civil servants within local government while community leadership 
highlights the leadership roles played by other parties in civic society, such as 
business organisations. This is outlined in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 Civic leadership 
 
(Royal Commission on Auckland Governance 2008, p. 523) 
 
In Hambleton’s view local leadership requires councils to provide a focal point 
for the development of a collective vision for the future that reflects local 
priorities and brings together key agencies to achieve it. This requires strong 
democratic accountability, a clear sense of place (to the effect that participants 
recognise that they are part of the same community of interest) and a capacity 
to bring the groups of local organisations and agencies together. Hambleton 
notes that in any given city there will be a pattern of dispersed leadership and 
that power is likely to be fragmented in conditions of social complexity. Civic 
leadership, as a whole, involves connecting the fragments and occurs when “a 
compelling vision emerges from an inclusive process and is then articulated by 
a leader or leaders”; “the results are inspiring” (ibid, p. 33).  
 
The concept of governance is inherently concerned with leadership and new 
forms of governance are likely to involve new forms of leadership, so as to 
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mobilise local stakeholders. Reflecting this Hambleton (2008) notes that some 
councils have redefined local leadership by replacing hierarchical approaches 
with partnerships and adopting a collaborative towards achieving common 
goals. Such councils tend to display the following characteristics. They:  
• articulate a clear vision for their areas 
• promote the qualities of their areas 
• win resources 
• develop partnerships 
• are prepared to work on complex issues 
• maintain support and cohesion (Hambleton 2008). 
 
Governance theorists consider that this collaborative model of leadership 
represents a necessary response to the shortcomings of traditional forms of 
public authority by focusing attention on community priorities and galvanising 
various actors to contribute to delivering them, with the active participation of 
local citizens (see Sullivan 2008). In this view effective local leadership must 
involve an ability to mobilise local actors and agencies and work in partnerships. 
Gallop (2006), for example, argues that government needs to be more strategic 
in order to promote more collaboration between levels of government and their 
communities. In his view strategic government is the governance paradigm of 
the 21st century and is necessary to address problems created by public sector 
reform that made whole-of-government responses to issues more difficult. It is a 
justification based on the view that suggests citizens are demanding a more 
collective approach to the activities of government in order to address issues 
such as crime, anti-social behaviour, drugs, alcohol and social dysfunction (the 
wicked issues?).  
 
More recent interpretations of community governance, such as Gallop’s, tend to 
place emphasis on policy initiatives of the community-strengthening type, that 
is, “stronger forms of local connectedness and better linkages between 
government and other agencies to mobilise local assets” (Considine 2006, p. 2). 
The concept has four dimensions: increased connectedness, distributed 
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leadership, inclusive partnerships, and new governance institutions. A critical 
factor underpinning them is the manner in which public agencies, citizens and 
excluded groups contribute to the process of determining priorities and co-
ordinating services, reflecting a move away from “older models of hierarchical 
co-ordination to experimental new forms” (Considine and Giguere 2008, p. 258). 
These new policies are also characterised by a territorial focus rather than a 
focus on specific sectors or policy subjects. 
 
New localism  
Community governance is inherently local and interest in promoting it as a 
legitimate governance option is reflected in the increasing importance given to 
the connection between the governance of places and economic performance 
(see the report of the Royal Commission on the Governance of Auckland 2009). 
A pertinent theory is new localism. Initially promoted by the New Local 
Government Network, a United Kingdom think-tank, it has now become widely 
recognised in the mainstream local government policy debates (see Filkin et al 
2000).41 New localism combines the political insights of traditional localism, a 
belief that all government activity should be as local as possible, with the 
techniques and lessons of recent public sector reform. As a concept it draws on 
theories of devolution seeking to have more responsibilities located with local 
government; but it also seeks organisational forms designed to address the 
parochialism and lack of capacity which plagued traditional localism. In bringing 
localism to a modern audience it promotes a collaborative response to the 
problems confronting communities, such as the use of strategic local 
partnerships and, the development of city-regions and mandatory strategic 
planning. New localists take as read much of the modernist agenda and 
envisage a form of local government that is less defined by its capacity as agent 
and more by its capacity to “win the approval of local people and stakeholders 
for its problem-solving, vision and expression of their interest” (Filkin et al 2000, 
p. 11). 
 
                                                 
41
 For example, the Conservative Party’s Green Paper, Control Shift: Returning Power to Local 
Communities (Cameron 2009), criticises what they describe as the government’s lip service to localism, 
and recommends a localism where power is shared and communities are once again trusted. 
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New localism attempts to put a modern spin on traditional localism and the view 
that small is always best. It does this by emphasising the role of leadership 
which transcends organisational leadership to be concerned with places, as well 
as by acknowledging the need to operate within a minimal framework of 
national standards. New localists seek to marry the concepts of devolution and 
decentralisation with a broader framework of public sector reform in order to 
prevent local authorities becoming small versions of the bureaucratic state. In 
this sense new localists share an affinity with writers, such as Bryson (2004), 
who posit a view of the world in which the binary distinctions between the 
domestic and international spheres, between local and central government, and 
between the government and private/voluntary-sector actors are blurred. This is 
well illustrated in their view of local leadership, according to which the local 
authority will: 
 
be concerned with everything that affects the public in the locality, 
whoever is responsible for it and will work with the public as individuals 
or in local organisations to champion and achieve change that is desired 
by local people (Filkin et al 2000, p. 6). 
 
For new localists, leadership involves a dynamic and strategic conception of 
local governance, which requires local authorities to do more than simply follow 
the community’s preferences. Their approach to leadership reveals an 
indebtedness to theories of community governance as it involves developing 
and communicating visions in order to bring together and co-ordinate multiple 
agencies. While new localism has had a strong influence in the way in which the 
government and opposition parties in the United Kingdom have begun to think 
about local government (parties are literally competing in the media to show 
how their local government policies reflect new localist principles such as 
greater devolution) it is also consistent with the earlier work of community 
governance theorists (see Stewart and Clarke 1996). The key features of 
councils that adopt a new localist agenda are a commitment to: 
• working with others to determine what needs to change in the locality 
• promoting a consensual approach to developing a strategic vision 
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• developing a practical strategy to realise the vision and promote the 
realisation of this strategy locally and to central government 
• acting as a broker between agencies 
• acting as strategic commissioners, free from vested interests 
• presenting themselves convincingly as guardians of the public 
interest 
• taking the tough decision that no-one else will ().  
 
The idea that the local authority is part of the community and also has a role in 
how it is shaped is reflected in two related concepts, co-operative communities 
and partnership governance. Both reflect a concern that competition between 
governments has reduced citizenship rights, increased inequality, transferred 
decision-making to semi-private networks, such as public private partnerships, 
and resulted in a diminution of the public space traditionally occupied by local 
government, a trend that can only be reversed if councils act like co-operative 
communities (Warner 2001).42 Co-operative communities arise when councils 
build social capital by sharing autonomy with citizens and acting as catalysts, 
convenors and facilitators (ibid).43 This theory recognises community-building as 
a fundamental public good, promotes new forms of participation by citizens and 
non-citizens as well as moving beyond market models for the delivery of public 
goods. Operating councils as co-operative communities involves balancing 
economic and social goals, creating new spaces for innovation and democratic 
engagement, and focusing on physical and social infrastructure in order to 
provide a stabilising force in a constantly changing world. The concept of 
‘partnership governance’ (Skelcher et al 2004) is similar, as it also argues for 
the involvement of a wider range of community actors in public decision-making. 
It involves a new way of thinking about society, one that begins with the 
multiplicity of communities, namely:  
 
                                                 
42
 Deliberative democracy is a form of decision-making in which participants are encouraged to see all 
sides of an issue before arriving at a decision. 
43
 Local Government, Serving Citizens in a Competitive World, presentation to the Local Government 
Conference, Wellington, 2006. 
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self-reliant communities of place and interest, where co-operation rather 
than competition contributes to consensually set social values and goals 
(where) local communities collectively identify impediments to a better 
quality of life that is defined in contextual terms and work together to 
construct the space for creating long-term sustainable solutions 
(Skelcher et al 2004, p. 9). 
 
In this model of council as a type of community, the role of government is to 
provide the platform on which citizens can set consensual goals and essentially 
construct a model of governance which meets their own long-term needs, a 
concept consistent with a community governance approach. 
 
Local government as ‘place-shapers’ 
The Lyons Inquiry into Local Government Funding (Lyons 2007), which was 
commissioned by the British Government in 2004, endorsed in its report much 
of the new localist and community governance agenda. The purpose of the 
inquiry was to consider the case for changes to the system of local government 
funding in the United Kingdom and to make recommendations. However, during 
its work it was realised that funding could not be treated in isolation from the 
broader question of the role and function of local government and its terms of 
reference were extended accordingly. They included the strategic role of local 
government, the government’s devolution and decentralisation agenda, and its 
desire for greater responsiveness to citizens. The report provides a 
comprehensive vision of local government, which it describes as ‘place-
shaping’. 
 
While the inquiry’s full recommendations on funding have not been officially 
endorsed, its work on the overall role and purpose of local government has 
been influential in recent policy debate, with both government and non-
governmental agencies drawing widely on its recommendations. Sir Michael 
Lyons, the report’s author, argues that local government should occupy a 
central and leading role in local communities beyond its traditional role in the 
provision of local services. How this should happen, he argues, will depend on 
the interactions between council leaders and local citizens. Lyons calls for 
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strong local communities, an explicit vision, and inclusive decision-making, and 
talks about communities of place and communities within council jurisdictions. 
Place-shaping, the big idea of the Lyons Report, is described as the “creative 
use of powers to promote the general well-being of a community and its 
citizens” (Lyons 2007, p. 60) and its key features are listed as: 
• building and shaping local identity 
• representing the community, including in discussions with higher 
levels of government 
• regulating harmful behaviours 
• maintaining the cohesiveness of the community and ensuring 
marginalised voices are heard 
• helping to resolve disagreements, especially over prioritising 
resources 
• making the local economy successful to support the creation of new 
businesses 
• understanding local needs and preferences 
• working with other bodies to respond to complex challenges (ibid, p. 
62). 
 
The idea of place-shaping is based on two assumptions. The first is that local 
authorities should have a role in influencing services used by local people, 
regardless of the formal arrangements for the management of those services. 
And the second is that councils are in a unique position to promote the 
participation of citizens, communities and service users in the co-production of 
services and outcomes, such as partnerships with community organisations. 
Lyons’ view of strategy as extending beyond the organisation into the 
community is consistent with the approach to community governance promoted 
by Stewart and Clarke more than a decade earlier. Like them he believes that 
councils’ democratic mandate provides them with facilitative and enabling roles 
through which they are ideally placed to lead a process of community 
strategising. Pre-empting potential criticism that this degree of devolution would 
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lead to England becoming a ‘post code lottery’, Lyons argues for ‘managed 
difference’  the idea that communities should be able to set various standards 
for services above national guaranteed minimums (Lyons 2007).  
  
Key attributes of community governance theories 
The previous discussion, which places the concept of community governance in 
a broader conversation of ideas, highlights the degree to which different 
conceptions of governance share a number of common features. These are 
summarised in Table 9. 
Table 9  Key attributes of local governance theories 
Concept/Theory  Attributes  
Urban governance Strategic  Inclusive Devolution 
Strategic 
leadership 
Vision Partnerships Legitimacy 
New localism Leadership Shared vision Community 
broker 
Place-shaping Shaping local 
identity 
Cohesiveness Working with 
others 
 
Common attributes involve a focus on citizens and communities, multiple roles 
played by councils, inter-agency collaboration, strategic or long-term thinking, 
the creation of community visions, and inclusiveness. It has a strong localist 
orientation, which is designed to strengthen local voice and adopt a locally 
specific or place-based approach to priority setting and planning. Yet such 
policy settings create tension with egalitarian concerns about the national 
distribution of public investment and the degree to which national standards 
should be achieved (see Lyons 2007 and his discussion of post code lotteries). 
For national policy-makers a balance must be found between empowering 
localities to innovate while still ensuring citizens have access to the same or a 
similar range of services. While community governance theory is silent on these 
questions, it does reflect a strong preference for collaborative approaches at a 
local level justified by the argument that many of the issues facing communities, 
such as crime and disorder, cannot be solved at the national level alone.  
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In its initial phase, community governance theory was developed to explain 
changes in council behaviour as they adapted to the first stages of public sector 
modernisation in the United Kingdom, particularly fragmentation. In its more 
recent phases, however, community governance theory has become more 
normative, offering an alternative institutional and methodological approach to 
complement traditional forms of local government. In this form community 
governance theory is less concerned with issues of size, function, efficiency or 
rights than local government theory. In contrast, it tends to focus on inter-
agency relationships and networks as a way of developing local solutions to 
institutional problems. It is, in a broad sense, a post-modern theory of local 
government, designed to operate within the ‘soft’ boundaries of the new 
globalised social order, an environment which is constantly changing and 
evolving (Bogason 2001).  
Conclusion 
 
As an institutional response to changing socio-economic conditions, community 
governance is often viewed as an “authentic, interactive localism speaking truth 
to the power of globalisation” (Considine 2006, p. 3). This involves institutional 
arrangements that allow policies and programmes to be tailored to address 
uncertainties and diversity, something that is difficult for central planners or 
national policy-makers to do. Community governance, it is argued, enables 
councils to address issues of fragmentation and strengthens the ability of 
communities to compete in an increasingly global environment characterised by 
placeless power and powerless places in which geographical communities are 
competing to attract mobile capital (Albrechts 1991).  
 
Yet the traditional concerns of councils have not really changed. Drinking water 
still needs to be provided, the rubbish still needs to be collected and councils 
continue to impose regulations on citizens’ behaviour. In this sense community 
governance is an ‘add-on’, a set of complementary roles that use local 
government’s democratic mandate and leadership position to advance progress 
towards various outcomes. It has also become a useful ‘catch-all’ to describe a 
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style of governing that has not yet been developed into a fully fledged, coherent 
theory. However, as a vision which might describe a necessary or desirable 
approach to local government, community governance and its implementation 
are typically fraught and require that a range of competing elements be 
balanced. For example, integrated approaches to addressing local issues 
involving greater use of local networks (usually of officials) sits uneasily with the 
objective of achieving a more democratic local polity in which citizens have 
more say about what officials do. The next chapter draws on the common 
features identified in community governance-related theories and develops a 
series of community governance principles, which are then employed in the 
assessment model used in Chapter 7 to assess the potential strength of 
community governance in the New Zealand model. 
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Chapter 3 Community governance principles 
 
This chapter builds on the theory discussed in the previous chapter. In particular 
it develops a series of governance principles and a model for assessing the 
capacity of the New Zealand system to adopt a community governance 
approach.  
 
A number of community governance theorists have sought to identify the 
principles underlying community governance. For example, Stewart and Clarke 
(1996), whose work is described in the previous chapter, have developed a 
concise statement of principles, namely leadership, partnership, monitoring, 
advocacy, responsiveness, balance (reflecting diversity), and empowerment. In 
their view effective community governance reflects an ability to balance each of 
these roles, particularly roles concerned with the macro-level issues of the area 
as a whole and the micro-level particularities of neighbourhoods, including 
relationships within the city/district. Their approach is consistent with the 
conclusions of a study undertaken by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2001), which, 
drawing on a longitudinal study of 12 cities, identified six local governance 
principles.44 In the view of the foundation, community governance involves: 
• strategic planning – the process of shaping the future and negotiating 
mutual policy goals and priorities with citizens and stakeholders 
• partnering and participation – involving collaboration with citizens and 
government and non-government agencies, within and beyond municipal 
boundaries (horizontal and vertical co-ordination) 
• effective and efficient administration 
• the articulation of mutual policy goals and provision of appropriate 
information to measure progress towards outcomes 
• participation by citizens in setting budgets and priorities along with 
synergies between public and private funding 
                                                 
44
 Cities of Tomorrow – International Network for Better Local Government. At least two of the officials 
who took part in the policy development phase of the LGA 2002 were associated with the Bertelsmann 
study. 
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• innovation and mutual learning through benchmarking and networking 
(nationally and internationally). 
 
Principles of this sort have become almost generic in the community 
governance literature and the OECD (2000) has recommended a very similar 
set, namely:  
• increasing democratic legitimacy and accountability through directly 
elected mayors  
• stronger political leadership and modernised voting procedures  
• new forms of citizen participation in decision-making  
• better frameworks for long-term strategic planning 
• the use of integrated multi-sectoral partnerships (OECD 2000, p.6). 
 
The themes of collaboration, citizen participation and strategic frameworks 
make a strong appearance, as they also did following the Rio Declaration in 
1992 and, eventually, the articulation of Local Agenda 21 (LA21). LA21 was set 
up as a locally focused programme which sought to encourage local authorities 
to co-ordinate agencies to create sustainable communities. It has its origins in 
chapter 28 of the Rio Declaration,45 which describes local authorities as 
representing the sphere of governance closest to the people and called upon 
them to consult their communities and develop and implement local plans for 
sustainability.46 Collaborative and integrative planning toward specified 
outcomes was the essence of LA21 strategies. This was reflected in the catch-
phrase ‘think globally and act locally’, which highlighted the need for groups of 
citizens to take action to shape their world at the level of society that they can 
realistically expect to influence – neighbourhoods, towns and cities. It also 
focused attention on the potential of sub-national governments to contribute to 
national and international goals.  
                                                 
45See www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 for a copy 
of the declaration. 
46
 While the uptake of LA 21 in New Zealand was less than that in countries where governments provided 
financial incentives to participate, city councils such as Hamilton and Waitakere were early adopters and 
their experiences were to influence the shape of the LGA 2002. 
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Such sentiments also began to influence government policy-making 
internationally, particularly in the United Kingdom, in which much of the 
community governance discourse has its origins (Rhodes 1997, Stewart and 
Clarke 1996). In a think-piece on the role of local government entitled Vibrant 
Local Leadership (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005), the British 
Government suggested that the core attributes or principles of the new 
governance in local government should be: 
• visible and accountable leadership 
• a vehicle for partnership, working and bringing key stakeholders together 
to work collectively to solve local problems 
• efficient, effective and transparent decision-making 
• strong and effective scrutiny 
• coverage of the whole council area 
• arrangements that are inclusive of all communities 
• encouragement to people from all sections of the community to play key 
roles 
• a clear and effective neighbourhood dimension 
• the support of local people and stakeholders  
 
Throughout the vision painted in Vibrant Local Leadership are some key 
community governance ideas, such as the emphasis on visible leadership; 
partnership working; coverage of the whole council area; inclusiveness; and a 
neighbourhood dimension. They are concepts that are consistent to most 
frameworks, particularly the importance of local government’s leadership role, 
which is seen as not only encompassing the role of champion for its area but 
also one of challenging and scrutinising services provided by other public 
agencies to ensure they meet the needs of citizens and users. This is a view 
also reflected in the work of theorists like Considine (2006), who emphasise the 
important role councils can take in developing community strategies that set out 
a vision for bringing together local communities and organisations.  
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Principles: local government and community governance  
 
There is a potential symmetry between the principles of (good) local 
government and the principles of community governance. However there are 
some differences in emphasis, to the degree that the principles of local 
government are more focused on organisational matters than the external 
environment. They also emphasise the citizen as a user of council services 
rather than a member of a multiplicity of communities. Table 10 provides a 
typical example of local government principles.  
 
Table 10  Principles of effective local government 
Principle Explanation 
Democracy Citizens have the right to elect local authorities under 
conditions of political freedom and universal suffrage. 
Legal protection Local authorities should operate within a legal or 
constitutional framework that protects against arbitrary 
intervention or dismissal by higher authorities. 
Autonomy Primary accountability should be to citizens and councils 
should be able to make local laws. 
Leadership Legislation should enable strong leadership while 
requiring councils to adopt clear strategic direction. 
Simplicity Legislation should be easy to read and systems of local 
government should avoid unnecessary complexity and 
layers of local government. 
Clarity Legislation should clearly state the purpose and mandate 
(powers and responsibilities).  
Sufficiency Councils should have access to the revenue-raising 
powers and financial resources sufficient to meet their 
responsibilities. 
Effectiveness Local government should be expected to operate 
efficiently and effectively and provide quality services 
through sound planning and management. 
Equity The distribution of services should reflect the diverse 
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needs of the local community. 
Support Central government should ensure that investment is 
made in capacity-building and advice particularly when 
new functions are transferred to local authorities. 
Oversight  Local authorities should be subject to the same oversight 
and monitoring as applies to other public institutions, such 
as independent audits, Ombudsman’s Office. 
Representative-
ness 
Electoral systems should ensure as far as possible that 
councillors represent all sectors of society, in particular 
women, youth and the disadvantaged. 
Transparency Procedures for council meetings should be clearly defined 
and the decision-making process should be transparent 
and open. 
Probity Codes of conduct should be enforced to prevent 
corruption or undue influence in decision-making. 
Participation Councils should be required to consult local communities 
on key issues and to formally consider submissions and 
feedback received. 
Networking Structures and processes should enable active sharing of 
knowledge and resources between local governments. 
Partnerships Legislation should enable local partnerships for planning 
and service delivery between councils, other government 
agencies, civil society and the private sector. 
Dialogue Formal mechanisms should be established for regular 
policy dialogue between local and central governments, 
particularly concerning roles and functions. 
Innovation Legislation should provide flexibility to enable local 
governments to respond creatively to changing needs and 
circumstances. 
Improvement Opportunities should be in place to enable councillors and 
staff to undertake regular training to improve practice and 
performance. 
Cultural respect In addressing these principles local government systems 
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should reflect local cultural values and traditions. 
 
(Source: UTS 2007) 
 
The above conceptualisation of effective local government was compiled by the 
University of Technology in Sydney (UTS), a project sponsored by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and Commonwealth Local Government Forum 
(CLGF).47 Based on international practice and relevant literatures the principles 
identify a range of desirable characteristics for effective local government. The 
result is a comprehensive list of principles which has been designed to act as a 
benchmark in reviewing local government legislative frameworks. The UTS 
work sets out, in principle form, the characteristics or attributes that we might 
expect to see in any well-functioning local government system. In essence 
these are: a legislative framework which clearly spells out the expected role; 
ensures they have access to sufficient resources to implement that role; 
possesses the necessary level of autonomy to respond to local needs; and 
operates in a manner which is open, accountable and efficient. 
 
A similar approach to defining principles is provided by Loffler (2003), who 
approaches community governance as an enhanced form of local government 
and has developed a comprehensive model which distinguishes both local 
government and community governance across a number of dimensions (see 
Table 11). 
                                                 
47
 Unpublished policy paper. 
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Table 11  Characteristics of local government and community governance 
Local government needs to consider:  
not only … … but increasingly 
Organisational leadership Leadership of networks 
Developing organisations 
 
Ensuring policy coherence across 
organisational departments and 
services 
 
 
Creating a set of values and a sense 
of direction which leaves room for 
individual autonomy and creativity for 
mid-level managers and employees 
Developing communities 
 
Ensuring policy coherence across 
organisational and sectoral borders 
and levels of government as well as 
over time (sustainable development) 
 
Managing expectations of citizens, 
companies and other stakeholders 
Policy and strategy Balancing strategic interests 
Focus on the needs of customers 
 
 
 
 
Separation of politics and 
administration 
 
 
 
 
Annual plans, concentrating on current 
expenditure 
Activating civil society (through 
information, consultation and 
participation) in local policies and 
management 
 
Public management as a process of 
interaction between elected officials 
politically appointed officials, ad hoc 
advisers, career civil servants and 
external stakeholders 
 
Long-term plans, incorporating 
community plans, capital budget plans 
and asset management 
People management Management of the labour market 
Increasing labour productivity through Improving staff contribution to all goals 
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downsizing 
 
Getting staff to focus on quality of 
services 
 
 
 
 
Motivation through more objective 
evaluation systems and more flexible 
pay systems 
 
 
Recruiting and retaining qualified staff 
through transparent hiring processes 
 
 
 
Making better use of staff resources 
within the organisation 
of the organisation 
 
Getting staff to focus on quality of life, 
in terms of quality of service outcomes 
for users and other stakeholders and 
also quality of working life for fellow 
staff 
 
Motivation by allowing staff to 
contribute a wider range of their skills 
and aptitudes to work of the 
organisation 
 
Recruiting, training and promoting staff 
in ways which increase the diversity of 
the public services in terms of gender, 
ethnicity, age and disabilities 
 
Making better use of staff resources by 
increasing mobility within the public 
sector and also between other sectors 
and other areas 
Resource management Resource and knowledge 
management 
Budget formulation as a top-down 
exercise (with fixed ceilings on total 
expenditures) 
 
Measurement of unit costs for 
performance improvement and 
performance monitoring 
 
Transparent financial reporting 
Preparation of local budgets with 
active participation of city councillors, 
including community representatives. 
 
Measurement of money and time costs 
as experienced by organisation and 
stakeholders 
 
Fiscal transparency to community with 
     112 
 
 
 
Improving technical efficiency 
 
 
Making ICT available to all staff for 
efficiency-enhancement purposes 
external stakeholders on value for 
money 
 
Improving social efficiency, including 
equitable distribution of budgets 
 
Generating and sustaining new 
knowledge through knowledge 
management, for both staff and 
stakeholders 
Processes Internal and external relationships 
Internal business improvement 
processes (business re-engineering) 
 
 
 
Competing for tendered tasks 
Managing processes beyond 
organisational borders, including 
intergovernmental relations and 
constraints 
 
Managing multiple contracts and 
supplier relationships and developing 
co-production of services with users, 
communities and other stakeholders 
Measurement of objectives and 
subjective results 
Measurement of multi-dimensional 
performance 
Reporting systems based on needs of 
public managers and government 
oversight bodies 
 
 
Benchmarking results, internal 
processes or organisational 
performance against other local 
authorities 
 
Use of performance information for 
Publishing of performance information 
based on the needs of stakeholders in 
the community (social, ethical and 
environmental reporting) 
 
Involving stakeholder groups in the 
definition of performance standards 
and measurement of performance 
 
 
Encouraging innovation and learning 
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control purposes at multiple levels (individual, 
organisational, networks) 
Functioning of the local authority Developing good local governance 
Serving the community by producing 
policies, services and knowledge 
(service provider) 
 
Improving the internal efficiency of 
local authorities 
 
Increasing user satisfaction with local 
services 
Enabling the community to plan and 
manage its own affairs (community 
developer) 
 
Improving the external effectiveness of 
local authorities 
 
Building public trust in local 
government through transparent 
processes and accountability and 
through democratic dialogue 
 
(Source: Loffler 2003, p. 168) 
 
Loffler’s work begins by defining the dimensions of presumed ‘good’ local 
government and goes on to explain what needs to change for each dimension if 
a community governance approach is to be taken. The governance aspects 
have a strong external focus so that, for example, the ‘processes’ dimension 
becomes, in the governance mode, internal and external relationships. The 
common themes in Loffler’s model are the way governance involves an 
extension of focus beyond the organisation and into the more fluid world of the 
community as a whole, such as civic organisations and businesses, as well as a 
strong focus on participation, integration and outcomes. It also emphasises the 
concept of empowerment and treats the local authority as an enabling 
organisation more than a provider. Compared with the UTS approach to local 
government principles Loffler presents a more diminished and organisationally 
focused version of local government, although she runs the risk of being seen to 
accentuate the differences in order to create a discrete model of community 
governance. 
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In Loffler’s interpretation the essential difference between local government and 
community governance is that the latter has a greater external orientation; it is 
concerned with outcomes and involves steering other agencies, although in 
practice the differences are probably a matter of degree. Most of the 
dimensions used by Loffler represent spectrums of local government practice 
with formality and hierarchy at one end and informality and responsiveness at 
the other. Her approach is consistent with the more abstract principles 
developed by Stewart and Clarke (1996) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2001). 
These are strong engagement with citizens and stakeholders (partnerships); 
facilitating citizens to set community goals; network management and policy co-
ordination; working beyond organisational mandates; strengthening civil society; 
and a focus on the quality of life. Similarly, the analysis of community 
governance theories at the end of Chapter 2 identified a number of common 
themes which replicate the principle frameworks discussed above. They are a 
focus on citizens and communities; multiple roles played by councils; inter-
agency collaboration; strategic or long-term thinking; the creation of community 
visions; and inclusiveness. These have been incorporated into the assessment 
model described below. 
Developing an assessment model 
 
Principles, by their nature, are inevitably difficult to translate into guidance for 
action. Can we assume, for example, that all principles are of equal weight and 
importance or should some be given preference? Even when we know the 
relative importance of a principle how do we determine the appropriate 
weighting that should be applied? For example, having sufficient autonomy to 
respond to community needs may be an important principle of community 
governance, but how autonomous do councils need to be? Having sufficient 
income sources to respond to such needs may also be an important principle 
but are some methods of funding better than others? The next section attempts 
to address these issues by proposing an assessment model that consists of a 
framework of principles, dimensions and measures. 
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Developing an assessment model involves identifying, at a reasonably high 
level of abstraction, principles which would need to be exhibited in any local 
government framework if it was to exercise community governance. Drawing on 
the theoretical work on community governance and the more applied work on 
principles discussed in this chapter, six principles are proposed for the 
assessment model. These are: 
 
1. Authority: councils exercising community governance have sufficient 
authority to make decisions on matters of local public interest.  
2. Autonomy: councils exercising community governance can respond to 
citizens’ concerns without undue restrictions imposed by higher 
authorities. 
3. Outcome orientation: councils exercising community governance are 
concerned with broad intersectoral outcomes of concern to their citizens. 
4. Community focus: councils exercising community governance involve 
citizens and stakeholders when determining priorities and the 
community’s long-term direction. 
5. Partnership: councils exercising community governance undertake policy 
and operational co-ordination with other organisations including other 
levels of government. 
6. Inclusiveness: councils exercising community governance implement 
mechanisms to allow citizens to participate in decision-making. 
 
The purpose of the model is to assess the capacity of the local government 
system in New Zealand to take on a community governance approach and 
identify areas that would need to change or be enhanced. The first two 
principles concern the underlying legislative and regulatory framework of the 
local government system and involve the concepts of authority and autonomy. 
In order for community governance to occur the local authority must be 
regarded as an authorising agent, that is, it should be seen as having both 
legitimacy and status in the eyes of local citizens. Councils must also have a 
sufficient level of autonomy to enable them to negotiate with disparate local 
interests and have a capacity to act on agreements subsequently entered into. 
This requires an appropriate level of powers and competencies to implement 
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policies and influence events to the degree that local authorities themselves 
determine.  
 
The outcome orientation principle is concerned with the degree to which local 
authorities are focused on the achievement of community-wide outcomes as 
opposed to an exclusive focus on the delivery of specific organisational outputs, 
and the manner in which they exercise their leadership mandate. The 
‘community-focused’ principle highlights the manner in which councils involve 
their stakeholders and citizens when setting direction and agreeing priorities – it 
is primarily concerned with leadership. The collaboration principle examines the 
degree to which, recognising the multi-faceted nature of many of the issues 
affecting communities, councils are engaged in resource sharing and/or other 
collaborative relationships, particularly with higher level governments. Finally 
the inclusiveness principle captures the fundamental importance of strong 
democracy and the role citizens can and should play in setting the direction of 
the local authority and determining priorities. 
 
In order to ‘operationalise’ the assessment model, dimensions and specific 
measures are required. Loffler groups her principles into seven dimensions 
ranging from leadership and strategy to performance and oversight. The 
dimensions are a combination of process attributes, institutional factors and 
operational style. For the assessment model 10 dimensions have been 
selected. This has been done by disaggregating the system of local government 
into its basic parts and selecting those that are relevant to each principle. For 
each dimension one or more measures have been identified in order to 
determine the ability of the dimension to adopt a community governance 
approach. Assessments simply identify the dimension as ‘adequate’ for 
achieving community governance or ‘needing improvement’. The dimensions 
and measures are: 
• size and structure: size is selected as a proxy for capacity; that is, do 
New Zealand councils have the necessary level of resources to actively 
contribute to community governance? Structure concerns the ability of 
systems of local government to undertake activities which have different 
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levels of benefit and thus beneficiaries. The measures for this dimension 
are local authority average populations (a proxy for capacity) and the 
prevalence of multi-level governance arrangements (to indicate ability of 
the local government sector to deliver services that benefit diverse areas) 
• empowerment: this dimension is concerned with the manner in which 
local authorities are empowered. Are local governments’ powers tightly 
defined, through, for example, the principle of ultra vires, or do they have 
some form of general powers? The choice of powers determines how 
well the system can respond to citizen concerns and expectations. The 
measure is the presence or otherwise of general empowerment 
• finance: this dimension is concerned with councils’ financial autonomy, 
that is, the degree to which local authorities are able to make local 
expenditure decisions without oversight from higher levels of authority. 
Local government systems in which funding is determined by higher level 
governments tend to have less discretion in the way resources are 
prioritised and local spending decisions made. The measure is the 
proportion of ‘own tax’ revenue raised by the local government system 
• central government supervision: questions about authority and autonomy 
are answered not only by examining the constitutional status of local 
government but also by looking at the degree to which national 
governments ‘steer’ the activities of lower level governments and the 
nature of the steering mechanisms employed. The measure for this 
dimension is the place where New Zealand sits on the spectrum of 
mandatory and discretionary steering mechanisms  
• functions: the choice of functions as a dimension is to highlight the 
degree to which councils are able to make decisions that have a direct 
effect on the well-being of their respective communities. Measures are 
the proportion of local government expenditure that makes up national 
gross domestic product (GDP), overall public expenditure and the range 
of functions undertaken. The more significant these are the more a 
system is seen to be contributing to well-being 
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• strategy: virtually all local authority systems either require or encourage 
councils to undertake some form of strategic planning. This dimension is 
concerned with whether or not strategy is organisationally focused or 
externally and outcome focused. The measure concerns whether or not 
councils have a statutory mandate to undertake outcome-focused 
community strategic planning and the New Zealand approach is 
compared with the approaches taken in England and the Republic of 
Ireland, both of which reflect a strong community governance orientation 
in their design 
• leadership: this indicator is concerned with the nature of local 
government leadership and whether or not it is optimally situated to 
provide ‘community leadership’ as described in the community 
governance literature. The measure is the existence or otherwise of 
directly elected mayors  
• collaboration: this dimension examines the degree to which the statutory 
framework governing local government encourages or requires councils 
to ‘join up’, that is, participate in joint service delivery or planning 
initiatives. The measure examines the degree to which such directives or 
incentives are required 
• decision-making: this dimension examines the range of opportunities 
citizens have to influence the decision-making processes undertaken by 
their elected representatives. The measure for this indicator examines 
legislative or statutory requirements to consult or involve citizens in 
decision-making 
• local democracy: this indicator is concerned with the ‘thickness’ of local 
democracy and the strength of representation. The two measures are 
representation ratios and the role of sub-municipal bodies. High 
representation ratios are regarded as diminishing voice and 
consequently citizens’ influence on council decision-making. In contrast, 
the presence of sub-municipal bodies is regarded as enhancing 
opportunities for citizens to exercise ‘voice’. 
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The local governance assessment model 
 
The assessment model is described in full in Figure 5. The assessment itself is 
undertaken in Chapter 7.  
 
Figure 5 Local governance assessment model  
Principle Dimension Measure 
Authority    
 Size and structure  
  Average population per 
council 
  Multi-level capacity 
 Finance  
  Proportion of ‘own tax’ 
revenue 
Autonomy   
 Empowerment  
  Existence of general 
competence type powers 
 Central government 
supervision 
 
  Use of non-mandatory 
steering instruments by 
central government 
Outcome orientation   
 Functions  
  Expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP and 
public expenditure 
  Range of mandatory 
functions 
Community focus   
 Strategy  
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  Outcome-based strategic 
planning mandatory 
 Leadership  
  Role of mayors and form 
of selection 
Partnership    
 Collaboration  
  Range of mechanisms to 
promote joined-up activity 
Inclusiveness   
 Decision-making  
  Opportunities for citizen 
involvement 
 Local democracy  
  Representation ratios 
  Existence of sub-
municipal bodies 
 
The assessments will be undertaken using a number of approaches. Where 
appropriate data is available comparisons will be made to other local 
government systems to determine where New Zealand sits on relevant 
spectrums. Where comparative data is not available assessments will draw on 
original source documents already in the public domain, including archived 
material and relevant academic papers, such as annual reports, Long Term 
Council Community Plans, refereed journals and official government 
publications.  
Conclusion 
 
The assessment model has been designed to assess the capacity of the local 
government system in New Zealand to adopt a community governance 
approach. The model is based on common themes identified by community 
governance theorists and also draws on the work of a range of commentators 
who have sought to develop their own community governance principles. Each 
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of the 10 dimensions will be assessed as being either adequate or needing 
improvement and are discussed in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 4 The role of local government 
 
This chapter discusses theories and frameworks of local government, including 
recent international trends regarding local government reform and community 
governance. It also examines a range of meta-trends which are used to explain 
the recent growth of interest in governance and local government.  
 
The New Zealand Government’s decision to establish a commission to examine 
the way in which the metropolitan area of Auckland should be governed 
signalled a growing realisation that the way decisions are made in cities and 
districts matters, and may have national consequences, particularly in large 
metropolitan areas. This understanding has not always been the case, at least 
in New Zealand, as the following editorial lament suggests:  
 
Once again the movement for local government reform has foundered on 
the rocks of political expediency … It is simply a reversion to the laissez 
faire of yesteryear. … History records 31 years of non-achievement in 
local body reform (Timaru Herald, 21 October 1977, quoted in Boswell 
1981).  
 
The history of local government reform in New Zealand has been one of benign 
neglect, in which ministerial efforts to reform the sector were rebuffed by 
successive governments until the fourth Labour Government rose to the 
challenge. Since that time local government reform has continued with 
remarkable frequency, with the Government’s response to the Royal 
Commission indicating that it continues to be a matter of official concern, 
particularly the governance of large cities. This ongoing interest, which is 
replicated in most other parts of the developed world (see Dollery and Robotti 
2008), has resulted in a growth in the academic interest in, and theories about, 
the role and nature of local government. These theories are drawn broadly from 
the disciplines of economics and political science. 
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Economic theories of local government 
 
Both economics and political science have advanced strong arguments for 
robust systems of local government, each discipline highlighting different roles 
played by councils in economic and political life. Economists regard 
governments as playing four primary economic roles: allocation, distribution, 
regulation and stabilisation, with local government being primarily concerned 
with the allocation functions and to a lesser degree regulatory functions (Bailey 
1999). Regulation is primarily undertaken at a national level, but local 
government may act as a regulatory agent; it may also be better placed to 
determine appropriate regulation of matters of local importance, such as liquor 
bylaws. In addition, councils are well placed to address instances of local 
market failure, for example, in local sewerage services, where the cost of 
developing infrastructure and the inability to charge consumers for their use of 
such infrastructure limit non-public providers (ibid). 
 
The economic case for local government also hinges on the value of 
decentralising or devolving services to lower-level governments to meet the 
diverse preferences of consumers. This is seen to enhance efficiency as 
councils can operate more like markets than hierarchies, resulting in levels of 
service that are more likely to reflect the preferences of local citizens. Bailey 
(1999) distinguishes three types of decentralisation: 
• economic decentralisation – which is concerned with the location of 
economic decisions (for example, with the consumer) 
• political decentralisation – which provides sub-national governments with 
the power to levy taxes and charges so as to deliver self-determined 
outputs 
• administrative decentralisation – which creates regional offices of central 
departments, normally lacking any policy discretion. 
 
The three forms of decentralisation are not mutually exclusive and may operate 
alongside each other, varying according to policy arena. In fact any comparative 
study of local government would note that they occur in differing combinations 
     124 
in almost every country. While decentralisation might make economic sense 
under certain conditions, the policy challenge is to determine what those 
conditions are and which services should be decentralised. A number of 
theories attempt to answer this question, such as fiscal federalism, which is 
discussed below.  
 
Fiscal federalism 
Fiscal federalists argue that local governments exist to provide “goods and 
services whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdictions” (Oates 1999, 
p.1121) and that doing so will ensure greater economic welfare than a more 
uniform provision of services from the centre. Fiscal federalists argue that by 
decentralising services local governments can match citizens’ preferences 
better than national governments, as people can shift between jurisdictions until 
they find one that provides the range of services they desire. What has come to 
be known as ‘Oates’ decentralisation theorem’ states that local governments 
should “be created such that preferences vary little within localities but vary 
strongly between them” (Bailey 1999 p. 21).  
 
Fiscal federalism captures many of the popularly advanced arguments for 
devolution and decentralisation, including the argument that devolution to local 
government encourages new ideas and initiatives which could not be safely 
tried at a national level. In other words, the smaller scale of local governments 
limits the consequences of government failure!  
 
One of the economic arguments underpinning fiscal federalism is the 
suggestion that devolution and decentralisation make economic sense because 
they give voters more control over decision-makers. This idea was also 
advanced by the work of Tiebout in 1956 (see Bailey 1999), who suggested that 
local governments could act in a similar way to markets. This occurs when 
dissatisfied residents express disapproval by ‘exiting’ their council and shifting 
to a different local government administration, one which provides a range of 
goods and services that more closely match their preferences. In this way 
efficiency would be enhanced and performance improved as local governments 
seek to satisfy the majority of their citizens.  
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While the theory is attractive the Tiebout model makes assumptions that limit its 
real-world application. First, it assumes that citizens have full information about 
the differences in revenue and expenditure patterns and the goods and services 
provided by different local authorities and are able to make rational 
comparisons (taking into account issues of cost and quality). Second, it 
assumes that exit is relatively free of cost, which requires local governments to 
be small and numerous. A third assumption is that each council can influence 
the full range of local services, which often is not the case. In practice these 
conditions are seldom met. For example, it is difficult for citizens to get 
information on councils’ performance and so make appropriate assessments 
about cost and quality; exit is unlikely to be costless, and the ability of councils 
to influence the full range of local services is often constrained by higher 
authorities that often set national service levels as well as the use of regional 
service arrangements, which effectively diminishes local differences.48 
 
Bailey’s contribution 
In contrast to the pragmatism of the fiscal federalists, Bailey (1999) takes a 
more principle-based approach, suggesting that the question of determining 
which level of government does what can only be solved by considering the 
“profound multidirectional interdependencies between structure, functions and 
finance” (Bailey 1999, p. 116). His concern is with achieving allocative 
efficiency, which, he suggests, involves matching form, function and finance. 
The criteria he advances for achieving this matching include the following:  
• Local government should provide the majority of public sector services 
because their benefits are localised. 
• Local government should only provide services where the risk of local 
market failure is high and government failure is low. 
• The jurisdictions of local governments should, as far as practicable, be 
coterminous with the areas benefiting from the provision of their services. 
                                                 
48
 Marsh and Kay (2004) suggest that the empirical evidence for the Tiebout effect is less than 
convincing, especially outside the fragmented local governance environment of the United States.  
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• Councils should be as small as possible, while still achieving economies 
of scale. 
• Scope for exit should be facilitated by increasing inter-municipal 
competition for residents, and decentralisation of services within council 
areas (Bailey 1999). 
 
In Bailey’s view the optimal size of local government units reflects a trade-off 
between the benefits of decentralisation and the possible loss of economies of 
scale. A critical aspect of his approach is his assertion that the “geographic size 
of municipalities needs to match the areas benefiting from service provision in 
order that those who benefit from a service bear the local tax costs financing it” 
(ibid, p. 228). The practical challenge, however, is to match the geographical 
spread of benefits with the liability to pay taxes. Bailey’s answer is to make 
jurisdictions as large as practicable while maintaining democratic legitimacy and 
opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making. Larger jurisdictions 
prevent tax exporting and spillovers and minimise fiscal disparities between the 
taxable resources of communities.  
 
Finding this balance is far from simple, however. While the fiscal federalists 
undervalue the strategic fit between form, function and financing and fail to 
resolve the accountability problem created by fiscal transfers, Bailey’s solution 
poses a different problem. Achieving the appropriate fit requires larger 
jurisdictions but larger councils tend to be less democratic with lower voter 
turnout and fewer mechanisms by which citizens can influence decision-making 
and so hold officials to account; that is, they tend to be more bureaucratic and 
elected members less accountable (Drage 2008). His approach continues to 
beg the question of how to design institutions to achieve the alignment between 
areas of benefit and political jurisdiction without losing the responsiveness that 
comes with smaller local authorities. The answer is inevitably going to be 
influenced by context and the range of services local governments are expected 
to deliver. Bailey is writing for a predominantly British context and, given the 
social policy responsibilities undertaken by British councils, larger jurisdictions 
have a logic that is not present in systems with a different mix of service 
responsibilities. Given New Zealand local government’s minimalist functional 
     127 
responsibilities, area of benefit is primarily defined by the extent of the 
infrastructure networks owned and operated by councils, such as the number of 
communities attached to a council’s water or wastewater networks – other 
factors are less likely to apply. 
Political theories of local government 
 
Political theories of local government tend to emphasise its role in the 
development of citizenship and the distribution of power, rather than the efficient 
delivery of public goods. De Tocqueville expresses this eloquently when he 
argues that local government is necessary to give citizens the experience of 
government and act as schools of citizenship. His study of American democracy 
in the early 19th century found evidence that participation in local self-governing 
associations and local governments enabled citizens to come together to 
discuss their common needs and increase their awareness of the needs of 
others (see Siedentop 1994). This observation also underpins much of the more 
recent theory of civic republicanism, which sees the practice of self-government 
as building character and enhancing democracy (see Sandel 1996).  
 
A related view regards local government as a check and balance on the power 
of the executive. From this perspective popular decentralised self-government 
helps guarantee the freedom of local communities, maintaining the separation 
of powers in which the interdependence of society dictates that all members 
should be active in promoting the public interest to avoid the possibility that 
government is left to a minority or distant elite (Norton 1994). Ensuring that 
public authority is distributed over a number of levels of government also 
reduces the ability of any one level of government to concentrate power in its 
hands alone. “Decentralisation of power and local solidarity are principal means 
to counteract the threats to freedom that any gap between rulers and ruled 
implies” (ibid, p. 31). Further checks and balances are provided simply by the 
existence of an empowered and legitimate local government system. John 
Roberts argued more than 40 years ago that: 
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the growing power of government, as evidenced by its ever increasing 
intervention in the economic and social affairs of the people, constitutes 
another reason for the existence of an efficient system of local 
government. While central and local government must share, as 
collaborative partners, the total task of governing the nation, an effective 
local government structure is an important counterweight to the growth of 
central government power. Local government is not solely a matter of the 
management of local services; it provides the democratic machinery for 
the expression of local opinion on all matters of public policy (Roberts 
quoted in Boswell 1981, p.30). 
 
Political theory also recognises that local government provides a learning 
ground for budding central government politicians. It has lower barriers to entry, 
which allows participation by a wider and more representative group of 
individuals, while also giving new politicians a chance to develop their skills and 
experiment with innovative policy ideas (see Lyons 2007). Also highlighting the 
value of distributed government, Buchanan (1995/96) promotes the concept of 
competitive federalism and argues that federal systems which distribute power 
between levels of government offer better protection of individual liberty than 
unitary systems of government, particularly if the political units are small. He 
notes, in particular, that a vote is worth proportionately more in communities 
with small numbers of voters, and in such communities it is easier for citizens to 
organise in order to replace political incumbents. While Buchanan’s notion of 
competitive federalism is indebted to Tiebout’s work on exit, he acknowledges 
the concept’s real-world limitations (that is, ideal conditions are seldom realised) 
by arguing that ‘virtual exit’ may be just as effective as real exit. Virtual exit 
represents the possibility or threat of exit, and in order to change political 
behaviour the threat may be as important as exit itself. Just the existence of 
neighbouring councils that are perceived as operating more efficiently or 
effectively creates moral pressure on elected members to improve their 
performance.  
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Localism 
Localism is a normative belief in the value of local decision-making. It is 
generally justified on the basis of three values: democratic participation in public 
affairs; the efficient allocation of public goods and services; and community 
strengthening (see Filkin et al 2000). The participation argument, in particular, is 
based on the assumption that smaller localities are more effective at providing 
opportunities for meaningful political participation than larger authorities, 
reflecting citizens’ access to decision-makers. Participation is also regarded as 
a valuable social good in its own right because it enhances moral autonomy and 
builds a sense of local identity (Sandel 1996, Putnam 1995, Sen 1999). 
Ultimately it is seen to promote civic virtue, and understanding, and strengthens 
‘bridging’ social capital, that is, the increased social trust that comes from 
engagement between diverse communities (Putnam 1995, Muhlberger 2000).  
 
Proximity to local governments can also help citizens ensure that decision-
makers provide the range of local public goods and services that meet their 
particular needs and preferences. This argument emphasises the heterogeneity 
of the national community and the difficulties faced by national providers 
(central government) in tailoring services to the circumstances and preferences 
of diverse communities. Locating decision-making as closely as possible to the 
communities affected by decisions is also seen as a way of strengthening 
community in its own right. Putnam’s (1995) work in Northern Italy notes the 
relationship between the strength of regional government and the degree to 
which citizens participate in clubs and societies and theorises that high social 
participation is related to responsive and effective governance at the regional 
level. Local government is one of the arenas for civic engagement that 
contributes to social capital. It also encourages citizens to believe they have a 
stake in their own communities, in contrast to feelings of disempowerment that 
tend to be associated with larger and more remote governments, reflecting, 
perhaps, the fact that trust in local government tends to be higher than trust in 
national governments.49 
 
                                                 
49
 See Community Perceptions of the Three Spheres of Government, Local Government and Shires 
Association of New South Wales, GPO Box 7003, Sydney.  
     130 
Despite the value of participation and proximity, when it comes to designing the 
institutions of government localism has a number of shortcomings. Cashin 
(1999), for example, argues that voters behave more self-interestedly when 
decision-making authority is brought closer to them, citing a common practice in 
the United States for well-off suburbs to incorporate as separate authorities in 
order to avoid the cost of supporting the urban poor. She uses the phrase 
‘tyranny of the favoured quarter’ to describe the increasing fragmentation of 
local governance in many states that has resulted in metropolitan regions 
stratified by race and income. Localism, in this context, represents extreme 
parochialism and a political NIMBYism.50 Localist forms of governance are also 
poorly placed to deal with externalities and spillovers, such as where one 
community benefits from taxes paid in a neighbouring community, and require 
additional co-ordinating mechanisms since some services must be provided 
regionally (see Bailey 1999). 
 
Subsidiarity 
A complementary but more sophisticated discourse, subsidiarity, captures many 
of the promises of localism while recognising its limits. From its first articulation 
in 1931 by Pope Pius XI in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (Novak 1996), 
subsidiarity has provided a normative justification for strengthening the role of 
citizens in public affairs. Locally, one of the clearest definitions of subsidiarity 
was made by the Royal Commission into Social Policy established by the fourth 
Labour Government in New Zealand more than two decades ago. The 
commission defined subsidiarity as the principle that “no organisation should be 
bigger than necessary, and nothing should be done by a larger and higher unit 
that can be done by a lower and smaller unit” (Royal Commission on Social 
Policy 1988, p. 806). However, the concept has had a limited impact in New 
Zealand, as the commission’s report has largely been ignored by both the fourth 
Labour Government and its successors and the concept of subsidiarity is 
seldom seen in public sector discourse. The concept has, however, had a much 
                                                 
50
 ‘Not in my backyard’ syndrome. 
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more positive reception in parts of Europe and the European Union itself, where 
it has been incorporated in the European Charter of Local Self Government.51 
 
As a concept to guide policy-making, subsidiarity is helpful as it avoids some of 
the difficulties of localism by recognising the degree to which the technical 
characteristics of some public goods and services will result in diminished public 
welfare should they be provided solely by localities. For example, services that 
require a high degree of technical knowledge but occur infrequently will 
inevitably need to be undertaken by high level governments, where costs can 
be spread over a bigger community and demands for expertise are likely to be 
greater. While subsidiarity theorists debate the nature of the technical 
characteristics that might justify provision by higher levels of government, in 
broad terms they are seen to involve economies of scale and redistributive 
factors.  
The drivers of local government reform 
 
One of the features of the last few decades has been the efforts by many 
developed countries to reform their local government systems, with economic 
theory, in particular, a major driver. In recent years countries examining the 
form, functions or financial arrangements of their local government systems 
have included Denmark, Ireland, Scotland, England, New Zealand, all the states 
of Australia, South Africa, Fiji and several provinces of Canada. In many of 
these countries change has almost become the norm as governments struggle 
to find the policy settings that balance macro-economic concerns with 
efficiency, and national policy objectives with citizens’ expectations to influence 
decisions which affect their communities. This relatively universal focus on local 
government, accompanied by ongoing public sector reform, is largely explained 
by a series of exogenous factors that have changed the context in which 
governments operate. Three factors, in particular, are relevant to the subject of 
this thesis: globalisation, increasing social diversity and a demand for greater 
autonomy or civic participation (Albrechts 1991, Albrow 2001).  
 
                                                 
51
 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/122.htm. 
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The impact of globalisation has been a specific factor behind the British 
Government’s thinking about local government reform. In a recent paper it 
commented that “the increasing interdependence of the world economy means 
that every nation, region and city of the UK faces more intense global 
competition” (ODPM 2006, p. 55). In a world in which capital has become 
increasingly ‘footloose’, councils, if they are focused on enhancing the well-
being of their citizens, will need to be aware of the implications of globalisation 
and respond to them as appropriate to their level of authority. Support for the 
proposition that increasing globalisation and social change creates roles for 
localities and sub-national governments comes from commentators across the 
political spectrum (Vargas Llosa 2001, Bell 1973, Habermas 1992, Etzioni 
1996). These writers have in common a view that the locality, or at least the 
sub-nation, is now a meaningful site for political debate and allows engagement 
by a much broader range of policy actors than previously, that politics is now 
much less an activity of the elite. Arguing for a ‘New Westphalian’ paradigm to 
strengthen global and sub-national forms of governance (the Treaty or treaties 
of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 and established the system 
of nation states as we know it today), Valaskakis (2001) pictures a world in 
which, because of new challenges, “national governments are in the process of 
becoming bit players of the new era” (ibid, p. 56) and calls for new governing 
institutions.  
 
These challenges might be seen as reflecting a shift of power from political to 
economic decision-makers, perhaps indicated by the rise of multi-national 
corporations and the transfer of decision-making authority to international 
governing organisations, such as the World Trade Organization and 
International Labour Organization. Sassen (2006) describes this process as one 
of “denationalisation”, in which global firms become informal political agents and 
historical national goals are gradually displaced by global aims (ibid, p. 5). It is 
also associated, in her view, with a hollowing out of legislatures and parliaments 
and a strengthening of executive power, creating the space for local 
governments to act in order to fill the resulting vacuum. Other writers also make 
a similar link between globalisation and local governance (see Andrew and 
Goldsmith 1998, Harmsworth 2001). Tarschys (2001), for example, argues that 
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the modern state is effectively squeezed between two competing forces, “a 
more assertive local and regional level of government on the one hand and the 
dynamics of international and supra-national regulation on the other” (ibid, p. 
33). Indeed large urban regimes, like New York and Tokyo, are regarded as 
forming the basis for new transnational networks which have the potential to 
effectively take on the traditional roles of the state (Sassen 2006). The 
phenomenon in which globalisation is changing the role of the state and making 
room for more localised forms of governance is reinforced in the theory of 
‘glocalisation’, which takes the view that local identities increase in importance 
as the national sphere of identity erodes.  
 
The glocalism concept suggests that local identities acquire more 
importance as global decision-making increases in scale, as it is through 
local identities that citizens both understand and relate to a global 
environment marked by uncertainty. Economic integration therefore 
enhances rather than diminishes the local community. As globalisation 
intensifies, smaller units of political affiliation may be relied on to a 
greater degree to meet citizens’ expectations and channel citizen 
identities (Paasi, quoted in Harmsworth 2001, p. 7). 
 
The theory of glocalisation provides an alternative take on the effects of 
globalisation by suggesting that instead of increasing homogeneity, 
globalisation has created the opportunity for greater local difference. Advocates 
for the theory argue that some local governments and communities have in fact 
already seized these opportunities. Yet it is not only external factors, like 
globalisation, that are undermining the efficacy of the state and its traditional 
policy levers. Social change is having a similar effect. Increasing diversity 
makes it more difficult for hierarchical and command and control decision-
making models to operate. The growth of multiple identities and multi-cultural 
communities with different expectations has challenged the welfare state 
consensus and its one-size-fits-all approach, creating a situation where the 
concept of a “dominant state-centred welfare has corroded and lost its 
hegemony” (Evers quoted in Williamson 1999, p. 30).   
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Diversity is reflected not only in the social and demographic makeup of 
contemporary societies, but also in their economic foundations and the shift 
from ‘Fordism’ to ‘post-Fordism’, which has implications for both the private and 
public sectors (Stoker 2000, Giddens 2000). The term Fordism, referring to the 
assembly-line manufacturing processes introduced by Henry Ford, has been 
employed more broadly to describe any process designed to produce large 
quantities of single components at the lowest price. It has come to be used also 
as a generic label for social and commercial institutions that deliver standard 
products on the assumption that customers’ preferences are uniform. Such 
approaches to production, however, struggle to meet the different needs and 
preferences of plural and diverse communities. Parsons (1997) argues that 
control through hierarchies (Fordist organisations tend to be hierarchical) has 
given way to less bureaucratic, flatter, more fragmented post-modern or post-
Fordist structures. Post-Fordist advocates, such as Stoker (2000), argue that 
changing modes of production and expectations among consumers have 
implications for local public services, which will need to reflect the differences of 
individual communities and respond to their needs and wants as the market 
responds to customers, particularly with the growth of multi-cultural 
communities. While the Fordist/post-Fordist discussion arguably simplifies 
complex social and economic phenomena, it serves to highlight the degree of 
change taking place in our social, economic and political systems. Such 
changes have implications for the relative roles of local and central government.  
 
Adding to the pressures created by the challenges of globalisation and diversity, 
governments are also being confronted by a citizenry at once less trusting of 
governments,52 less inclined to use traditional forms of democratic participation, 
such as voting, and more demanding that its views be considered. Whereas 
globalisation effectively creates external constraints on the state’s freedom of 
action, the demands of civil society to participate in public decision-making 
create an equivalent internal constraint, such as the growing interest in 
proportional voting systems as a way of providing opportunities for a broader 
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 Surveys taken in the United States since 1958 show that the proportion of citizens who agree that “you 
can trust the government in Washington to do what is right has fallen from 63 per cent to 27 per cent 
(Ladd 1998). Preliminary data for 2008 shows that confidence in the executive branch and Congress had 
fallen to 11 per cent (The Economist, 28 March 2009, p. 36).  
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range of political actors and to limit executive power. Similar pressures are 
occurring in local government (Williamson 1999).  
 
As citizens articulate their needs and preferences more clearly, increasingly 
outside traditional party mechanisms, governments have been forced to find 
ways of being more responsive. Some commentators suggest that a new form 
electoral politics has been formed, one of “continual mediation … in order to 
preserve balance and maintain social harmony” (Lakoff 1996, p. 34). Lakoff 
argues that to be effective governments must establish institutions and 
processes that allow the diversity of voices in communities to be heard. 
Perhaps the greatest indication of this, in practice, is the recent tendency of 
many governments to devolve responsibilities to local governments and to 
require such governments to adopt innovative practices, such as citizen 
participation techniques. Consistent with these trends, citizenship is proposed 
as a critical concept in the reconceptualisation of local government, particularly 
for constructing localities and providing a rationale for loyalty to local 
communities (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998). Paradoxically, shared citizenship, 
which involves equal rights to services and a vision of inclusiveness, allows 
local differences to be resolved (ibid). Citizenship “speaks to the link between 
individual and community levels of identity, and local citizenship conveys the 
potential for local government structures to represent and reinforce the 
interrelationship between individual and collective identities” (ibid, p. 110). In the 
United States, for example, the pressure for greater civic participation has been 
reflected in neighbourhoods, towns and local communities by the growth of a 
movement of citizens acting together to solve community problems:  
 
It is a non-partisan movement that crosses traditional jurisdictions and 
operates on a shoe-string. It is a movement that begins with civic 
dialogue and leads to public action (National Commission on Civic 
Renewal, quoted in Livable Communities 2000, p. 15). 
 
Community-based demands for a greater say in how their communities are run 
are replicated throughout most of the developed world, if not more widely, and 
have driven recent changes to local government practice. In fact there has been 
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a high level of convergence, reflecting the dominance of particular reform 
ideologies and the transfer of ideas between countries.53 For example, the New 
Zealand approach to long-term financial planning has been replicated in South 
Australia, Queensland and New South Wales.  
 
Modernisation 
One theme that has shaped much of the thinking about reform, at least up to 
the end of the 1990s, is the idea of modernisation, a contested idea which 
Christopher Hood described as one of the most powerful themes in 
contemporary management (Hood 1998 quoted in Dollery and Wallis 2001b). In 
its widest sense ‘modernisation’ is a way of speaking about a distinct range of 
changes to the institutions and practice of governments which have occurred to 
various degrees over the last two decades of the 20th century – reforms that 
challenged the prevailing Weberian-based model of public administration and its 
heavy reliance on rules and hierarchy.  
 
The modernist challenge to the traditional form of public administration is well 
documented (see Boston 1991a and 1991b) but there is less consensus about 
the reasons or need for change. Boston suggests that fiscal imperatives were a 
decisive influence leading to change along with a general political shift to the 
right and a corresponding interest in privatisation and commercialisation 
(Boston 1991a). Others saw it as a reaction to growing bureaucratisation, which 
was seen to slow development and undermine the capacity for innovation, 
leading to “less national government, less central government, but greater 
governance over local processes” (D’Alema quoted in Giddens 2000, p. 5). The 
modernist agenda, however, has not met with universal enthusiasm. Kelsey 
(1994), for example, questions both the results of, and necessity for, reform, 
which she describes as implementing a dogmatic liberal agenda resulting from 
a crisis of legitimacy in the western democracies. 
 
The modernisation project set out to organise bureaucracies so that 
departments have clear and consistent objectives, a high standard of 
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 For example, there is regular contact between officials and academics in New Zealand and many 
Australian states, including a joint local government Ministerial Committee.  
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accountability, transparency regarding trade-offs, less likelihood of provider 
capture, contestable provision of advice, and the removal of trading activities 
from direct political control. As Boston describes the phenomenon, changes to 
the machinery of government sought to achieve “consistency, accountability, 
transparency, contestability, complementarity, co-ordination, economy, 
efficiency, the minimisation of capture and improved bureaucratic 
representation for dis-advantaged groups” (Boston 1991b, p. 239). In short, the 
objective was a public sector that was more likely to be responsive, arranged in 
a way that would reflect a greater plurality of voices, and focused on outcomes.  
 
Similar purposes guided the reform of local government, particularly in New 
Zealand. The reform agenda reflected a strong commitment to increasing 
transparency, accountability and efficiency and resulted in large scale 
consolidation as the multiplicity of small single and multi-purpose local bodies 
was merged into a much smaller number (see Chapter 1). Corporate sector 
practices, such as the separation of trading activities and removal of elected 
members from the operation of councils, followed. In addition, possibly 
reflecting local government’s uncertain constitutional place, the Government 
has also introduced policies that create greater accountability to citizens 
through compulsory consultation and the requirement to prepare annual plans, 
reports and long-term financial strategies. Internationally, reform followed 
multiple paths, reflecting both local political initiatives and competition between 
states:   
 
the trends towards administrative restructuring currently under way, the 
breakthrough innovations and the numerous negative developments, 
point to two central key problems which represent the two central 
challenges for local government in the run-up to the 21st century. These 
are how to make the transformation from: 
• sectoral optimisation strategy to strategic management of overall 
administration (and) 
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• internal modernisation to redefinition of boundary between local 
administration and its political, economic and social environment 
(Naschold 1997, p. 25). 
 
Drawing on a number of international studies Naschold argues that reform has 
seldom been consistent, sustainable or even in the same general direction and 
suggests that local government modernisation consists of three meta-trends. 
These are internal rationalisation, democratisation and market orientation.  
• Internal rationalisation. This largely captures what Boston (1991a) refers 
to as ‘machinery of government’ reforms. It includes a separation of 
outcomes and outputs, accrual accounting and more flexible work and 
personnel practices, along the lines of New Public Management. 
• Democratisation. This involves more community participation in decision-
making and the devolution of decision-making to lower orders of 
government and organisations in civil society.  
• Market orientation. This consists of increasing corporatisation, 
privatisation and use of market-type instruments, such as external 
contracting and market testing.  
 
The rate at which the reform trends have been taken up and ‘bedded in’ varies. 
In New Zealand more emphasis appears to have been placed on internal 
modernisation and the use of market-type interventions than on devolution, 
democratisation and the empowerment of civil society. While noting that 
modernisation has resulted in both successful innovation and institutional 
failure, Naschold argues that a greater challenge for local governments was to 
manage the transition from internal modernisation to the development of 
strategic management. Modernisation, as carried out in the eighties and 
nineties, tended to be organisationally focused with a concern to improve 
efficiency and accountability. Still to be achieved was the “redefinition of the 
interfaces between local administration and politics, society and the economy” 
(ibid, p. 5).  
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The process of change is ‘lumpy’, with initiatives in up to half the councils in 
Naschold’s sample either stagnating or regressing, leading him to suggest that 
a process of ‘demodernisation’ was also occurring in some jurisdictions. 
“Modernisation is not merely a linear institutional evolution involving cumulative 
differentiation, specialisation and innovation at ever higher levels, but also 
exhibits strategic dis-continuities, reverses and signs of dis-integration” (ibid, p. 
12). Being a non-linear process, modernisation represents an uneven 
progression of reform elements with different jurisdictions emphasising different 
elements. For example, in their study of local government reform in Australia, 
Marshall and Sproats (2000) describe the way in which some states, such as 
New South Wales (NSW), gave priority to enhancing democracy, while other 
states, notably Victoria, emphasised efficiency. The result was a very different 
approach to the issue of consolidation, where NSW left the decision up to 
communities themselves, in contrast to Victoria’s top-down process, which saw 
the number of councils cut to less than a third by state decree.  
 
Despite the tendency to treat modernisation as a largely technical exercise, 
many of the elements considered to be part of the modernisation agenda were, 
and continue to be, contentious. While different approaches were taken to the 
issue of consolidation, the same is also true of devolution, with some countries 
adopting it with enthusiasm and others giving it less than ‘lip service’. Dollery 
(2008) suggest that local government reform is path-dependent and that 
specific change can be explained only by reference to circumstances unique to 
each area, while Oates notes “the degree of fiscal decentralisation is itself the 
outcome of complex political and economic forces” (Oates 1999, p. 1140). The 
case of separating trading from non-trading activities by establishing arm’s-
length entities, for example, has been actively pursued in New Zealand but not 
to the same degree in Australia, which lacks statutory vehicles for their 
establishment, such as CCOs and CCTOs. Similarly, privatisation has been 
adopted more rigorously in the United Kingdom, particularly in the Thatcher-led 
reforms, than in either Australia or New Zealand local government systems, 
although it has been an underpinning theme in both these countries.  
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The key elements of the modernisation agenda were generally in place by the 
end of the nineties or had been rejected for political or philosophical reasons. In 
the last decade more emphasis has been placed on the outcomes of public 
policy and the general well-being of communities and citizens and less on the 
nature of the institutional machinery. This new emphasis is captured in 
legislation, like the United Kingdom’s Local Government Act 2000 and New 
Zealand’s LGA 2002, both of which contain broad statements of purpose 
emphasising well-being and the principle of sustainability. In the United 
Kingdom, since the 2000 local government act, modernisation has generally 
been concerned to achieve five objectives: improvements in local services; 
more effective community leadership; increased accountability; greater local 
stakeholder engagement; and improved public confidence in local government 
(Communities and Local Government 2009). Despite this broadening of the 
reform agenda, one theme continues to influence public policy towards local 
government, the suggestion that there are often too many councils and, in 
relation to New Zealand, that the process of consolidation never went far 
enough.  
 
Consolidation 
One persistent issue for local government reform is that of consolidation and the 
widespread view that ‘bigger is better’ and that larger councils are more 
efficient. The process is almost ubiquitous, with Queensland, for example, 
undergoing a systematic programme of consolidation in 2008 and Western 
Australia currently undertaking a similar process, although the rationale may 
vary, with Queensland placing more emphasis on strategic capacity while 
Western Australia appears to place more emphasis on the issue of efficiency. 
The release of the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance’s report has 
also prompted calls for consolidation in other parts of New Zealand, such as the 
Wellington region and the West Coast of the South Island. However, there is no 
consensus on the relative merits of smaller or larger authorities. Oates (1999) 
states that, while the evidence is mixed, it can be argued that the influence of 
citizens increases as the size of government declines. His suggestion, that size 
has a negative correlation with effective democracy, is reinforced by Allan 
(2003), who argues that the value of smaller councils lies in: 
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• better access to elected members and officials 
• better knowledge of local conditions 
• more political attention to local issues 
• cost consciousness 
• fewer hierarchical administrative structures 
• more likelihood of an open culture. 
 
The data, to the degree that it exists, also fails to support the ‘big is cheaper’ 
argument (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 Council expenditure by head of population 
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                                                       (Source: www.localcouncils.govt.nz54)   
 
Using a simple formula which divides total council expenditure by the normal 
resident population, Figure 6 provides an opportunity to identify whether 
patterns exist that might suggest a correlation between the cost of running 
councils and their size. The argument for consolidation is based on the 
                                                 
54
 Population data is drawn from the 2006 census and council expenditure data is drawn from the 2009 
Statistics New Zealand survey. 
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assumption that serving greater populations allows for economies of scale by 
sharing overhead costs across a greater number of taxpayers. However, the 
evidence from Figure 6 fails to support such conclusions. Large councils tend to 
be clustered around the $1,500 per person band for annual rates, whereas 
medium-sized councils, those with a population of around 50,000, tend to be 
clustered at a lower figure. What is most interesting about the data is the fact 
that some of the country’s smallest councils are also its cheapest to run.  
 
Balancing intimacy against efficiency is a classic problem of organisational 
design, where attempts are made to align administrative boundaries with the 
area of benefit flowing from council services. Yet councils are multi-purpose 
organisations and their various ‘businesses’ will have different areas of benefit. 
For example, while local parks will tend to benefit residents in particular 
neighbourhoods, something like economic development will inevitably benefit a 
larger area. Oates’ solution to this issue, the problem of reconciling political 
jurisdictions with services with differential areas of benefit, involves multi-tiered 
forms of governance (Oates 1999). For example, regional governments are 
preferred because they are able to encompass watersheds and catchments as 
well as other environmental resources, and metropolitan governments are seen 
as a way to bring together central cities and suburbs, while smaller local 
governments are seen to allow residents to determine those services directly 
relevant to their own needs that are of a local scale. 
 
Central government steering 
The degree to which relationships are collaborative partly depends on the way 
in which central governments go about ‘steering’ their local governments. This 
is particularly salient in regimes, like New Zealand, where local government is a 
creature of statute and draws its authority from legislation enacted by the 
national parliament.  
 
Steering, as the metaphor suggests, concerns the mechanisms higher 
authorities use to direct and influence the policy and operational decisions 
made by their councils (see Dollery and Wallis 2001b). The range of 
mechanisms is heavily influenced by the nature of the relationship between the 
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two spheres of government. Montin (2000) suggests central-local government 
relationships can be conceptualised as sitting somewhere on an 
‘autonomy/integration’ spectrum (see also Loughlin 1986). Where local 
government systems sit on this spectrum has a direct bearing on the type of 
mechanisms higher level governments are likely to employ when wishing to 
direct or steer local authorities, that is, their method of supervision.55 These 
mechanisms range from the strongly prescriptive, involving nationally defined 
performance, such as the English comprehensive performance assessment 
approach,56 to more negotiated approaches, such as regular meetings between 
governments and local government associations. Governments have access to 
a wide range of steering mechanisms (see Table 12). 
 
Steering mechanisms characterised by medium and high prescription tend to 
apply to councils that sit at the integrational end of the autonomy/integration 
spectrum. Tightly prescribed performance standards, tied funding, national 
standards and recentralisation generally act to diminish local autonomy and 
emphasise national control, at least for defined services. Some, such as rate-
capping, are blunt instruments which not only limit local governments’ discretion 
to respond to community needs and preferences but can also lead to game-
playing by both local and national politicians. Game-playing results when 
politicians exploit accountability vacuums to blame each other for any 
governance failures, such as the failure to invest in infrastructure. Councils at 
the autonomist end of the spectrum tend to reflect steering approaches which 
strengthen voice and transparency, both measures increasing the 
understanding and influence of local citizens with regard to council affairs.  
 
                                                 
55
 While not within the scope of this project the range of accessible instruments will also be affected by 
other factors such as the constitutional status of local government. 
56
 At the time of writing, the government had announced the creation of a new approach to local 
performance measures in which the more than 1,000 specific output targets were to be replaced by 
approximately 100 outcomes type targets (see www.dclg.gov.uk). 
     144 
 
Table 12 Central government steering mechanisms 
Strategy Effect on local discretion 
Measures to increase transparency Low 
Accrual accounting 
Annual plans 
Explicit performance targets 
Funding policies 
Long-term financial plans 
 
Measures to strengthen voice Low/medium 
Public access to information 
Public access to meetings 
Complaints procedures 
Citizens’ charters 
Postal voting 
Proportional representation/wards 
Citizen-initiated referenda 
 
Measures to standardise local services Medium 
National standards 
Tightly prescribed performance standards 
Direct central funding 
Discretion to opt out of local control 
Devolution to non-elected agencies 
Recentralisation 
 
Measures to reduce local financial 
discretion  
High 
Capping local rates 
Shift to lump sum central grants (in place of 
‘own source’ revenue) 
Nationalisation of business rates 
 
 
(Source: based on Dollery and Wallis 2001b) 
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The nature of any steering mechanism will have a direct bearing on the ability of 
councils to exercise community governance. As Stoker notes: 
 
the path to reform is not to allow local institutions complete autonomy or 
equally to imagine that the centre can steer the whole of government 
system. We need a form of central-local government relations that allows 
scope for all institutions to play an active role … (Stoker 2005, p. 3). 
 
In New Zealand’s case the interventionist strategies employed are concentrated 
at the low to medium end of Dollery and Wallis’ (2001b) prescriptive scale 
(medium to high end of the discretion scale), such as postal voting and freedom 
of information laws, both of which reflect strategies focused on increasing 
transparency and enhancing voice. However, since the passage of the LGA 
2002 and the introduction of general empowerment there has also been greater 
use of ‘medium’ type intervention instruments of the standardising services 
nature, particularly in the environmental and public health area. For example, 
national policy statements and national environmental standards are apparently 
being developed by the Ministry for the Environment,57 a decision has been 
made to more actively employ the Minister for the Environment’s call-in powers 
for projects of national importance, and a tendency has emerged to provide 
chief executives of central government agencies with the power to dictate 
employment conditions and professional standards for council staff undertaking 
devolved regulatory functions.58  
Local government taxonomies 
 
The previous discussion highlighted the different paths local government reform 
has taken and its association with history and ideological preference. The result 
is a diverse range of local government models with sufficient variety to 
encourage its own academic discipline as various writers have sought to find 
                                                 
57
 For an overview of the government’s desire to establish greater central direction in the environment 
portfolio see www.mfe.govt.nz/rma/central/amendments/cab-paper-phase-two-reform.html. 
58
 Examples include the Building and Control Act 2008, in which the chief executive of the Department 
of Building and Housing can directly override the authority of a council chief executive in the operation 
of a council’s building control staff. Similar approaches are being considered for the Food Safety 
legislation and the review of the Health Act 1956. 
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patterns by developing local government taxonomies. Taxonomies tend to 
classify forms of local government by levels of autonomy, central government 
relationships, strength of democracy, types of funding, and degree of citizen 
participation. However there is no common analytic framework, with taxonomies 
based on factors as diverse as countries’ different histories, cultures, legal 
traditions and socio-economic conditions (Wolman 2008).  
 
Alan Norton (1994) has attempted one of the more ambitious systems for 
classifying local government systems. Distinguishing 13 characteristics in his 
study of nine systems of local government, he has proposed five broad 
categories named after leading exemplars: British, North American, South 
European, North European and Japanese.59 Among his key criteria is the 
constitutional base of the local government systems. European systems are 
more likely to be based on national constitutions while other systems tend to be 
empowered through acts of Parliament or covered by the mandate of sub-
national constitutions. The way local authorities receive their powers differs 
between those systems with a form of general competence and those whose 
powers are limited by higher statute. The proportion of public spending 
allocated to local government systems also varies significantly, as does the 
extent of participation by citizens, especially at elections. 
 
While traditions overlap. Norton draws out two overall trends. One emerges 
from the tendency of southern and northern European societies to regard local 
government as an organic part of the community. These local government 
systems draw on the tradition of Roman natural law, frequently employing 
written constitutions to define their powers and derive legitimacy from local 
communities. Central and local government are seen as spheres, rather than 
levels, of government with complementary roles in what Norton describes as a 
collective tradition that seeks to build unity to avoid territorial fragmentation. 
Local government systems with a constitutional base operate with a greater 
level of certainty and guaranteed level of social rights than other systems and 
                                                 
59
 Norton’s criteria are: constitutional status; national structure; powers; control of legality; control of 
local policy; control of local policy historically; local functions 1949-89; local authority expenditure of 
gross domestic product (GDP); public expenditure as a proportion of GDP; local executive authority; 
representation system; party system; and participation at elections. 
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“provide, as it were, a philosophy within which central and local governments, 
and political parties, are expected to act” (Norton 1994, p. 16). In contrast, the 
Anglophone tradition, including New Zealand, is at once more instrumental and 
more pragmatic and councils are seen as just one of a number of local agencies 
competing for the right to deliver services.60 In this tradition, powers are not 
usually defined constitutionally and the extent of council authority is more 
dependent on the goodwill of their parliaments. The collectivity of the European 
models is replaced by an active individualism in which the default position is 
laissez faire and competition between councils is more pronounced.  
 
Using a different set of criteria Andrew and Goldsmith (1998) and John (2001) 
distinguish between Northern European and Southern European models of local 
government. The southern group is characterised by a form of political localism 
in which communitarianism is an important feature. This involves a strong sense 
of collectivity which brings the centre and locality together, enabling the national 
representation of local issues. In contrast, the Northern European model, which 
includes Britain and the Netherlands, places more emphasis on legal localism 
and more value on local self-government and decentralisation. John (2001) 
notes that Northern European councils have become more institutionalised than 
their Southern European counterparts as a result of the larger role they have 
played as providers of welfare-state services. In Southern Europe these 
services tend to be provided directly by the state without the consequential 
institutionalising effect on local government. New Zealand does not feature 
directly in either of their typologies although it is likely to be viewed as being 
close to the British, and therefore Northern European, tradition.  
 
In contrast to the more abstract or high level nature of these models, Shah 
(2006) has developed a descriptive typology which offers 10 alternative models 
of local government. In brief, these are: 
                                                 
60
 A pertinent example might be the nascent interest expressed by members of the Blair Labour 
government towards what they called “double devolution” – the passing down of responsibility for 
running services directly to citizens’ organisation, bypassing local authorities altogether. 
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• the Nordic model, in which local authorities provide most of the functions 
of the state, possess considerable autonomy and are mostly small and 
self-financing 
• the Swiss model, which has long historical roots and enjoys considerable 
levels of local autonomy in areas including education, social welfare, 
energy, roads and local taxation 
• the French model, a ‘dual supervision’ approach, in which local 
authorities have little local autonomy and there is a strong chain of 
command between councils and departments of the state 
• the German model, which balances co-operation, subsidiarity and 
centralised policy-making with local service delivery 
• the British model, which limits the role of local government, has large 
local authorities with little discretion and strong vertical fiscal imbalance 
• the Indian model, which is a largely centralised model 
• the Chinese model, in which local and provincial government are an 
integral part of the national administration and large councils deliver 
services on behalf of the state 
• the Japanese model, which combines the central control found in the 
French version and the delegation of the German model 
• the North American model, in which generally small councils have a 
degree of autonomy but can be dominated by state legislatures and the 
services provided can vary from services to property to education 
• the Australian model, in which councils are primarily focused on the 
delivery of local services. Functional responsibilities are limited compared 
with other jurisdictions and the proportion of public expenditure is less 
than 5 per cent. (The Australian model incorporates former British 
colonies such as New Zealand and Canada.) 
 
In relation to the challenge of developing taxonomies, Shah argues that there is 
not yet any uniform approach to the design of local government systems which 
takes into consideration size, structure and functions, although he notes that 
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finances generally follow functions, and accountability to residents is a strong 
and underpinning principle. His failure to find high level generic patterns among 
different local government jurisdictions is explained by Norton’s (1994) 
argument that local government systems are path-dependent. Each system is 
seen as being the result of pragmatic developments in response to “wars, 
invasions, revolutions, political pressures, evolving and conflicting concepts and 
values, economic and social demands … and the state’s efforts to promote 
economic growth and counteract unemployment and other contingencies” 
(Norton 1994, p. 22). He describes the process whereby the frameworks 
governing local government powers and responsibilities are subject to constant 
reshaping by unpredictable forces as a dialectic one, with the result that the 
history of local government is one of tension, with periods of relative local 
autonomy followed by periods of relative central control (ibid). As Coaffee notes: 
 
tension exists between centralising focus and constructing prescribed 
policy at national site level, and decentralising power and responsibility to 
a more inclusive group of stakeholders in order to develop increasingly 
nuanced and locally specific sets of regeneration priorities and outcomes 
(Coaffee 2005, p. 108). 
 
In contrast to the largely country specific typology of Shah, Aberbach and 
Christensen (2003) distinguish three broad categories of local government 
systems: individual-economic, collective and pluralist. The individual-economic 
model, which is similar to Norton’s Anglophone category, reflects a dominant 
policy concern by the state with creating a system of local government that 
enhances individual self-interest and strengthens overall efficiency. In contrast, 
the collective model stresses cultural integration, that is, a sense of social 
cohesion and identity and a collective view of the state and its parts. With its 
emphasis on communitarian values and an organic approach to local central 
relationships, it compares with Norton’s continental model. The individual-
economic model is distinguished by a preference for market-style instruments, 
defines the political role as primarily frame-steering (steering by remote control) 
and emphasises the role of citizens as economic actors. The collective model is 
characterised by more traditional notions of citizenship, shared values and a 
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sense of “belonging to a collectivity with a common heritage and common 
future” (ibid, p.15).  
 
In addition to the individual-economic and collective models, the authors identify 
a third and emerging model of local government, which they describe as a 
pluralist model. The pluralist model recognises the heterogeneous and mobile 
nature of communities, and their increasing institutional variety, as well as the 
way in which the democratic base has been strengthened by “encompassing 
more actors and interests in a participatory style, thereby creating more 
legitimacy than might result from a more centralised and controlled process” 
(ibid, p. 2). This emerging model acknowledges an environment with multiple 
power centres in which public policy is ultimately ambiguous and less coherent 
than in either the individual-economic or collective approaches. Aberbach and 
Christensen’s plural model is the nearest any of the classification systems come 
to recognising the trend towards community governance. It shares many of the 
characteristics of a community governance approach, such as its emphasis on 
community participation and institutional variety. 
 
Taxonomies and the New Zealand system 
With regard to its size and constitutional status New Zealand local government 
contains a number of the core elements found in Norton’s Anglophone tradition, 
particularly in the period between 1989 and 2002. The Anglophone pattern 
reflects similarities with New Zealand in terms of constitutional status and 
common law origins. The fit, however, largely depends on the criteria on which 
the taxonomy is constructed. Shah, for example, defines a separate category in 
his schema for the Australian system of local government, defining it as a 
system which has limited functional responsibilities and therefore low levels of 
expenditure in relation to the state. Using functions and expenditure as criteria it 
is clear that New Zealand and Australia are relatively unique.  
 
A key feature of the New Zealand system of local government, also shared by 
systems in Australia, Canada, South Africa and to a degree the United States, 
is the country’s history of colonisation and the role of settler society. In these 
countries, local government’s origins were largely instrumental and councils 
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were established to ensure new settlers had the necessary infrastructure to 
create functioning communities. The demands of development, however, were 
such that the state was required to play a more proactive role than in the 
established European democracies. Certainly in New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada the general weakness of local government (in terms of size and access 
to resources) meant that they lacked the capacity to undertake the investments 
needed for more complex policy interventions, such as health services, and 
higher level governments ended up playing a more prominent role. 
 
Aberbach and Christensen’s (2003) taxonomy, while high level, allows us to 
categorise changes to the New Zealand system in 2002. Before the LGA 2002, 
the New Zealand local government system largely reflected the classic 
exemplar of the individual-economic type of council. However, post LGA 2002, 
the most relevant category is probably their emerging pluralist category. The 
new emphasis on inclusivity, sustainable development and integrated 
approaches to decision-making, such as a softer central government interface, 
represents a move away from the instrumental bias found in the individual 
economic model and a move to a more plural approach. However, classification 
systems are inherently dynamic, councils change and models will generate 
findings based on the criteria applied. Cheyne (2008), for example, argues that 
the effect of the LGA 2002 in New Zealand and the modernisation agenda in the 
United Kingdom has been to shift the two systems towards the Northern 
European approach. 
Conclusion 
 
Local government theory provides a comprehensive explanation of the role of 
local government from both an economic and political perspective. Its 
theoretical contribution to economic welfare and democratic participation is 
clear; however, policy is seldom driven by theory alone. The history of local 
government reform highlights the influence of rhetoric and popular ideas that 
might have more to do with promoting the political careers of particular 
politicians than finding optimal governance arrangements for regions and 
localities. Local government reform in New Zealand can be seen as reflecting 
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the way in which theory has influenced policy settings and framed debates as 
well as acknowledging the influence of political expediency and the role of 
individual actors with their own particular preferences. 
 
     153 
 Chapter 5 Community planning and governance 
 
This chapter summarises and analyses research into community planning 
undertaken by a sample of local authorities. It concludes by distinguishing those 
councils which approach community planning as primarily a compliance 
requirement (and interpret the legislation in a minimalist manner) and those 
which regard it as providing a mechanism for delivering community governance.  
 
The topic of the thesis concerns the concept of community governance and how 
well positioned New Zealand councils are to achieve it. While the community 
governance assessment model in Chapter 7 is the primary tool for undertaking 
this assessment, the way councils undertake community planning also affords a 
useful insight. Community governance theory places considerable weight on 
councils engaging with citizens in order to set strategic direction for their 
localities in both an inclusive and collaborative manner. As described in Chapter 
2, the LGA 2002 enhanced council long-term planning by requiring councils to 
facilitate a process to identify community outcomes, a process that some 
commentators have described as community planning (see Local Futures 2006) 
or community strategic planning (see McKinlay 2006). Others regard it as 
community governance in practice (see Leonard and Memon 2008). Compared 
with traditional or organisationally based strategic planning, this new approach 
treats strategy as being concerned with community-identified outcomes and the 
needs of the locality as a whole. 
 
In relation to international approaches to community planning, such as the 
community-style planning undertaken in the United Kingdom and Ireland, the 
New Zealand legislation allows substantial variety in the way implementation is 
undertaken. Other than what was developed by the local government sector 
itself, little official guidance has been provided regarding how councils should 
undertake their planning responsibilities and the legislation is written in such a 
way that considerable discretion is allowed. Consequently councils’ approaches 
to community planning reflect considerable innovation and diversity. 
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Research approach 
 
This chapter draws on analysis by Local Futures, a publicly funded research 
initiative which examined local government strategic planning over a five-year 
period beginning in 2004. In order to examine the way councils were 
undertaking their second LTCCPs (the second LTCCPs were to be adopted by 
30 June 2006), a sample of nine councils was selected, representing a mix of 
rural and urban, North and South Island authorities. A small team of 
researchers was commissioned to interview officials, with a focus on identifying 
changes and improvements made since the adoption of their first LTCCPs and 
documenting the way councils undertook their community outcomes processes. 
The author was a member of the research committee that oversaw the research 
and was involved in setting the parameters of each case study. This chapter 
draws on the unpublished reports of those researchers. The nine councils 
chosen for the sample were: 
• Waitakere City Council 
• Manukau City Council 
• Porirua City Council 
• Auckland Regional Council 
• Grey District Council  
• Otago Regional Council 
• Wellington City Council 
• Dunedin City Council 
• Marlborough District Council. 
 
The selected councils were part of a larger sample of councils studied by Local 
Futures and were selected to ensure diversity in terms of size, location and 
socio-economic influences, as well as exhibiting a range of experiences with 
their approaches to strategic policy and planning (see Table 13). 
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Table 13  Sample council characteristics61 
Council Populatio
n 
Type Characteristics 
Waitakere 
City Council 
201,300 City: North Island Fast-growing, multi-cultural 
city 
Manukau City 
Council 
 
361,900 City: North Island Fast-growing, very multi-
cultural city 
Porirua City 
Council 
 
51,000 City: North Island Medium-sized city with 
diverse population 
Auckland 
Regional 
Council 
 
1,414,700 Regional: North 
Island 
Largest regional council, 
major issues around land 
use and public transport 
needs 
Grey District 
Council  
 
13,650 District: South 
Island 
Small town recovering from 
years of declining 
population and investment 
Otago 
Regional 
Council 
 
203,500 Regional: South 
Island 
A narrow focus on 
environmental management 
regulatory roles 
Wellington 
City Council 
 
192,800 City: North Island A wealthy city seeking to 
redefine itself as a creative 
hub 
Dunedin City 
Council 
 
123,000 City: South Island Generally static with little 
population growth  
                                                 
61
 Estimated population for 2008; source www.stats.govt.nz. 
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Marlborough 
District 
Council 
44,500 Unitary: South 
Island 
A unitary council in a 
community that has become 
increasingly diverse as a 
result of changing land use 
(wine industry) 
 
(Source:  www.localcouncils.govt.nz) 
 
The sample ranges from large urban to small rural councils and includes one 
unitary authority and two regional councils; however, it is not representative of 
the whole sector and, as Table 14 shows, the sample is heavily weighted to 
large urban councils. To be representative, the number of small rural councils 
would need to be increased, but this would have diminished the ability to 
analyse relevant case studies as few, if any, of the small rural councils sought 
to exploit the community governance potential of the community outcomes 
framework.  
 
Table 14 Sample population as proportion of total population 
 Population Sample 
Number of councils 83 9 
Proportion of cities 20% 55% 
Proportion of districts 60% 12% 
Proportion of unitaries 5% 11% 
Proportion of regionals 14% 22% 
 
The non-representational sample has been adopted due to the objective of the 
study, which is to distinguish the nature of weak and strong community 
governance as opposed to summarising the practice of the sector as a whole. It 
is surmised, and the results of Local Futures’ research back this up (Local 
Futures 2006), that larger urban councils, such as Manukau City Council, have 
invested significantly more in their community planning exercises than smaller 
councils (not just in real terms but also proportionally), with many of the latter 
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having barely complied with the letter of the legislation. Also, if the 
intergovernmental aspects of the model are to be examined, the emphasis will 
need to be on urban communities, as urban problems tend to be an ongoing 
governmental focus, particularly those communities where social problems are 
more pronounced, such as Porirua City and Manukau City.62 Interviews were 
undertaken with local authority staff during 2008 and also covered preparation 
for the 2009-2019 LTCCP. Some councils (those that had been early compliers 
with the LGA 2002) were undertaking reviews of their community outcomes, 
while others were simply refining the existing strategic frameworks and focusing 
on organisational alignment. 
Community planning: the process 
 
The community outcomes process is a requirement of s73 of the LGA 2002, 
under which all councils are required to facilitate a process to identify 
community outcomes at least once every six years. Councils’ LTCCPs, which 
are reviewed every three years, not only describe these outcomes but indicate 
how the councils’ activities will contribute to their achievement. While almost all 
councils had a history of developing strategic plans before the LGA 2002, 
particularly since 1989, these new provisions were different. Unlike traditional 
strategic plans, which tend to be organisationally focused, the focus of the new 
framework was outcomes for the community as a whole. Councils were no 
longer to determine the direction of their communities; they were to follow. This 
has thrown up a number of issues, both theoretical and practical. 
 
One of the findings of these case studies, which were consistent across the 
sample, revealed that councils with a history of strategic planning experienced 
fewer problems with the new provisions than those without any such history. 
Indeed some, such as Manukau and Waitakere, felt the LGA 2002’s provisions 
were essentially inferior to their previous approaches to strategic planning. Both 
councils were at the forefront of good practice, particularly with respect to 
                                                 
62
 Interviews by the author with officials from both Manukau and Porirua councils reveal that neither 
authority finds difficulty engaging with government agencies, many of which located themselves in these 
cities. In contrast, rural mayors frequently complain of the difficulty of attracting the interest of those 
same departments. 
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collaboration with other stakeholders and community engagement, and both 
had invested extensively in strategic planning before the new legislation was 
enacted. Unlike much of the pre-LGA 2002 strategic planning, Waitakere and 
Manukau were more outward focused and took what could be described as a 
strong community governance approach – their strategic plans were about 
achieving outcomes for their communities rather than councils and both were 
engaged in ongoing conversations with other stakeholders over city-wide 
issues.63  
 
Manukau developed a collaborative multi-sector process branded as 
Tomorrow’s Manukau (see www.tomorrowsmanukau.co.nz), which was as 
much about the process of stakeholder collaboration as about strategic 
planning. Underlying the council’s approach was a realisation that many of the 
issues facing the city (particularly the social issues) could not be addressed by 
any single agency. Consequently the council sought to increase its 
effectiveness in these areas, particularly in relation to social outcomes. Seventy 
agencies were initially involved in Tomorrow’s Manukau with the key partners 
being the Ministry of Social Development, the District Health Board, Housing 
New Zealand, the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, Te Puni Kokiri (the Ministry 
of Maori Development), the New Zealand Police and Manukau Institute of 
Technology.  
 
The original Tomorrow’s Manukau document had a vision of ‘Progressive, 
Proud and Prosperous’ and included seven themes or outcome areas which 
included the themes of ‘Safer Communities’ and ‘Vibrant and Strong 
Communities’ (ibid). The process was led by a steering group that was 
responsible for developing, co-ordinating, overseeing and monitoring the 
development of the vision. An inter-agency group and champions were 
established for each outcome area, with participating agencies expected to 
prioritise these outcomes in their work programmes. While the level of agency 
commitment may have been variable, Tomorrow’s Manukau was seen to be an 
                                                 
63
 Manukau’s approach was well known to officials drafting the LGA 2002, who sought to replicate many 
of its features in that statute. 
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important step in building trust-based relationships and practical community 
governance. 
 
Waitakere City Council’s ‘Eco City’ vision, based on the principles of Agenda 
21, has guided its strategic planning since 1993 and during this period the city 
had become internationally known for its sustainability initiatives. Community 
engagement was regarded by the council as a cornerstone of its approach with 
the council playing the role of broker when faced with difficult issues. Strong 
community and stakeholder involvement involved the use of innovative 
techniques like charettes. By the end of the nineties the council began to adopt 
a similar approach to that used by Manukau City Council, particularly working 
with key stakeholders to address social and environmental issues. The flagship 
project, the Waitakere Well-being Project, brought together a range of social 
and health sector groups to address social issues in the city. In comparison with 
Manukau’s emphasis on engaging with government departments, Waitakere 
tended to emphasise engagement with not-for-profit organisations and the wider 
community. Waitakere’s approach was regarded as more grass-roots than 
Manukau’s, which tended to focus on formal partners who had influence over 
the allocation of financial resources.  
 
Porirua City’s experiences were similar to both Manukau and Waitakere in that 
it had a tradition of innovative strategic planning to call on. Its first community 
outcomes process was undertaken in 2003, which meant that the council was 
required by law to undertake a review in time for the 2009-2019 LTCCP. A joint 
steering group consisting of council members, government departments and the 
community was formed to oversee the process. The initial process involved 110 
community groups and organisations and resulted in seven outcomes, which 
were prioritised by the council and grouped into the four elements of well-being. 
The 2009 LTCCP, in contrast, placed greater emphasis on the development of 
action plans to implement the outcomes.  
 
Wellington City Council was also able to draw on earlier strategic planning 
exercises when it identified its first tranche of community outcomes in 2003. The 
council’s process resulted in 43 outcomes, none of which were prioritised. Two 
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years later they repeated the process, seeking the views of 190 stakeholders 
and groups (only 36 responded). The process had a number of components: 
• Council staff compiled key issues as identified by 20 key agencies and 
six focus groups of residents. 
• These issues were then considered by a representative public review 
panel (20 members). The panel formulated draft community outcomes. 
• The draft community outcomes were subject to media and public 
consultation. 
• After consideration of 122 submissions, 45 community outcomes were 
set by the panel. 
 
When attempting to set strategic directions the council found the resulting 
multiple outcomes unhelpful and further grouped them into 13 council 
outcomes, around which a number of high level council strategies have since 
been developed. These strategies were introduced to achieve greater internal 
alignment and counteract the tendency towards silos within the council 
organisation as well as help councillors focus on longer term outcomes. 
Strategy trees have been developed to show the connections between 
outcomes and council activities.  
 
The Marlborough District Council developed its first set of community outcomes 
in 2005, adopting 13 outcomes, which were effectively ‘rolled over’ into the 
2009-2019 LTCCP. Rather than review the outcomes through its most recent 
LTCCP, the council decided to focus on strengthening internal alignment 
between its identified outcomes and its organisation (see Figure 7). The council 
was, however, involved in a review of its Regional Policy Statement (a 
statement of regional environmental standards primarily concerned with water 
and air quality, as required by the RMA 1991), which provided an opportunity to 
rethink some of its high level outcomes. Figure 7 also shows the way in which 
this council attempted to use the outcome model to achieve alignment with 
other agencies, both around outcomes and in relation to activities undertaken. 
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Figure 7 Marlborough’s outcome planning framework 
 
(Source: http://www.marlborough.govt.nz/content/docs/ 
plans%20and%20reports/Volume_1_FINAL_22_06_09.pdf) 
 
The alignment within Marlborough’s planning framework reflects the advice 
councils have received from the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG). 
Community outcomes sit in a framework of objectives, plans and measures 
which, while not in statute, have similar authority as they are subject to 
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guidance provided by the OAG. The nature of this guidance is described in 
Table 15. 
Table 15 What the auditors were looking for 
LTCCP component Analysis/Assessment 
Well-being Vires test 
Community outcomes Strategic choices and trade-offs 
Rationale for activities How the activity contributes to well-
being/outcomes 
Levels of service Attributes that the service influences or 
provides 
Measures How the effect on attributes will be 
assessed 
Targets The level of performance sought 
 
(Source: OAG 2008) 
 
As interpreted by the Auditor-General, the process is both strongly linear and 
cascading. Dunedin City Council’s LTCCP is a good example of this in practice 
for the way in which its seven community outcomes are each aligned with a 
separate well-being area. In addition to the LTCCP, the council’s State of the 
City report has been analysed to give an overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of the linkages between council activities and community 
outcomes. Like a number of councils, Dunedin City Council came to its first 
community outcomes process with a background in strategic planning. Its first 
outcomes were identified in the 2003/04 year, with the council settling on seven. 
These were grouped under four themes which also related to divisions within 
the council’s 10-year budget, namely, economic well-being, environmental well-
being, social and cultural well-being, and organisation. The council has noted a 
change in orientation since that time. In 2003 the focus was largely on the 
direction, form and development of the city, and in 2006 there was more 
concentration on the city council’s role as facilitator, while in 2009 the focus 
shifted to addressing sustainability issues. Community outcomes were 
developed through the maintenance of: 
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programmed dialogue with a range of institutions, groups and 
individuals….known as the ‘city stakeholder process’ [which] includes 
community groups, Maori, non-governmental agencies, business, other 
local authorities and some government departments (Dunedin City 
Council LTCCP Vol. 1, p. 32).  
 
A range of specific tools was used to facilitate the city stakeholder process, 
such as well-being forums, community focus groups and annual residents’ 
opinion surveys. The DCC also runs an ‘Expo’ as part of its consultation for the 
triennial LTCCP, which is a type of open house consultation exercise that it 
offers as an alternative to traditional public meetings. The DCC highlights a 
number of roles for itself in the outcomes process, a key role being that of 
facilitator. It does this by ensuring that the community is consulted on the 
development of the outcomes, for example, through annual well-being forums. 
Other roles include service provision, funding, planning, and a range of 
capacities, including leader, partner and stakeholder. 
 
The Otago Regional Council’s LTCCP has six community outcomes which are 
notable for not being clearly associated with specific well-being areas. Each 
outcome is linked to key actions and measures, representing a cascading 
relationship of outcome – action – measure. They described their community 
outcomes process as “providing opportunities for the Otago community to 
discuss its desired outcomes in terms of the future social, economic, 
environmental and cultural well-being of Otago” ( ORC Draft LTCCP 2009-2019, 
p. 9). This is one of few specific links to the well-being purpose of local 
government in its LTCCP, although it is strongly qualified by a narrow definition 
of role: 
It is important to understand that whilst this Council has identified the 
outcomes for Otago, it is not responsible for achieving all of those 
outcomes. For example, this Council will not undertake work that is the 
responsibility of the health sector, NZ Police and other organisations 
(ibid). 
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While the council notes that community outcomes can guide decisions made by 
other agencies, it failed to elaborate on which agencies might be relevant. 
Given that ORC identifies climate change as one of its key issues for the future, 
which as a ‘wicked issue’ cannot be managed by one agency alone, it is 
surprising the council’s LTCCP has so few references to collaboration.  
 
When faced with the requirement to identify community outcomes, regional 
councils faced a somewhat different set of challenges. While issues arose with 
respect to the relationship of their processes with those undertaken by territorial 
authorities within their regions, and practice varied, most found that the LGA 
2002 failed to fit comfortably with their other statutory responsibilities. The 
Otago Regional Council (ORC), for example, suggested that their councillors 
placed more emphasis on regional environmental planning processes, which 
range from water to pest management, than the LGA 2002. Most agreed that 
given the range of statutory planning functions for which regional councils have 
responsibility there was little value in going through the LTCCP consultation. 
The Auckland Regional Council, however, was in a particularly unique position 
as it sought to balance its regional council responsibilities not only with the 
community outcomes process and the LTCCP but also with a range of 
Auckland-specific planning responsibilities, such as the Regional Growth 
Strategy, Regional Land Transport Strategy, Auckland Regional Economic 
Development Strategy and the One Plan (designed to implement the Auckland 
Sustainability Framework). 
Defining the content 
 
Outcomes tended to reflect generic themes and some councils worked hard to 
identify linkages with the interests of other agencies. Manukau City Council 
found, by chance, that the statutory obligation to identify community outcomes 
coincided with a scheduled review of their Tomorrow’s Manukau planning 
framework, the city’s pre-LGA 2002 approach to community planning. Officials 
took the view that the broad themes of the original exercise were still relevant 
but that a more robust set of outcomes was needed and used the existing 
themes in Tomorrow’s Manukau as the basis of their community consultation. 
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The council developed a consultation strategy that operated at a number of 
levels and involved numerous public meetings, including a survey of 
approximately 1,000 participants. This was undertaken both to provide a wider 
public perspective and to understand the different preferences of the city’s 
various population groups, including Maori. Council officers played a leading 
role in the consultation and involved the city’s community boards. Leadership 
roles were given to government agencies and not-for-profits in order to organise 
and facilitate a range of consultations, particularly with marginalised groups. 
The objectives that emerged from the consultations were handed to the existing 
outcome groups for analysis and attempts were made to assess the 
community’s intent and determine the practical effects needed to achieve that 
intent. The objectives became the new community outcomes published in a 
revised Tomorrow’s Manukau. Each theme included a number of outcomes and 
targets (see Table 16). 
 
Table16 Tomorrow’s Manukau themes 
Educated, knowledgeable population 
Healthy people 
Moving Manukau 
Safe communities 
Sustainable environment and heritage 
Thriving economy 
Vibrant and strong communities 
   (Source: www.communityoutcomes.govt.nz) 
 
Each of the city’s community boards has also developed community-based 
strategies with outcomes that link to the city-wide version. For example, the 
Botany Community Board has, within the ‘Healthy People’ theme, given priority 
to the outcome of improving physical access to health facilities (Manukau City 
Council 2009) while the Clevedon Board has, within the same theme, prioritised 
reducing coastal water pollution from sewerage outfalls (Manukau City Council 
2009). At the time of writing, council officials were looking at ways to improve 
the community’s understanding of what is happening and how community 
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outcomes are being implemented and have suggested that they expect 
community outcomes will become more organic and less fixed over time. 
 
In preparation for their 2006-2016 LTCCP, Waitakere City Council officials set 
out to design a community-based process, based on their earlier ECO city 
platform, to develop a new set of outcomes. Using its existing outcomes as the 
starting point, officials developed a visual story to explain how the community 
had changed and presented this to a series of public meetings. Two panels of 
experts were set up to synthesise the information into draft community 
outcomes and 15 outcomes were endorsed, including specific outcomes for 
Maori. One of the two panels was appointed by Maori. The outcomes take the 
form of high level themes, each of which refers to a number of more specific 
outcomes (see Table 17). For Waitakere City Council the result of the 2006 
process was remarkably consistent with the strategic goals adopted in its earlier 
pre-LGA 2002 strategic plan, reflecting perhaps both the membership of the 
panels involved and the influence of the council’s leadership. 
 
Table 17 Waitakere City Council outcome headings 
Green network 
Mauri Ora (Access to Maori 
resources) 
Nga Makukura (Maori leadership) 
Strong economy 
Strong communities 
Sustainable and integrated transport 
Sustainable environment 
Autonomy 
Health lifestyle 
Urban and rural villages 
Vibrant arts and culture 
Environment protection 
Participation in society 
Working together 
    
(Source: www.communityoutcomes.govt.nz) 
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Grey District Council is the smallest of the sample councils and the least 
resourced for strategic planning. It was also an early complier, identifying eight 
community outcomes in 2003. For the 2009-2019 LTCCP, community feedback 
was sought on the original outcomes, with residents being asked to rank them 
in priority and identify any gaps. By the end of the process, the 2003 statement 
was largely restated with greater weight given to the themes of opportunity, 
access and affordability. The council has worked closely with its neighbouring 
authorities and the outcomes were intended to be common along the West 
Coast.  
 
The sample councils’ first attempts to undertake community planning were 
varied, with some able to build on relationships developed in earlier exercises, 
while others literally started from scratch. One area that almost all councils 
found difficult was developing effective intergovernmental relationships with 
departments and Crown agencies. 
Strengthening collaboration  
 
Community governance emerged as a way of describing the role of local 
governments that were responding to the fragmented governing space left by 
local and central government reform in the United Kingdom. Although New 
Zealand has not been subject to the same level of fragmentation at the local 
level (in fact the first reform phase was characterised by the opposite, 
widespread consolidation), achieving outcomes was inevitably regarded as 
requiring collaborative initiative.  
 
Dunedin City Council, having identified community outcomes through a 
conventional strategic planning process, set about determining which local and 
national agencies contributed to their achievement. For example, the outcome 
‘Supportive community’, which emphasised a culture of volunteering, tolerance, 
diversity and participation in local democracy, was seen as the responsibility of 
a wide range of public and non-public agencies (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8 Dunedin: collaborating for outcomes 
Outcome  
A city where residents feel included 
and connected with their wider 
community 
• Our city is built on strong 
communities.  
• All volunteers feel valued. 
• We are an ethnically diverse and 
tolerant community. 
• The people participate in our 
representative democracy. 
 
 
 
Contributing stakeholders  
Work and Income New Zealand 
Ministry of Social Development 
Presbyterian Support 
Dunedin Council of Social Services 
Huirapa Runaka  
Age Concern 
 
In addition, the council’s LTCCP Summary and State of the City report both 
highlight examples where the DCC works with agencies and stakeholders in 
furthering community outcomes. In contrast, the Otago Regional Council 
explicitly sought to constrain its own role; however, it did acknowledge the 
potential for community outcomes to guide decisions made by a range of 
agencies. In a section on working relationships the council’s LTCCP states that: 
 
the Otago Regional Council will work with our location organisations, 
Maori, Central Government and non-Government organisations, and the 
private sector, in furthering community outcomes (ORC 2009, p. 12). 
 
While their statement mirrors the requirement in the LGA 2002, it provides no 
elaboration on how it will be achieved. It is perhaps another example of a 
largely compliance-driven approach. The council’s description of agency roles 
emphasises functional accountability and an ultra vires mentality, that is, a 
reluctance to look beyond legislative duties. 
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Porirua City reported that its relationships with central government agencies 
have developed and strengthened during the first six years of the LGA 2002 
framework, shifting from being largely reactive to more of a full partnership (or 
more accurately a range of partnerships). The council is increasingly operating 
as co-ordinator for different inter-agency initiatives, with funding channelled 
from government agencies through the council – the council undertaking the 
management of contracts on behalf of the state as well as handling the 
monitoring and reporting roles. The council reports that relationships with 
departments are better than ever and include significant projects that have 
reallocated resources and resolved local issues. In their view the community 
plan and LTCCP provide a safe context that encourages risk-averse 
government agencies to work with them and operate in a community 
governance manner. Collaboration has also improved with other local 
authorities in the region, particularly through the Wellington Regional Strategy. 
This has been further strengthened by the willingness of central government 
agencies to push for a regional consensus when major funding decisions, such 
as roading and public transport, need to be made. As the example of Porirua 
indicates, the LTCCP process has provided a mechanism for government 
agencies to communicate with local government. Grey District, for example, has 
historically had few links with government departments but regarded its three 
social outcomes (health services, education and personal safety) as providing a 
platform on which these links might be enhanced and developed in the future, 
despite the limitations of being a small council with few resources. The council 
that had achieved the most buy-in by external agencies and consequently the 
strongest community governance was probably Manukau City Council. 
 
Since 2006 Manukau City has continued to refine its strategic platform, 
Tomorrow’s Manukau, which, at the time of the research, had the active 
participation of more than 70 agencies. The most recent iteration focused on 
major projects where collaboration had the potential to make a significant 
difference. Where the first version of Tomorrow’s Manukau contained a list of 
actions reflecting what organisations were already doing, the second version 
included a workbook with detailed sets of targets allocated to participating 
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organisations. Projects were assessed on the basis of their ability to contribute 
to outcomes and reflected the following priorities: reducing family violence, 
increasing participation in early childhood education, a Manukau arts festival, 
and place-based neighbourhood renewal. Each project has a project manager 
and specific implementation plan.  
 
Most notable about these priorities is their broad scope and the degree to which 
at least two of them, family violence and education, are outside the traditional 
focus of the council’s activities. Strong leadership is regarded as important and 
the council’s chief executive has taken on a leading role in the process. 
Interestingly, the council found it took a number of iterations of Tomorrow’s 
Manukau in order to develop goodwill and trust with officers, with a lack of trust 
between participants in the early years. Initially the process was seen as largely 
council-driven and less effective at redirecting or developing new agency 
responses.  
 
The second iteration of Tomorrow’s Manukau involved cross-agency teams 
which were responsible for redefining community outcomes and developing 
actions/responses to those outcomes. However, a problem of ‘silos’ arose, 
forcing the council to focus on more effective horizontal and vertical integration. 
To address this, the steering group was restructured so that it was seen as less 
of a council and more of a community-owned entity. In addition, its scope was 
redefined to provide more oversight and strategic leadership – such as ensuring 
that resources for collaborative action are focused around agreed key priorities. 
As an example of community governance in practice, Manukau City Council has 
established what it calls Tomorrow’s Manukau Forums, each of which has an 
issue focus, such as youth or environmental sustainability. While trust between 
partnering agencies has grown, officials note some gaps in their collaborative 
strategy, with engagement stronger at the operational level than the policy level. 
Increasingly engagement with the Government has begun to operate at a 
regional level and the council has had to push to ensure that social issues 
remain on the table within the new regional Forums.  
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In comparison, Waitakere has placed more emphasis on dealing with particular 
issues than with a detailed inter-agency work programme. For example, the 
Waitakere City Well-being Collaboration Project is a partnership between the 
city, local community organisations and central government agencies. Intended 
to sponsor collaborative projects which will enhance the well-being of the 
Waitakere City community, the project involves a memorandum of 
understanding (now a partnership agreement) between the council and five 
funding agencies, which has now been developed into a partnership agreement. 
Since 2002 the council has sponsored annual well-being summits which have 
been used to determine mandate and direction for the following year. It was 
expanded in 2005 to include economic well-being and a project called the 
Waitakere Skills and Employment Project was established.64 
 
The council’s enthusiasm for collaboration in the social policy area was partly 
motivated by a desire to access greater levels of national funding to address 
local community issues. The council found the fifth Labour government more 
than willing to engage, although officials commented that as the 2008 national 
elections drew near interest in such partnerships appeared to diminish as 
officials became risk averse at the possibility of a new political regime. 
Collaboration appears to have worked best in the social policy area, possibly 
due to the proactive stance of the Ministry of Social Development, with less 
success in other areas like transport and the environment.  
 
The general success of Waitakere, Manukau and Porirua cities in establishing 
relationships with government agencies and a community governance approach 
was not widely replicated in the rest of the sample. A possible factor in their 
success might be the fact that all three councils have a history of working on 
local collaborations and a culture of concern with community issues not found in 
many of the other councils in the sample. Perhaps the other factor is that the 
demographics of all three cities, that is, young, multi-cultural and low socio-
economic status, make them a priority for government attention. 
                                                 
64
 The council’s approach to partnerships is known colloquially as the ‘Waitakere Way’. Similarly, 
Manukau City’s particular approach to collaborative strategy is known as the ‘Manukau Way’. 
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Analysis  
 
The LGA 2002 required councils to facilitate a process to identify the outcomes 
held by their ‘communities’, a form of community planning which is one of the 
defining features of community governance. How well New Zealand councils 
have implemented the framework and how well the framework measures up to 
international practice should give some insight into the strength or weakness of 
community governance in New Zealand councils and how enhancements might 
be designed.  
 
While the majority of councils saw the community outcomes process as an 
additional compliance exercise rather than an opportunity to implement 
community governance, many have found unexpected value arising from the 
process. Marlborough District Council, for example, found the LTCCP helpful in 
focusing councillors on the big picture and avoiding short-term thinking and 
policy ‘flip flops’. They regard their LTCCP as acting as a reference point 
enabling progress to be charted over time. Similarly, Wellington City Council 
found the LTCCP reinforced its three-year planning cycle and led to more 
strategic and less ad hoc decisions by the council’s elected members. The 
organisation has also been better at working co-operatively in a more integrated 
manner. Grey District Council found that the process of reviewing its community 
outcomes confirmed to the council that it was heading in the right direction as 
well as providing a basis for collaborative discussions with its neighbouring 
authorities.  
 
Some were less positive, with Dunedin City finding that the LTCCP had greatly 
improved process and financial management but that the framework failed to 
add value to technical performance, creative planning or to the council and 
councillors’ leadership capability. The requirement, introduced in the LGA 2002, 
that LTCCPs be subject to an audit opinion, was generally seen as driving a 
compliance mentality rather than encouraging councils to be creative and 
innovative. While councils designed and undertook a range of different 
consultative and information-gathering exercises to identify desired outcomes, 
the exercise was often controversial. Some councils, particularly smaller rural 
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authorities, regarded it as an unnecessary compliance burden that added 
nothing to their capacity to provide good governance and indeed made their 
task more difficult by raising citizens’ expectations. Reflecting on this new 
responsibility, the Mayor of the Hauraki District commented to the writer that the 
cost of identifying community outcomes and monitoring progress would only 
have value if government agencies agreed to adjust their local programmes in 
order to acknowledge local priorities and work towards their achievement.65  
 
The sample of nine councils revealed a number of approaches that ranged from 
councils that saw the LTCCP as having the potential to develop community 
governance approaches to those that saw the exercise as simply another 
compliance burden. Table 18 reviews the sample against three of the 
community governance principles developed in Chapter 3 in order to identify 
those councils that sought to develop processes that might strengthen 
community governance. The principles are the degree to which the process was 
inclusive, promoted partnering and had an outcomes orientation. Council 
practice is ranked as low, medium or high for each principle. 
 
Table 18 Analysis of community outcomes practice 
 
Po Mu Grey ARC ORC We Dn Mh Wn 
Inclusive 
 
High High Low Low Low High High Med. High. 
Partnerships 
 
High High Low. Low Low High Med. Low Med. 
Outcome 
orientation 
High High High Med. Med. High High Med. High 
 
Key 
Po Porirua; Mu Manukau; Grey Grey; ARC Auckland Regional; ORC Otago Regional; 
We Waitakere; Dn Dunedin; Mh Marlborough; Wn Wellington City. 
                                                 
65
 Private conversation at a rural and provincial mayors’ meeting, Wellington, September 2006. 
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Inclusiveness 
The sample councils took varying approaches in achieving the inclusiveness 
principle. Regional councils took the most technical and least populist route to 
determining outcomes with the ARC, for example, using a range of stakeholder 
groups to develop the initial set of outcomes, which were then polished and 
grouped by staff.66 The territorial councils were more participatory, with Dunedin 
City Council, for example, employing a broad range of consultative and 
inclusive mechanisms to identify community issues. It also established well-
being teams of stakeholders, which met annually to review progress. Wellington 
City Council employed a process that was both inclusive and participatory, 
combining stakeholder involvement and public consultation. 
 
Partnerships 
It was in relation to the partnership principle that major differences in the 
experience of the sample councils emerged. Partnering was strongest in 
Porirua, Manukau and Waitakere councils and relatively weak in the majority of 
others. This highlights a critical weakness in the New Zealand approach to 
community planning, that is the lack of any binding obligation on central 
government departments to take part either in the process of identifying 
outcomes or in the follow-up process of achievement. The Government had 
specific policy objectives for working in those three communities, which 
suggests that interest in joined-up approaches may be driven more by public 
policy objectives than a desire to put a new model of public governance into 
practice. In addition these councils have a history involving an extensive range 
of inter-agency collaborations. In contrast, Grey District, while looking to engage 
with central government agencies around social, educational and health 
outcomes, has achieved little more than the sort of ongoing liaison that would 
be expected to exist without a community planning framework.  
                                                 
66
 Interestingly the council itself inserted an additional outcome which had received no support at all in 
the feedback received from their stakeholder consultation. 
     175 
 
Outcome orientation 
The third principle is concerned with the degree to which the process has an 
outcome orientation. The majority of councils in the sample used a range of 
initiatives to identify the issues important to their citizens and develop an initial 
list of issues, such as stakeholder groups. These councils employed focus 
group techniques to develop the ‘first cut’ of outcomes, which was then used as 
a basis for more traditional public consultation processes. However, the result of 
this process was a set of outcomes that was very general and difficult to 
distinguish between cities and districts – the ‘healthy, wealthy and wise’ style of 
community outcome. Their high level and abstract nature raises questions 
about their suitability for building a community governance framework.  
 
Practice among the sample councils ranged from approaches which began with 
a blank slate and built up outcomes on the basis of consultative practice to less 
ambitious exercises with some councils preparing a list of draft outcomes and 
seeking comment. While the blank page approach was favoured by advocates 
of the legislation (see McKinlay 2004) on the grounds that it represented the 
best way of reducing council influence on the nature of the outcomes, the 
sample councils were more likely to begin with existing outcomes and ask 
citizens if they still reflected their aspirations and priorities. In practice, council 
officials had considerable influence on the shape of the outcomes regardless of 
the approach taken. For example, even in the blank page approach it was left to 
council officials to take the survey results, consultation feedback and other data 
and frame the final high level outcomes. Issues of weighting and framing occur 
in the information consolidation phase of the process and anecdotal evidence 
indicates that some councils, including Wellington City Council, felt officials had 
more to do with shaping the outcomes than the community (which possibly 
explains why Wellington was one of the councils that did not try to aggregate 
outcomes into six to eight high level versions). Although the community 
outcomes process is an important instrument contributing to effective 
community governance, the case studies highlighted a number of issues. For 
example: 
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• the different approaches taken to identifying the views and aspirations of 
citizens and the difficultly of ensuring the diverse voices of citizens have 
an opportunity to be heard. The New Zealand process is too easily 
‘captured’ by officials and interest groups  
• the variable capability and political commitment of councils, which 
resulted in some councils either not having or not allocating sufficient 
staff to develop innovative and inclusive processes. (This is not simply an 
issue of scale as some small councils, such as Opotiki, are highly 
regarded for both the quality of the LTCCPs and innovative practice.)  
• the discretionary nature of central government involvement, which 
created a difficult asymmetry, with councils holding responsibility for 
facilitating the process and identifying outcomes but lacking the 
resources, capability or statutory means for resolving them.  
 
Due to the manner in which the requirement has been drafted and the failure of 
the Government to extend the obligation to other parts of the public sector, the 
New Zealand approach to community planning has resulted in variable practice. 
Some councils have taken innovative approaches to developing community 
planning processes which are both collaborative and inclusive, while others, in 
contrast, saw it as largely a compliance exercise.  
Conclusion 
 
The concept of community governance describes the roles, institutional forms 
and processes which local authorities will need to embrace if they are to meet 
the expectations of their citizens in a largely post-modern environment in which 
organisational roles are inherently fuzzy. Not surprisingly the concept has 
attracted academic and practitioner interest at the same time that there has 
been a growing recognition of the importance of the locality in policy-making.  
 
This chapter has examined a sample of councils and the way in which they 
undertook their community outcomes process and made linkages with their 
LTCCP and other agencies. The research reflects a substantial degree of 
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difference between councils, from those where compliance might be seen to be 
minimal or perfunctory, to others where councils saw the process as having real 
potential to improve the well-being of their citizens. The fact that local 
government approaches compliance with its legislation in a variety of ways is 
not a surprise and largely highlights the difficulties governments have when 
introducing new processes and practices.  
 
Community planning is one of the mechanisms councils need to invest in if they 
are to achieve community governance and is identified in Chapter 3 as a 
component of the assessment model; some councils have recognised the 
potential for this. The research indicates that the LGA 2002 framework has the 
potential to stimulate long-term thinking and build effective collaboration around 
outcomes but there must be a political and managerial commitment. There must 
also be a commitment to participate in the process from other agencies. 
Practice is at best somewhat patchy. 
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Chapter 6 Governance scenarios: testing opinion 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the responses received to a questionnaire 
that sought feedback on three alternative governance scenarios. It concludes 
with a discussion about whether or not any of the scenarios are better placed to 
achieve community governance than the others. It contributes to the discussion 
on size and structure in Chapter 7. 
 
The question this chapter primarily addresses is whether the reform of local 
government in New Zealand has resulted in a system capable of delivering 
community governance and if so to what extent. To gather the necessary 
information a questionnaire was developed and a small number of experienced 
local government practitioners were invited to take part in the exercise, 
including discussion groups in which they were encouraged to elaborate on 
their answers. Participants were asked to comment on three different 
governance scenarios and answer a number of questions on each. 
 
In order to seek a broad range of views on the strengths and weaknesses of 
different approaches to local governance, three stylised governance options 
were developed and written as future scenarios. These formed the basis of a 
questionnaire and subsequently three discussion groups which drew on a small 
number of invited practitioners that came from different parts of the local 
government sector, namely officials, elected members and policy advisers 
employed by LGNZ. The questionnaire sought to identify a range of views in 
order to identify the local government structures that are best suited to achieve 
community governance, and what needs to be done to achieve this. For 
example, are the most effective structures local, regional or integrated? 
Participants selected were individuals who were familiar with how local 
government worked and had a number of years’ experience, either as elected 
members or working in or for the sector. The participants were not in any way a 
sample of local government opinion, their primary role was simply to highlight a 
range of issues to ensure that the assessment discussion considered as many 
issues and considerations as possible. The exercise was designed to add to the 
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author’s knowledge of factors influencing the effectiveness of different 
governance systems for achieving community governance.  
 
Each participant was provided with the scenarios and a questionnaire; this was 
followed by three meetings with participants to discuss their answers, key points 
of which were recorded by the writer. In order to ensure opinions were based on 
a common understanding, participants were provided with a brief introduction to 
the theory of community governance, which they were asked to read before 
answering the questionnaire and participating in the discussions. The purpose 
of this research method was to examine how different approaches may 
contribute to community governance in a manner that is free from any current or 
topical policy issues. The three models were designed to mirror ideal types in 
order to enable discussion to occur about their relative strengths and 
weaknesses, from the perspective of enhancing community governance. 
Responses to the ‘ideal’ models or scenarios were then compared with New 
Zealand practice and conclusions drawn. 
The three scenarios 
 
The three scenarios described three broad governance approaches and were 
given neutral names to avoid typecasting by participants; these were Sparta 
(the localist option), Athens (the regional options) and Rome (the integrated 
option). The characteristics of each scenario are described in Table 19. 
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Table 19 Stylised governance models 
 Localist Regionalist Integrated 
General 
characteristics 
Subsidiarity 
principle – 
undertakes all 
functions except 
those more 
suited to higher 
level 
governments 
Regional 
government as a 
major provider of 
services, devolved 
from the centre and 
transferred from 
localities 
Little change in 
responsibility for service 
provision but much 
greater alignment of 
strategies and policies; 
new statutory 
mechanisms 
Primary 
rationale 
Proximity to 
citizens 
Greater capacity Equity/equality of 
outcomes 
Boundaries for 
strategy 
development 
Territorial and/or 
regional council 
boundaries 
Regional 
boundaries, not 
necessarily related 
to status quo 
Not limited by local 
authority or 
departmental 
boundaries; possible 
alignment of government 
department boundaries 
with council boundaries 
Opportunity for 
‘joined-up’ 
approaches to 
local 
governance 
Poor, due to 
variable 
capacity and 
boundary non-
alignment 
Generally good, but 
depends on political 
will 
Integration is a primary 
focus; this model is 
designed to encourage 
and enable ‘joined-up’ 
approaches 
Functions Devolution 
medium to high 
Devolution high Devolution minimal 
Current 
alignment of 
agency 
jurisdictions 
Poor fit with 
government 
department/ 
agency 
jurisdictions 
Regional 
boundaries close fit 
with departmental 
jurisdictions 
Need to overcome silo 
approach of government 
departments 
Degree of 
financial 
autonomy 
Autonomy high 
with a wide 
range of funding 
tools 
High level of 
financial autonomy 
with wide range of 
funding tools 
Funding allocated by 
agreements – use of 
‘bulk funding’ 
arrangements – joint 
contracting 
The policy 
realm or scope 
to consider 
strategic issues  
Authority/oppor- 
tunity to 
respond to or 
address a wide 
range of well-
being issues – 
some national 
policy 
frameworks 
Authority/oppor-
tunity to respond to 
or address a wide 
range of well-being 
issues – some 
national policy 
frameworks 
Constrained – local 
responsiveness 
influenced by negotiation 
with centre 
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Each scenario takes a different approach to the location of decision-making. 
Localist approaches reflect the principle of subsidiarity and place decision-
making at the lowest practical level of government. Regionalist approaches 
represent a mid-point, in which responsibilities are shifted up from local 
councils, for largely efficiency and fairness reasons, and shifted down from 
central government, for reasons primarily concerned with responsiveness. 
Integrated models work largely with the existing distribution of responsibilities 
and generally involve greater alignment of local, regional and central 
governments around common outcomes.  
 
The strengths and weaknesses of each are well described in established theory 
(see Oates 1972, Bailey 1999, Cashin 1999). Localist models are seen as 
strong on responsiveness and opportunities for participation but score less well 
on issues of capacity and their ability to ensure equity; see, for example, the 
concept of the tyranny of the favoured quarter (Cashin 1999). Regional models 
provide better capacity and scope to deal with externalities and issues of 
fairness. In contrast to the others they scored poorly on opportunities for 
participation and responsiveness to local issues. Integrated systems attempt to 
achieve the benefits of national capacity with the information rich environment 
of the locality; however, they do so by compromising local autonomy.  
 
The New Zealand approach to local government contains elements of all three, 
depending on the policy arena under consideration. For example, environmental 
management is strongly regional while water-related functions are strongly 
localist, with an apparent gradual move towards an integrated approach. Seen 
in overall terms the regional sphere in the New Zealand model is 
underdeveloped and has a potential to take a stronger integrated approach in 
some areas.  
Summary of responses 
 
Three discussion groups were held, with the membership of each group drawn 
from three distinct populations. One group was made up of elected members, a 
second group was drawn from council staff and a third group was made up of 
     182 
officials based in Wellington who specialised in aspects of local government 
policy – the average group size was six. Participants were identified in advance, 
invited to take part, and sent the scenarios with a request that the questionnaire 
be completed before taking part in the discussion groups. Elected members and 
officials were selected from participants attending a national local government 
conference. The policy advisers’ group was selected from staff employed by 
Local Government New Zealand.  
 
Discussion was led by the writer and focused on the reasons behind 
participants’ questionnaire answers, the elaboration giving the writer an 
opportunity to seek clarification on various points. The purpose of the exercise 
was to provide a series of alternative perspectives on the strengths and 
weaknesses of three different options for strengthening community governance. 
Participants were not selected at random and the results have no statistical 
significance. The decision to segregate the participants by role was primarily to 
encourage participation (officials can feel constrained by working in the same 
groups as politicians and vice versa). It also gave an opportunity for any 
differences in views to be further interrogated; however, there was little 
divergence between the groups. A summary of the responses follows. 
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Group 1: Elected members 
A) Athens (Regional) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Better incentives and resourcing for 
staff 
Removes role duplication between 
territorial and regional councils (one-
stop shop) 
Single RMA agency 
More service cohesion 
Better funding for needy communities 
Greater accountability 
More uniformity of services and 
standards due to influence of national 
policy statements 
Represents a return to provincial 
government 
Devolution plus enhanced revenue-
raising 
Mandatory community boards 
 
 
Too much emphasis on national 
standards 
Referenda inconsistent with LTCCP 
process 
Health should remain a national 
responsibility 
Elected members remote from the 
community 
Less stability due to referenda  
Referenda undermines LGA 2002 
planning process 
Decisions based on popularity rather 
than long-term merit 
Perception of double-dipping with 
larger revenue mix 
Diversity of knowledge based and 
increased workload for elected 
members 
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B) Sparta (Local) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Improved networking between councils 
Economies of scale and expertise for 
core infrastructure 
Improved representation and therefore 
engagement 
Improved liaison between local and 
central government agencies 
The most democratic and inclusive 
option 
The voluntary nature of the regional 
arrangements 
Central government budgetary 
accountability for local outcomes 
 
 
Loss of monitoring role of regional 
councils 
Community board parochialism 
Community board role unclear 
Equalisation funding formula needs to 
include environmental characteristics 
Indirect accountability 
De-amalgamation 
 
C) Rome (Integrated) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Flexible and adaptive to changing 
circumstances 
Easier for government agencies to 
relate to councils 
Extra funding 
Fosters co-ordination rather than 
isolation 
Government representation 
recognises the role of local authorities 
Opportunity for joint funding 
partnerships and integrated services 
 
Reactive rather than proactive 
Boundaries may not suit all functions 
Creates an additional layer of 
bureaucracy preparing funding 
applications 
Possible friction between central and 
local government agencies due to 
perceptions of interference 
Risk of interference in local decision-
making by national government 
politicians 
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Direct electoral accountability and 
boundary alignment for local and 
central agencies 
Ability to bid for funds 
 
Little grass-roots involvement apart 
from the formal opportunities 
Wishy-washy government interface 
More central government bureaucracy 
at the local level 
Undermines local decision-making 
through government appointments and 
national plans 
 
 
Participants were asked to rank the options for their ability to strengthen local 
governance. On a simple scale of three for the strongest and one for the lowest, 
participants had no clear preference – each option scored equal points. 
Participants were also asked for their own thoughts on how community 
governance in New Zealand might be strengthened. The suggestions made by 
the elected members’ groups were: 
• strengthen regional councils’ environmental watchdog role 
• improve alignment between territorial boundaries and communities of 
interest 
• establish an independent boundary commission 
• provide more national standards with space for diversity 
• increase remuneration for rural and provincial councillors to recognise 
workloads 
• strengthen the role of elected members in environmental hearings made 
under the Resource Management Act.  
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Group 2: Council staff 
A) Athens (Regional) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Local control  
Local decision-making 
Economies of staff 
Greater revenue options 
One-stop shop 
Opportunities for staff 
Support for low socio-economic 
communities 
Devolution will result in less 
duplication 
 
 
Political instability due to referenda 
Lack of consistency in service levels 
between districts 
LTCCP would become 
unmanageable 
Referenda would lead to apathy 
Too much emphasis on one-size-fits-
all responses 
Referenda would undermine large 
infrastructure investments 
Unitaries are ‘judge and jury’ 
Community boards need defined role 
 
B) Sparta (Local) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Regional organisations of councils 
Stronger commitment to community 
outcomes 
Additional tools to ensure government 
programmes reflect local priorities 
Collaboration and potential economies 
of scale 
Closer liaison between councils 
Cost savings 
Opportunities for staff 
Bigger voice when approaching the 
 
Community boards need stronger 
delegations 
Risk of free-loading by councils 
Are community boards necessary? 
How about ward committees? 
Time taken to make decisions 
Ambiguity about authority 
Loss of regional accountability 
Funding issues 
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government 
Greater involvement of local 
communities 
Equitable sharing of costs due to 
economies of scale 
Mandatory links with government 
departments 
 
C) Rome (Integrated) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Whole-of-community focus 
Economy of scale 
Greater recognition by the government 
Sharing resources and staff 
Opportunities for staff 
Access to funding 
Outcome-focused LAAs and pooled 
funding 
National plans as long as they are not 
too prescriptive 
Ability to make adjustments as needed 
instead of being imposed by ‘white 
collars’ 
Funding  
Boundary alignment 
Local Area Agreements (LAAs) 
 
 
Opportunity for government 
interference in local politics 
Costly to implement 
Potential for big councils to dominate 
LAAs 
Bigger share taken by larger councils 
Government appointees would lead to 
perceptions of central government 
control 
 
 
 
 
Participants were asked to rank the options for their ability to strengthen local 
governance. Using a simple scale of three for the strongest and one for the 
lowest, participants gave Sparta (localist) the highest ranking, followed by 
Athens (regional) with Rome (integrated) the lowest. Officials made the 
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following suggestions about how community governance might be 
strengthened: 
• Unitary councils should be promoted. 
• Concern was expressed about direction of future change, especially any 
increase in functions. 
• There was support for greater alignment around outcomes. 
• The Rome option was seen to provide a better balance between national 
consistency and local diversity. 
• Referenda enhances community prioritising, although citizens’ juries 
might be better. 
• Territorial authorities provide better opportunities for citizen participation 
than regional councils. 
• Community boards, because of their proximity, provide the best 
opportunity for participation. 
 
Group 3: National local government policy advisers 
A) Athens (Regional) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Equalisation ensures adequate 
funding for low socio-economic 
councils 
Extra taxes to reflect wider 
responsibilities 
Consolidation of regional and 
territorial councils 
Referenda may increase public 
confidence 
Referenda strengthens citizens’ voice 
between election 
 
National Policy Statements can 
undermine local autonomy 
Greater complexity and risk of 
overlaps 
Extra accountability leads to greater 
risk aversion: difficult to create 
change 
Citizens may be unwilling to 
participate in referenda 
How willing are citizens to participate 
in referenda? 
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Potential economies of scale 
Funding for poor communities 
Ability to provide locally appropriate 
services 
Better funding 
Community input into all decisions 
Councils are more accountable to 
communities through the popular vote 
Is there capacity to take on additional 
responsibilities? 
Loss of local autonomy due to 
national policy statements (NPS) 
Local opposition to new taxes 
Referenda may undermine 
governance 
Less access to elected members 
Potential for local services to be 
provided at different quality levels 
Potentially undermines focus on the 
environment 
No flexibility 
Does not allow for local diversity 
within NPS 
Risk of reinventing the wheel on a 
regular basis 
Equalisation difficult due to the 
different circumstances of 
communities  
Potential to undermine the national 
community 
Government might curtail minority 
interests during periods of austerity 
 
 
B) Sparta (Local) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Joined-up thinking 
Ability to balance national and local 
priorities 
Government departments taking local 
 
Blurs separation between regional and 
territorial councils for RMA 
responsibilities 
Consultation requirements 
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and regional outcomes into account 
Equalisation grants 
Strong access to elected members 
Community voice through community 
boards 
More local autonomy 
Shared services 
Ability to influence central government 
plans 
Providing co-operation between 
councils 
Consolidation of regional and territorial 
councils 
bureaucratic and subject to interest 
group capture 
Risks of local power struggles 
The problem of consolidating local and 
regional outcomes 
Greater administrative costs to 
maintain the structure 
Lack of any economy of scale 
Inconsistent service levels between 
councils 
No practical mechanisms by which 
government departments can give 
effect to outcomes 
Is the compulsory minimum size 
necessary? 
Costs of a greater number of councils 
 
 
C) Rome (Integrated) Scenario 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
National outcomes easier to establish 
and deliver 
Better for addressing complex issues 
Alignment of local and central 
boundaries 
LAAs 
Ability to make budget bids alongside 
departments 
Joint funding, planning and alignment 
Ability to influence central government 
plans 
More central government presence in 
 
Loss of local diversity 
Boundary alignment difficult 
Risks of bureaucratic capture 
Unclear what role the government 
appointee will play 
Councils have different capacity to 
engage with and influence central 
government 
Could take a long time to establish 
Might discriminate against small 
projects 
Diminished community engagement 
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the regions 
Better and easier monitoring due to 
aligned boundaries 
National plan aligned with community 
outcomes 
Move away from ad hoc policy-making 
Ability to fund community projects 
Alignment 
advantaging formal groups 
 
 
 
Participants were asked to rank the options for their ability to strengthen local 
governance. Using a simple scale of three for the strongest and one for the 
lowest, participants had no clear preference. All three options received the 
same number of points. In order to strengthen community governance, the local 
government policy advisers highlighted the need to: 
• clarify national and local values 
• understand what functions are important to community governance 
• jointly plan and set budgets between central and local government 
• identify new ways to promote participation, such as increasing voter 
turnout 
• obtain more funding for ‘core’ functions 
• get government departments to reflect local outcomes in their business 
plans 
• achieve greater co-ordination in local funding and programmes 
• give local government a greater say in legislation and policy formation  
• provide councils with additional funding tools such as greater fee-setting 
ability 
• spend more time developing community understanding of issues 
• ensure councils have clearer community priorities based on a thorough 
understanding of the issues. 
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Analysis 
 
The discussion groups’ comments provided a mix of views about the right 
institutional mix for strengthening community governance. A number of 
participants saw larger authorities, for example, the unitary model, as providing 
better economies of scale, opportunities for professional advancement by staff 
and an ability to provide more equitable outcomes. However, concerns were 
raised about complexity and the risk of overlap with higher level governments 
with the consequential reduction in citizen influence (voice). A different set of 
concerns was raised in relation to the Rome scenario. This scenario 
represented a more integrated and joined-up model of local governance 
(integrated with central government) but caused some participants to express 
concerns about loss of diversity and risk of bureaucratic capture, again caused 
by citizen access difficulties. 
 
All group participants tended to highlight the importance of the ‘local’ in local 
government, regarded representation as a strong value and were suspicious of 
national solutions imposed by central government The localist (Sparta) scenario 
was seen as the most democratic and inclusive option; however, some concern 
was expressed at the lack of an effective regional level of government, lack of 
economies of scale and potential difficulties in aligning local and regional 
outcomes with this option. The localist scenario was also seen to be more 
susceptible to interest group capture than the other options. Athens, the 
regional scenario, was valued for its ability to give local government officials 
greater opportunity to specialise, reduce duplication between territorial and 
regional councils and increase devolution (greater capacity allows greater 
devolution). It was also seen to have stronger funding sources and greater 
ability to deal with socio-economic differences within communities, allowing it to 
address distributional issues and reduce tax exporting. Reservations expressed 
about this scenario concerned its lack of flexibility, a reduction in environmental 
focus (existing regional councils are primarily environmental watchdogs) and 
the potential to overlook minority interests. In relation to the third scenario, 
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Rome (the integrated option), support was expressed for its ability to undertake 
integrated planning, align boundaries with government departments and 
agencies and share resources. There were, however, a number of reservations 
expressed about this option, such as the potential for increased central 
government interference, bureaucratic capture and loss of local diversity.  
 
Following the discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
scenarios participants were then asked to suggest options for strengthening 
local governance. The results were quite varied with no obvious correlation with 
occupation group and appeared to be heavily influenced by issues that were 
current in the local government environment. The most commonly identified 
themes were: 
• integration and alignment with central government: replies under this 
heading ranged from more national standards (with room for diversity) to 
joint planning and budgeting with central government agencies, as well 
as the suggestion that departments should be required to show how they 
were contributing to community outcomes 
• greater citizen participation: all groups suggested that opportunities for 
citizens to participate in councils’ decision-making processes should be 
enhanced. Ideas ranged from promoting the use of community boards 
(better for community engagement due to their proximity to citizens) to 
efforts to increase voter turnout and civics education 
• building capacity: a number of participants highlighted the need to 
address capacity issues, including strengthening environmental 
regulatory roles, strengthening the role of elected members (and their 
remuneration) and increasing funding for councils to perform their ‘core’ 
roles. 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, participants valued local government approaches which had high 
levels of local autonomy and provided opportunities to enable citizens to have a 
meaningful impact on decisions that affect them. This approach, which tends 
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towards the localist scenario, was qualified in two important ways. The first was 
a concern with capacity, and a belief that some activities needed to be 
undertaken on a larger scale to achieve both economies of scale and the 
appropriate degree of expertise. The second was a desire to see a better 
alignment of local and national policies, although not at the expense of 
autonomy. Strong community governance was regarded as finding a balance 
between the ability to respond to local circumstances and ensuring an element 
of policy consistency through some form of national framework, echoing the 
notion of ‘managed difference’ (see Lyons 2007). Seen in the context of the 
current New Zealand approach to local government, which contains elements of 
each scenario, the following observations can be made: 
• Policies to strengthen local autonomy, such as the introduction of general 
empowerment, should be supported. 
• A greater focus is required on mechanisms for integrated planning and 
policy-making. 
• Both local and central government need to support programmes to 
enhance civic literacy. 
• Capacity in New Zealand local government is an issue and consideration 
should be given to some form of equalisation funding to assist 
implementation by smaller councils. 
 
The outcomes of this research method reinforce a number of the conclusions 
drawn from the case studies of councils undertaking community planning, in 
particular the diverse capacity of the sector and ambiguity about the potential 
for greater integration with central government and its agencies. However, there 
was no consensus among the participants about the optimal structures for 
achieving community governance. Feedback from participants tended to focus 
on what might be described as ‘conventional’ local government issues, such as 
relationships between territorial and regional councils, adequacy of funding, and 
consolidation. Few participants were able to divorce their thinking from 
immediate issues to focus on what was, for them, a largely theoretical 
conception of local government. While many useful observations were made to 
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address current ‘problems’ in terms of the overall objective, identifying options 
for strengthening community governance, no single scenario was supported. 
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Chapter 7 The assessment model  
 
This chapter applies the assessment model developed in Chapter 3. It analyses 
each of the dimensions identified in the model with reference to specific 
measures. In relation to the ability of the New Zealand system to achieve a 
community governance approach the dimensions are assessed as being either 
adequate or showing room for improvement. 
 
Previous chapters have noted the changing socio-political environment in which 
local governments operate and the rise of complex problems that cross 
intersectoral boundaries. Changing circumstances have forced councils to look 
at new ways of operating in order not only to improve local outcomes but to 
remain relevant to their citizens. Addressing outcomes inevitably involves 
tackling issues that sit outside the realm of traditional local government 
concerns and underpins calls for a more conscious endorsement of community 
governance. Community governance, as the term is used in this thesis, is a 
particular concept of local government which places councils at the centre of a 
network of local, regional and national agencies and organisations. Councils 
that take a community governance approach are concerned with the full range 
of issues confronting the communities within their jurisdictions, best exemplified 
in the notion of place-shaping (Lyons 2007).  
 
The community governance assessment model was developed in Chapter 3 
and has been designed to assess the degree to which the New Zealand system 
is able to adopt a community governance approach. The 10 dimensions 
outlined in Chapter 3 form the structure of this chapter, and an assessment as 
to whether it is ‘adequate’ or has ‘room for improvement’ is given for each. 
Size and structure 
 
There are two measures for this dimension: council populations (size) and the 
degree of multi-level governance (structure). Size has been selected as a proxy 
for capacity and attempts to answer the question whether the population size 
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served by councils in New Zealand is likely to affect their ability to deliver 
community governance. Are councils so small, for example, that they are 
unable to both employ appropriately skilled staff and establish effective 
decision-making systems? Structure concerns the ability of the local 
government system to undertake activities which have different fields of benefit, 
as this will affect the ability of higher order governments to devolve.  
 
Average population 
The size and structure dimension is concerned with the types of local authorities 
within a given system and their relative scale. It is proposed that the number of 
citizens a council represents provides a useful proxy for thinking about its 
capability and capacity. For example, the number of citizens has a direct effect 
on council income and tends to have a concomitant effect on the competency of 
staff and organisational systems.  
 
Within any given system, the size of local authorities is the outcome of an 
ongoing tension between efficiency and responsiveness. Efficiency arguments 
are generally defined as achieving economies of scale, while responsiveness 
arguments are described as protecting democracy and holding decision-makers 
to account. Ultimately whether councils are large or small depends on the trade-
off between these contrasting principles. Figure 9 examines the number of 
councils by population. 
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As Figure 9 indicates, the number of councils in New Zealand in proportion to 
the country’s population sits towards the bottom of the scale, with a ratio similar 
to Denmark and below that of its peers, like Canada and Australia. Despite such 
evidence, however, the conventional wisdom underpinning local government 
reform has been the assumption that there are too many local authorities and 
that they should be larger. Since 1989, for example, the law in New Zealand 
has required that any new territorial authorities must have a population in 
excess of 10,000 permanent residents (see LGA 2002) – a figure which, while 
large in comparison with the size of councils in the United States, is small in 
comparison with the United Kingdom.  
 
Twenty years after the consolidation of local authorities in New Zealand the 
consolidation narrative has lost none of its appeal, for example, in the 2005 
general election at least three parties promoted local government policies 
calling for a radical reduction in the number of territorial authorities (see 
McKinlay 2006). The average population of territorial local authorities in New 
Zealand is, however, relatively large. Table 20 indicates the average 
populations of local authorities in a range of countries. While the size of New 
Zealand councils is at the larger end of the scale, the figure fails to indicate the 
spread of sizes. New Zealand has a significant number of small local authorities 
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with population levels under 20,000 (approximately 30 per cent), reflecting the 
‘stretched-out’ topography of the country and the number of large but sparsely 
populated districts, compared with compact and intensely settled Europe. 
 
Table 20 Average council size by country67 
Country Average population per 
local authority 
New Zealand 
Republic of Ireland 
United Kingdom 
France 
Switzerland 
Scotland 
Australia 
Denmark 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Northern Ireland 
54,750 
33,000 
118,440 
1,580 
2,210 
153,000 
40,000 
18,760 
9,000 
23,000 
64,980 
 
(Source: Norton 1994 and local government association websites) 
 
The first phase of local government reform was driven by concerns that the 
sector was fragmented and capacity was uneven (see Chapter 1). For example, 
one of the overriding principles used by the Local Government Commission at 
the time was to make the boundaries of the new authorities as coterminous as 
possible with communities of interest (see McKinlay 1996). While this was 
arguably achieved in a number of communities, for example Christchurch where 
the council’s administrative boundaries matched the city’s urban form, it also 
resulted in a significant number of councils with small populations (see 
Appendix 1). The relatively long tail of small councils has raised issues about 
their financial sustainability with some commentators, including respondents to 
                                                 
67
 Source: Australian Local Government Association www.alga.asn.au; Knox (2002) Review of Public 
Administration: Unpublished Information Briefing Paper, School of policy Studies, University of Ulster; 
Norton (1994). 
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the scenario questionnaire (see Chapter 6), raising questions about their 
capacity to continue to fund essential infrastructure (see McKinlay 2006).68 
Despite such criticism, and the existence of resource constraints in relation to 
some infrastructural issues, such as the quality of small community water 
schemes, a community governance approach should assist smaller authorities 
to mobilise community support and achieve good community outcomes. It is not 
clear that size alone should be the major inhibitor – particularly if an effective 
multi-level governance structure is established.  
 
Multi-level governance arrangements 
The second measure for this dimension is the degree of multi-level governance 
in the New Zealand system. Multi-level governance arrangements tend to allow 
governments to establish a fit between area of benefit and ‘who pays’. Writers 
such as Bailey (1999) argue for a correspondence between jurisdictional 
boundaries and areas of benefit created by the services local authorities 
provide. This, however, is a complex task as different functions have different 
areas of benefit, weakening the correspondence argument. There are three 
approaches to dealing with the problem of multiple functions with varying areas 
of benefit. One approach, fragmentation, guided the Thatcher government’s 
local government reform strategy and ultimately gave rise to community 
governance theory in the first place (see Rhodes 2007). A second approach is 
to create authorities with large populations that also cover large geographical 
areas in order to attempt to incorporate the area of benefit of each activity. 
Problems with this approach are the externalities and tax transfers that occur 
where activity boundaries fail to align with administrative boundaries and most 
importantly a diminution of democratic representation.69 The third approach for 
dealing with the correspondence issue is to develop multi-level forms of 
governance, regions or counties, able to take responsibility for those sub-
national activities that benefit more than a single jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
68
 An example of what small councils facing large infrastructure costs have done was Banks Peninsula 
District Council, which triggered a review that led ultimately to it being absorbed into its larger 
neighbour, Christchurch City Council, in 2006. 
69
 A concern that English councils were too big and unresponsive has been a driving influence on the 
Conservative Party’s local government policy (see Cameron 2009). 
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The ability to achieve this alignment in New Zealand has been diminished by 
the emphasis on separating regulatory and operational functions which guided 
the institutional restructuring of local government in 1988/89. Aligning territorial 
and regional council planning and activity in order to address community issues 
is made more complex because of the role regional councils play, 
predominantly a type of environmental watchdog (although a number have 
broader service delivery roles, for example Greater Wellington). Regions that 
have taken this to be their dominant responsibility have sometimes found 
themselves in conflict with territorial authorities where, for example, a local 
development might not proceed because it has failed to meet prescribed 
regional standards.  
 
The nature of the New Zealand local government structure, with its two forms of 
directly elected local authorities with separate functions in a horizontal 
relationship, is relatively unique. Previous reform objectives, which were largely 
about enhancing accountability and transparency (ensuring a separation 
between ‘poacher and gamekeeper’), have resulted in a relatively inflexible 
structure. The more common approach to designing local government systems, 
so that those who benefit from services are also the same population that pays 
for them, involves creating either large local authorities, such as in the United 
Kingdom, or some form of multi-tiered structure (see Table 21).  
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Table 21 Local government structures 
Country Population 
(m) 
Sub-national 
tier 
Local tier(s) 
Denmark 5.5 5 regions 98 municipalities 
France 60.9  22 regions 
96 departments 
35,000 communes 
Germany 82.4 16 Lander 323 counties 
117 unitary cities 
13,299 municipalities 
Netherlands 16.6 12 provinces 443 municipalities 
Australia 20.4 6 states 
3 territories 
565 local councils 
Canada 33.4 10 provinces 
3 territories 
2 metropolitan 
communities 
143 upper/regional 
councils 
3,647 local councils 
South Africa 47.4 9 provinces 6 metropolitan councils 
46 districts 
321 municipalities 
New Zealand 4.5 12 regional  
councils 
73 territorial authorities 
England 50.4 Greater London 
Authority 
8 regions 
(administrative) 
34 counties councils 
238 district councils 
36 metropolitan councils 
(unitary) 
47 unitary councils 
33 London boroughs 
 
(Source: adapted from Gough 2009, p. 7) 
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Local government systems in the developed world tend to be multi-level and 
better reflect the different nature and circumstances of communities than single 
tier systems (see Norton 1994). Large urban conglomerations can be either 
unitary metropolitan councils or operate within some sort of metropolitan 
authority that undertakes issues of metropolitan scale. Such arrangements can 
also enhance the capacity of local government systems to take on a greater 
number of functions, for example, the Danish approach. Following reform in 
2007 Denmark ‘downsized’ to five regions, which were given responsibility for 
providing major public services, such as hospitals and secondary schools (see 
www.kl.dk/English/Local-Government-Reform). In the Australian context this is 
partly achieved by the state governments playing some of the roles carried out 
by counties or regions in Europe and the Americas, for example, the provision 
of health services.  
 
Since the late eighties, local government reform in New Zealand has appeared 
to place strong emphasis on structural consistency throughout the country, with 
initially only one council, Gisborne District, standing out from the national model 
by being given both territorial and regional council powers. Regional councils, 
because they were established with a limited mandate, were poorly placed to 
take on additional responsibilities, even if such responsibilities were promoted 
by government departments (for example, regional development initiatives and 
transport funding). In addition, the boundaries of regional councils are based on 
river catchments, which have, in most cases, a poor correlation with 
communities of interest, further reducing their suitability as providers of a 
broader range of services. A number of Australian local authorities address this 
issue of providing regional services to regional communities, through what are 
known as regional organisations of councils (ROCs). These are voluntary 
associations of local authorities established for the purpose of delivering shared 
services or those services which are more efficiently provided across council 
boundaries. Although ROCs are informal structures, they can have a high 
degree of permanence. For example, the 12 councils of the Hunter Valley have 
established a legal entity called Hunter Councils Incorporated to undertake a 
range of joined-up programmes. The Hunter ROC has been in existence for 50 
years and provides opportunities for sharing professional expertise, regional 
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procurement and inter-council collaborations.70 ROCs, which are basically a 
form of networked councils, have the potential to more strongly match place-
based communities than the regional council model in New Zealand; however, 
many ROCs are short lived and may be subject to political expediency. The 
complexity of designing structures which allow for capacity and efficiency, as 
well as democracy, was highlighted in the replies given to the scenario 
questionnaire (see Chapter 6). Respondents’ replies were tempered by 
concerns that in any reorganisation ‘localness’ should not be lost, autonomy 
must be preserved and participation guaranteed. In other words, there was a 
need to find a balance.  
 
Dimension assessment 
In relation to this dimension, size and structure, New Zealand’s councils are 
relatively large by international standards, and, following the first stage of local 
government reform, there is an improved fit between administrative boundaries 
and communities of interest. Both factors suggest that, in terms of achieving 
community governance, size and structure are not major obstacles; however, 
the limited role of regional councils has proven to be a major inhibitor to 
significant devolution, and devolution is directly related to influencing outcomes. 
 
Although the LGA 2002 provided regional councils with a power of general 
competence and detailed a process by which territorial authority functions could 
be clustered and transferred to regional councils, only one authority, Greater 
Wellington, has exploited the opportunity. New Zealand’s local government 
structure is currently poorly placed to deal with both overlapping issues and 
non-environmental issues with a regional area of benefit.  
 
Because of these limitations this indicator is assessed as having room for 
improvement.  
                                                 
70
 See the Hunter Councils’ website at www.huntercouncils.com.au. 
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Finance 
 
This dimension is concerned with councils’ financial autonomy and the degree 
to which the local authority has freedom to make expenditure decisions in order 
to respond to local concerns and influence outcomes. The measure for this 
dimension concerns the proportion of ‘own source’ revenue raised by the local 
government system. 
 
Local government theory argues that local authorities should be largely self-
funding for reasons of both accountability and efficiency (Bailey 1999). In 
addition access to, and control over, funding is directly related to the capacity of 
councils to influence local outcomes. The issue of budgetary discretion is thus 
highlighted, a fundamental principle also recognised by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe (2000), which resolved that member states 
should ensure a fair distribution of public financial resources between the 
different tiers of government, taking account of the responsibilities assigned to 
each of the tiers and their evolution. It recommends that local authorities have a 
system of financing their expenditure which is based on the following principles:  
• Local authorities’ resources and their allocation must be consistent 
with the need to carry out their responsibilities effectively.  
• A substantial proportion of transfers, as well as their own resources, 
must not be earmarked.  
• Local authorities are entitled, within the national economic policy, to 
raise adequate resources of their own; the possibility of sound 
competition in tax levels should be maintained, while avoiding harmful 
tax competition.  
• The amount of state grants must be fair and foreseeable.  
• The system of financing as a whole must be consistent with the 
constraints of the national economic policy (Committee of Ministers 
2000, accessed on 6 April 2009 at www.coe.int). 
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In relation to the finance dimension, international practice and theory suggest 
that councils should be empowered to allocate financial resources, their own as 
well as transfers, according to their responsibilities and in accordance with 
consistent rules. In addressing this, Bailey (1999) proposes two key principles. 
The first is that councils should have access to buoyant local taxes which, along 
with user charges, enable them to be largely self-financing. The second is that 
central government transfers should primarily be concerned with resolving spill-
overs and financial inequities (councils with low finance-raising potential). This 
dimension uses a single measure, the level of financial autonomy exercised by 
local authorities. 
In order to establish programmes to meet local priorities, local governments 
require a funding base that not only maximises their autonomy but also provides 
them with the ability to set local tax levels or have access to untied national 
grants. It is an issue that has caused considerable local, national and 
international debate and, as Table 22 indicates, few countries achieve the ideal 
outlined by Bailey and the Council of Europe. In Ireland, for example, the right 
to levy local taxes on property was removed by the state in the 1970s and has 
never been reinstated, despite repeated calls from the local government sector 
and public inquiries. 
 
Table 22 Intergovernmental transfers 
Country Intergovernmental transfers – 
general (as percentage of total 
municipal resources) 
Intergovernmental transfers – 
tied (as percentage of total 
municipal resources) 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
Norway 
Sweden 
UK 
NZ 
12 
28 
11 
17 
11 
32 
0 
0 
1 
46 
14 
8 
27 
12 
 
(Source: adapted from Bailey, 1999, p.239) 
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The New Zealand model of local government finance is unique for the 
comparatively high proportion of income received from property taxes (rates) 
and charges and the low proportion of central government transfers (see Dollery 
2008). As illustrated in Table 23, income from property taxes and charges 
makes up 57 per cent of total income – there is no limit on the rate of tax that 
can be charged and there is no rate-capping regime. Councils have the 
authority to set property tax rates after public consultation and the adoption of 
their annual plan and budget. The relatively small proportion of funding which 
comes from central government is primarily local government’s share of the 
road tax and is targeted so that councils in lower socio-economic areas receive 
some advantage. Since the formation of the Labour-led Government in 1999 
funds have been made available to help communities upgrade sewerage and 
water treatment schemes. Smaller funds have also been established that 
contribute to local government-owned infrastructure that services the tourism 
industry as well as assisting with the implementation of new regulatory regimes. 
Despite requests from the local government sector itself for more generalised 
forms of funding assistance, central government continues to favour needs-
based approaches. 
 
Table 23 Local government income sources 
 NZ 
Property taxes and 
charges 
56.1% 
Regulatory income 5.2% 
Central government 
grants 
12.7% 
Investment income 5.7% 
Sales and charges 20.2% 
 
(Source: www.localcouncils.govt.nz) 
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While councils have political autonomy in setting annual levels of property 
taxes, the growth in council tax demands has become a major political issue 
with affordability problems for a range of citizen groups, particularly those on 
fixed incomes. Pressure has been exacerbated by the fact that certain types of 
properties have increased in value at a much faster rate than the average. For 
example, coastal properties have been subject to large shifts in value and 
property taxes, despite efforts by councils to ameliorate the impact of valuations 
by using uniform charges and differentials. Many retired people live in these 
areas and consequently are more affected by increased rates.  
 
A government-appointed Commission of Inquiry concluded that the proportion 
of property rates, at 57 per cent of council income, should be reduced to about 
50 per cent (New Zealand Government 2007). The Inquiry’s suggestion for 
achieving this was that water and wastewater services be funded by a form of 
volumetric charging, that councils should reduce the level of depreciation which 
is currently funded, and that additional central government transfers should be 
provided. The Inquiry also recommended that council discretion to set 
differentials on the general rate and use uniform annual general charges should 
be replaced with targeted rates in the interest of transparency.71 At the time of 
writing, the Government was considering the implications of the Inquiry’s 
recommendations.  
 
The extent of New Zealand local government’s reliance on a local property tax 
poses something of an interesting case. The advantages of local property taxes 
from an economic perspective are that they are highly visible, promote local 
autonomy and can be increased to meet the costs of local public services. Yet 
there are political constraints on councils which make it difficult for elected 
members to increase rates faster than the willingness of citizens to pay and it 
was notable that a large number of candidates successfully stood on anti-rate-
increase platforms in the 2007 local government elections. The degree of 
political change in those councils highlights the difficulty of increasing property 
                                                 
71
 It is common practice for councils to use a minus differential to reduce the rates on rural properties as a 
way of acknowledging lower use of council services. Likewise many councils have positive differential 
on businesses to reflect the additional costs of servicing central business districts. 
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taxes beyond what citizens are prepared to pay while at the same time 
highlighting the question of whether or not councils have access to the 
appropriate funding tools to provide the necessary public amenities modern 
cities require. Despite the technical advantages of property taxes, the reliance 
on a single form of tax potentially limits the behaviours of local authorities, 
particularly since the introduction of long-term financial management practices 
in 1996, which heavily emphasise prudent financial management of assets.  
 
While some additional funding tools have been provided to reduce reliance on 
property taxes, most importantly the power to charge levies on new 
developments to pay for increased demands on existing infrastructure 
(development contributions), the reliance on property taxes as councils’ major 
source of income creates strong disincentives to allocate resources in a non-
conservative manner. The recent success of electoral coalitions standing 
against increases in property taxes has reinforced the notion that councils 
should stick to core business, usually defined as the operation of network 
infrastructure rather than any proactive focus to achieve outcomes. The 
pressure on local government politicians not to raise property tax rates beyond 
a minimum threshold (usually the rate of the consumer price index) often comes 
from ministers of local government, and business and farming groups, as well 
as citizens, and is a dominant concern for councils at annual planning time.   
 
Dimension assessment 
While local government’s strong financial autonomy is an important positive in 
relation to its capacity to exercise community governance, there is at least one 
limiting factor, the sector’s reliance on a single tax base. This has a poor 
correlation with ability to pay and discourages councils from undertaking 
activities that might have fiscal consequences. However, given the level of 
autonomy possessed by councils and the fact that the approach to community 
governance taken by this thesis is primarily about working more effectively with 
other agencies and communities rather than expanding the range of services 
undertaken by councils (enabling and facilitating), this dimension is assessed as 
adequate. 
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Empowerment 
 
This dimension is concerned with the manner in which local authorities are 
empowered and is designed to assess councils’ freedom, or flexibility, to 
respond to local concerns. Two measures are used, the adequacy of the 
accountability regime and the adequacy of the empowerment regime. 
 
The adequacy of the accountability regime 
Community governance theory promotes an idea of local government as a 
largely autonomous form of local polity which enables citizens to make 
meaningful choices about matters of collective interest and decide “collectively 
binding rules and policies … a means of reconciling and revealing preferences” 
(Andrew and Goldsmith 1998, p. 115). The degree to which local government 
systems allow for meaningful dialogue partly depends on the level of freedom 
local decision-makers have to set agendas and consider matters raised by their 
citizens, which in turn depends on the way in which accountability and powers 
are defined.  
 
Local government accountability regimes tend to be of three types: top-down, 
bottom-up and rules based (see Table 24). Categories (B) and (C) are generally 
regarded as the most conducive to a community governance orientation. 
 
Table 24 Accountability regimes 
 Characteristics Instruments 
A) Top down Higher level governments set 
directions and monitor 
performance e.g. local government 
as decentralised service providers 
Ministerial directives 
Performance 
agreements 
B) Bottom up Voters and citizens  
Framework to ensure integrity of 
representation 
Binding referenda 
Proportional 
representation 
Mandatory consultation 
Transparency 
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Compulsory voting 
C) Rules based Administrative law principles 
Prescribed decision-making 
criteria 
 
Judicial review 
Scrutiny by 
parliamentary agencies 
(independent) 
 
Recognising that in unitary regimes ultimate authority sits with parliament or, in 
federal states, the constitution, top-down accountability places considerable 
authority in the hands of higher level governments, enabling them to intervene 
directly in the affairs of councils. Intervention might be exercised through the 
right to appoint members of councils, as in France, or allow a minister to 
overrule a council decision because it conflicted with government policy. Such 
accountability regimes are likely to be associated with high levels of government 
transfers, where councils are decentralised service providers with minimal 
autonomy to set local priorities. In contrast, bottom-up regimes place emphasis 
on giving citizens the mechanisms for holding their elected representatives to 
account. These can include binding referenda, such as those used in 
Switzerland and some American states; proportional voting systems, which are 
better at ensuring the electoral make-up of councils reflects community choices; 
mandatory consultation provisions through the use of participatory democracy, 
such as participatory budgeting approaches in Brazil; and the creation of 
smaller local authorities to encourage the Tiebout effect. Another approach to 
strengthening accountability is by ensuring compliance with agreed decision-
making processes. Under this approach any outcome (as long as it is within the 
law) is mandated if councils observed correct process in arriving at their 
decision. Ensuring processes are complied with is normally the responsibility of 
the courts and third party agencies like the Ombudsman’s Office and the 
Auditor-General, or their equivalents. 
 
While Table 24 treats the three styles as discrete, in practice accountability 
regimes tend to have elements of all three approaches. In New Zealand the 
emphasis has largely been on categories (B) and (C), involving citizen oversight 
through mandatory consultation requirements and strengthening the role of third 
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party oversight, particularly through the Auditor-General’s and Ombudsman’s 
offices.  
 
The adequacy of the empowerment regime 
The nature of a local government system’s powers can similarly be written in a 
broad or narrow sense. Three broad approaches exist: powers defined by 
constitution, general empowerment or ultra vires (see Table 25).  
 
Table 25 Empowerment models 
A Recognition of local government in 
the nation’s constitution 
South Africa 
B The provision of general 
empowerment provisions in local 
government’s empowering statute 
New Zealand, Australia 
C An empowering statute that limits 
council activity to prescribed roles 
and process i.e. the ultra vires 
principle 
Fiji, United Kingdom (New 
Zealand pre-LGA 2002) 
 
In practice, approaches may feature a combination of elements. While officials 
debated the nature of the general empowerment clause to be incorporated in 
the LGA 2002, some of the participants raised concerns that it should be drafted 
in a manner which discouraged the judiciary from ‘second guessing’ 
parliament’s intentions. The United Kingdom, for example, has a power of well-
being which is similar to general empowerment but is in fact limited by the 
existence of a range of other more specific powers related to individual 
functions. General empowerment can also be limited by the use of specific 
proscriptions, such as provisions that make it ultra vires for a council to 
undertake national functions, like policing or defence. A number of cities in the 
United States have established ‘home rule’ charters which are in most respects 
similar to the general empowering provisions found in New Zealand and much 
of the OECD. 
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The LGA 2002 provided local authorities in New Zealand with a power of 
general competence (see Chapter 1) enabling them to undertake any lawful act 
to achieve their purpose, as long as it was not specifically proscribed or 
exclusively allocated to another agency.72 In doing so New Zealand came into 
line with what has become a modern approach to empowering local 
government. The New Zealand approach, primarily (B) but with some elements 
of (C), is distinctive both for its lack of specific proscriptions and for the decision 
to separately prescribe taxing and bylaw-making powers, thus removing them 
from the general empowering provision. The LGA 2002, in particular, is 
designed in such a way that empowerment is tempered by the provision of 
opportunities for citizens to influence the decision-making processes of councils 
as well as applying what some within the sector regard as a ‘heavy-handed’ 
process compliance regime, such as the audit of the LTCCPs. Such compliance 
regimes can make councils risk averse. Generally, however, councils have a 
high level of operational autonomy with little ministerial ability to directly 
intervene in council affairs in a non-legislative way; however, this is gradually 
changing. 
 
Dimension assessment 
Community governance, with its emphasis on responsiveness, innovation and 
inter-agency co-operation, is more likely to be achieved in regimes where local 
government has constitutional recognition and general empowerment rather 
than an ultra vires framework. The current way in which local government in 
New Zealand is empowered, along with the requirement that councils consult 
with citizens and take their views into account when making decisions, should 
not provide any obstacles to achieving effective community governance. This 
dimension is assessed as adequate, even though parliament only needs a 
majority vote to change the sector’s powers and role. 
Central government supervision 
 
This dimension examines the way higher level governments steer or direct local 
governments (see Chapter 4 for a theoretical discussion on ‘steering styles’). 
                                                 
72
 For example, the power to arrest or levy income taxes. 
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There are two measures for this dimension: the degree of freedom councils 
have to set their own service delivery standards and central government’s 
supervision style. 
 
Discretion to set service standards 
To what degree is New Zealand local government able to determine the quality 
and quantity of the services it is responsible for? Are councils an autonomous 
political sphere or part of the overall governmental structure, in which 
responsibilities are allocated nationally or locally on a pragmatic basis and 
delivered according to national parameters?  
 
Autonomy can bee seen as sitting on a spectrum with integration at the 
opposite end (Montin 2000). Local government systems that sit at the autonomy 
end of the spectrum are characterised by self-government and a high level of 
freedom from intervention by state actors. For example, in systems with high 
degrees of autonomy national governments would not legally be able to 
override a properly made council decision. This autonomous model of local 
government reflects the traditional liberalism of writers, like John Stuart Mill, 
who regarded local and central government as distinct spheres of government 
within which central government should be restricted to only monitoring its 
activities (see Norton 1994). A similar approach is taken by Loughlin (1986), 
who describes a distinction between autonomists and functionalists. Advocates 
of the autonomist conception, while acknowledging the variable legal and 
constitutional restrictions that exist in different countries, focus on the potential 
within these systems for councils to exercise initiative and freedom of action. 
They tend to focus on the powers of local government, rather than the duties, 
and note that powers are often drafted in broad terms, consequently allowing 
considerable discretion (Stoker 2000, Filkin et al 2000, Reid 1999, Loughlin 
1986).  
 
A key factor in determining levels of autonomy is the discretion councils 
possess to set their own service quality and quantity levels, although these will 
vary across the different functions councils perform. Table 26 analyses a cross-
section of New Zealand local government functions using three criteria to 
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assess the level of autonomy in each functional area with criteria assessed as 
high, medium or low. The criteria are: 
• degree of self funding – this criteria assumes that, in general, where an 
activity is funded locally or by the users, national direction is likely to be 
minimal 
• council control over service quality – the ability to control the quality of a 
service, for example, the nature of new books added to the collection 
each year in city libraries, indicates local autonomy 
• council control of service quantity – the ability to control the quantity of a 
service, for example, the number of libraries in a city, indicates a level of 
local autonomy. 
 
Table 26 Autonomy index 
Function Council 
control of 
funding 
Council 
control of 
quantity 
Council 
control of 
quality 
Autonomy 
index 
ranking 
Libraries High High High High 
Wastewater 
treatment 
Medium High Medium Medium 
Water supply High Medium Medium Medium 
Building 
Control 
High Low Low Low 
Recreation 
centres 
High High High High 
 
The sample of activities assessed above suggests that New Zealand councils 
have a high level of discretion for setting service levels, thus having a high 
autonomy index. However autonomy can vary according to function and policy 
arena. It also changes over time, reflecting ideology and the policy preferences 
of particular governments. 
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Supervision style 
In the first instance central-local government supervision is framed by the 
constitutional status of local government within the confines of any particular 
state. Local governments that have their role and powers defined by constitution 
have a status that councils in countries without such recognition struggle to 
achieve. New Zealand falls within the latter category. While it lacks a written 
constitution, it does possess a number of constitutional documents which both 
protect the rights and liberties of citizens and establish boundaries to the 
authority of public bodies. Statutes such as the LGA 2002, the LEA 2001 and 
LGRA 2002 can be understood as part of the country’s constitutional 
framework. However, as a parliamentary democracy, local government’s 
functions, funding and powers are set by simple majority vote in parliament, 
which has sovereignty. Council status is ultimately negotiated and depends on 
both the preferences of national policy-makers and the political skill of the 
sector itself. Without the ‘security’ of constitutional recognition, local authorities 
and their various representative organisations must work to build alliances 
among groupings within parliament in order to promote helpful measures or 
block legislation that might threaten its ability to govern effectively.73 However, 
constitutional recognition by itself is no guarantee that local government will 
possess the authority and capacity to exercise effective community 
governance.74  
 
One of the distinctive themes of the community governance literature features 
the relationship between levels or spheres of government. Focusing on 
outcomes, and recognising that many issues can only be addressed through a 
multi-agency response, highlights the importance of institutional frameworks 
governing relationships. A major factor affecting supervision style is the position 
systems sit on the autonomy/integration spectrum (see above). Location on the 
                                                 
73
 Political leverage is arguably diminished in the New Zealand model by the lack of overlapping political 
memberships. Systems such as the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland have considerable 
alignment between local and national political representation. Overlapping membership with parties 
represented in both Parliament and councils provides an additional mechanism for influence. 
74While there is no guarantee constitutional recognition will enhance autonomy, councils still rate it 
highly. For example, the Australian Local Government Association unsuccessfully sponsored a national 
referendum in 1998, and in December 2008 launched a campaign for a second referendum. 
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continuum is far from static. For example, many Nordic and European countries 
have gradually been shifting towards the integrated end of the continuum in 
recent years, largely reflecting the growth of the welfare state in the post-WWII 
period (Montin 2000). The integrational approach tends to emphasise the status 
of local authorities as creatures of statute and highlights the degree to which co-
production and co-management are a feature of many local public services (see 
Considine 2006), a view reinforced in contemporary debates about sustainable 
development. Integrated approaches can be characterised as either highly 
subordinated to the state or as partnering relationships. Subordinated 
relationships tend to be strongly hierarchical. In contrast, partnering allows 
some room for negotiation and may involve a situation where councils are the 
means through which governments implement decisions. These relationships 
reflect a ‘co-operative dualism’, which downplays hierarchical approaches and 
sets the scene for more of a sustained dialogue around innovations and their 
implementation (Banner 2002).  
 
A related perspective is provided by Bailey (1999), who notes that central-local 
government relationships tend to be of two kinds. The first is the ‘centralised 
constraint’ model, in which central government sets the limits of council action 
within which they can act with full autonomy. The second is the ‘bargaining’ 
model, which occurs where local government’s role is protected in a 
constitution, diminishing the ability of central government to direct local 
decision-making. In this latter case central governments need to negotiate 
compliance, increasing difficulties when seeking nation-wide compliance. In 
practice, relationships tend to be in a constant state of flux, reflecting changing 
perceptions of autonomy, accountability and micro-economic control. A good 
example is local government reform in Norway. Recently the Norwegian system 
has shifted from its historic tradition of autonomy to a more strongly 
integrational stance, an integrational model in which central government is now 
setting broad goals and structural frameworks while councils are determining 
the means for achieving the goals locally (Larsen and Offerdal 2000).75 In 
                                                 
75
 Recent reforms in New Zealand have similar characteristics with new regulatory regimes in building 
and food safety, for example, diminishing local discretion and strengthening the ability of national 
agencies to direct local authorities. 
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essence, local government in Norway has become a “semi-autonomous political 
institution with a greater or lesser capacity for political action” with relationships 
that can be either of a principal-agent or partnership form (Montin 2000, p. 13).  
 
The type of instruments used by national government to supervise their councils 
reflects a combination of constitutional arrangements, ideology and the 
historical circumstances which gave rise to local governance systems. For 
example, supervision in many European states is descended directly from 
Napoleonic traditions in which territorial offices of the state were set up to 
supervise local authorities (Sellers and Lidstrom 2007). The New Zealand 
framework is characterised by the use of ‘softer’ style supervision instruments, 
which reflects on the overall level of supervision councils are subject to from 
central government (see discussion in Chapter 4). Sellers and Lidstrom (2007) 
have developed an index which measures the degree of supervision local 
authorities in 21 OECD countries are subject to (see Table 27). 
 
In developing their index the authors have used seven distinct indicators, these 
are: the existence of local supervisory officials; whether local executives are 
appointed by higher level governments or not; the level of local discretion in 
determining the form of local government; the degree to which the local and 
national civil services are integrated or exist independently; grants as a 
percentage of local revenue; local tax autonomy; and whether or not there is 
national supervision of local government borrowing (ibid 2007). Out of the 21 
countries in the study, New Zealand ranks third from the bottom in terms of its 
level of local government supervision. The only countries with less ‘supra local’ 
fiscal and politico-administrative supervision are Switzerland and the United 
States. 
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Table 27 Local government supervision  
Country Fiscal and politico-administrative 
supervision (average) 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Canada 
Ireland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Japan 
0.98 
1.06 
1.33 
0.98 
1.45 
1.59 
1.29 
1.26 
0.93 
1.26 
0.52 
1.42 
1.15 
1.46 
0.56 
1.10 
1.23 
0.38 
0.64 
0.53 
1.23 
 
(Source: adapted from Sellers and Lidstrom 2007, p. 620) 
 
The central-local government interface in New Zealand is a contested space 
that is yet to adapt fully to the implications of the LGA 2002. Nor is there 
necessarily a clear picture of the Government’s intent, as Reid notes: 
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The public rhetoric of empowering local government appears to have 
clouded what in practice is a tightening of accountability framed as 
empowering citizens to control their councils. In appearance it seems to 
indicate a failure to trust local democracy, i.e. locally elected 
representatives, to deliver desirable community outcomes without heavily 
prescribed process.76 How this balance, between empowered councils 
and empowered communities, is achieved will ultimately colour the 
potential for meaningful local governance arrangements in the future77 
(Reid 2002, p. 337). 
 
The nature of the interface varies by policy arena and there is some evidence to 
show that the Government is extending its policy interest and driving the New 
Zealand model, at least at the margins, towards the integration end of the 
spectrum. Compared with its international peers, such as European and Nordic 
local government systems, New Zealand’s central government tends to have a 
lower profile, makes use of fewer national strategies that bind sub-national 
governments and is more likely to allow councils freedom to operate within their 
traditional policy realms. This statement must, however, be conditioned by an 
increasing use of national standards in some policy areas, particularly the 
environment and more top-down planning approaches in infrastructure. The 
growing use of ‘standardising’ measures (in the terms of the Dollery and Wallis 
2001b framework) points to a subtle shift from a largely autonomous to a more 
integrated form of local government.78  
 
Dimension assessment 
Despite the gradual shift in the New Zealand system towards the integration 
end of the spectrum, supervision of local government in New Zealand continues 
                                                 
76
 The Government’s commitment to local empowerment was tested by whether or not it was willing to 
give councils the power to rate the hospitality industry, through what has become known colloquially as a 
‘room’ or ‘bed’ tax. Although included in the Rating Bill it was removed at the last minute after 
widespread criticism by the hospitality industry concerned that councils will use it as a ‘cash cow’. 
77
 While the Government has made it clear publicly that the reform of the Local Government Act 2002 
was not intended to address the constitutional relationship between local government and the national 
state, many commentators at the time thought the introduction of general empowerment had constitutional 
implications.  
78
 The amendment to the Resource Management Act 2005 is expected to result in more national policy 
statements. Standards are also being imposed for services such as potable water, landfills, urban design 
and waste disposal. 
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to be at the lower end of the supervision scale and would be unlikely to inhibit 
the necessary level of autonomy and responsiveness required to adopt a 
community governance approach. This dimension is assessed as adequate. 
Functions 
 
This dimension has been selected on the basis that the degree to which 
councils can directly influence the achievement of community outcomes has a 
direct bearing on their ability to exercise effective community governance and 
that being responsible for a broad range of functions increases their ability to 
influence outcomes. For example, councils with responsibility for health and 
education have more levers to enhance well-being than councils that lack such 
responsibilities. Consequently the range of mandatory functions undertaken by 
councils has been used as a measure along with the local government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP and public expenditure.  
 
Local government expenditure 
The conventional explanation for the size of local government in New Zealand 
and its share of pubic services (approximately 10 per cent of public expenditure) 
refers to the country’s small population and limited resources, which 
necessitated the active involvement of the state in the development of 
infrastructure (Bush 1995, Sutch 1956). Local government’s share of public 
expenditure, however, has not always been so low. A revisionist history is 
emerging which focuses on local government’s role in the creation of 
infrastructure and notes the frequency and scale of borrowing in foreign 
currency by councils in the 19th century. It explains the minimal role of local 
government and the country’s strong centralism by reference to the Labour 
government in the 1930s and the emergence of the welfare state (Cookson 
2007). Cookson writes that by 1930 local government accounted for almost half 
of total public revenue and expenditure, whereas by 2005 this figure had fallen 
to around 10 per cent (see Table 28). The trend was not unique to New 
Zealand; over the last century, the transfer of functions such as health, fire 
service and education from local to central government was mirrored by a 
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similar centralisation in the British state and the erosion of local government 
powers in that country (Banner 2002).  
 
Table 28  Local government expenditure  
Country Year Percentage of total public 
expenditure 
Percentage of gross 
domestic product 
    
Denmark 1994 31.3% 19.9% 
Italy 1993 13% 7% 
France 1992 27.2% 5.5% 
Netherlands 1994 23.1% 13.3% 
New Zealand 2007 9.3% 3.3% 
Norway 1994 60% 18.9% 
Sweden 1994 38% 27.5% 
United Kingdom 1994 27% 11% 
 
(Source: adapted from Bailey 1999, p. 84) 
 
While emergence of the welfare state, with its preferences for universal style 
policy solutions, signalled a reduction in the relative size of local government, 
the services provided by the sector have been dynamic. Over the first 50 years 
since their establishment, urban municipalities, in particular, expanded their 
activities in response to community demands. For example, Christchurch City 
Council invested in social housing as early as 1921 and established a crèche 
for shoppers a decade later. Wellington City Council not only employed the local 
concert master for the local orchestra (Wellington sinfonia), but also ran an 
abattoir. The diversity of functions can be seen to reflect a strong philosophy of 
localism and self-help that was part of the colonial experience. A similar trend 
also took place in rural New Zealand and by the time the Labour-Alliance 
government took office in 1999 very few rural councils in the South Island would 
not have been involved in the ownership or support of some form of rural 
medical centre. As central government reduced its presence in the provinces 
and downsized much of its traditional activity following ‘deregulation’, it was not 
uncommon for councils to find themselves filling the gap. A decade later the 
focus was more on working collaboratively to address ‘wicked issues’, such as 
     223 
graffiti and street racing.79 Despite the ability of councils to ‘top up’ or 
complement national services, in relation to its share of national and public 
expenditure the New Zealand local government system ranks as one of the 
smallest.  
 
Range of mandatory functions 
The range and scope of the functions councils are mandated (and empowered) 
to undertake represents one of the most important mechanisms through which 
they give effect to community governance. This occurs in two ways. In the first 
instance it ensures local authorities have responsibility for the provision (not 
necessarily as providers) of a sufficiently wide range of local services to enable 
them to enhance citizens’ quality of life. In the second instance their ability to 
make decisions about the distribution, quality and quantity of services provides 
a degree of leverage which enables them to influence other sectors, such as the 
non-government sector. So what should these services be? Is there a particular 
range of functions or activities that are necessary if councils are to exercise 
local governance or is it simply a matter of scale? There are three perspectives: 
 
1. activities or services which are the direct responsibility of the local 
authority. In relation to these services councils have rights as owners and 
funders to determine quality, quantity and strategic objectives 
2. activities or services provided under a mandate from national 
governments. Many of these functions fall into the ‘maximalist’ category 
described in Table 30, and are either funded or closely monitored by the 
state. Inevitably, decisions about quality and quantity are determined by 
the funders, diminishing the ability of councils, as providers, to tailor 
services to address unique and local circumstances. This is the case in 
centralised states like the United Kingdom and is a growing issue in 
decentred states like Norway and Denmark 
3. mechanisms to influence other providers. Such mechanisms may include 
the power to establish local regulations (unfettered by higher levels of 
                                                 
79
 Such was local government’s response that the Minister of Local Government, the Hon. Maurice 
Williamson, was heard complaining that ‘just because central government has stopped delivering a 
service is no excuse for local government to get involved”, conversation with the writer, 1998. 
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government); advocacy through the application of ‘bully pulpit’ powers 
(usually exercised by political leaders); and the use of joint 
planning/operations, such as the community development strategies 
employed in Ireland and both Strategic Local Partnerships and the 
Sustainable Communities Act adopted by the United Kingdom. 
 
Does the current suite of local government functions enable or inhibit 
community governance? Is the emphasis on property-related services too 
limiting? In a comparative study of functions, Gough (2009) argues property and 
amenity functions are essential for councils to undertake their place-shaping 
role (see Lyons 2007). Table 29 extends Gough’s study with the addition of 
New Zealand data. 
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Table 29 Analysis of local government functions 
 Denmark Germany Netherlands Australia Canada England South 
Africa 
New 
Zealand 
 R M L L P M S L P L R L P L R T 
Property 
                
Local roads  ++  ++  ++  ++ + ++  ++ ++ ++  ++ 
Public transport ++ + + ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++  ++ ++ + ++ + 
Utilities  ++  ++ + ++ ++ + ++ +    ++  ++ 
Waste  ++ + ++  ++  ++ + ++  ++  ++  ++ 
Local planning  ++  ++  ++  ++ + ++  ++  ++  ++ 
Amenity 
                
Parks and open 
spaces 
 ++  ++  ++  ++ + ++  ++  ++ + ++ 
Sport and leisure  ++  ++  ++  ++ ++ ++  ++ ++ ++  ++ 
Cultural facilities  ++ ++ ++  ++  ++ ++ ++  ++ ++   ++ 
Social 
                
Health: hospitals ++  ++ ++   ++  ++    ++    
Health: other  ++ + +   ++ + ++ +  + ++ +  + 
Education: 
primary 
 ++ ++ +  ++ ++  ++   ++ ++    
Education: 
secondary 
  ++ +  ++ ++  ++   ++ ++    
Education: post 
secondary 
  ++ +   ++  ++        
Other children’s 
services 
 ++ + ++ + ++ ++  ++ +  ++ +    
Social services + ++ ++ ++  ++ ++ + ++ +  ++     
Social housing  ++  ++   ++ + ++ +  + +   + 
Welfare and 
employment 
 ++  +  ++ +  +        
Public Order 
                
Police   ++   ++ ++  ++ ++  +     
Fire and rescue    ++   ++  ++ ++  +  ++   
Emergency 
planning 
 ++  ++ +  ++  ++ ++  + ++ ++ + ++ 
Other 
                
Strategic 
planning 
+ + ++  ++  ++  ++   + ++  ++ ++ 
Strategic 
infrastructure 
  ++  +  ++ ++ ++ +  + ++ ++  ++ 
Economic 
development++ 
++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++  ++ ++ ++  ++ 
Environmental 
protection 
 ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ +  ++ ++ ++ ++ + 
     226 
Key 
++ Strong role 
+ Modest role 
Denmark 
R Regions 
M Municipalities 
 
Germany 
L Lander 
L Local 
Netherlands 
P Provinces 
M Municipalities 
Australia 
S States 
L Local 
England 
R Regional 
L Local 
South Africa 
P Provinces 
L Local 
New Zealand 
R Regional 
L Local 
 
(Source: adapted from Gough 2009, p. 23) 
 
As Gough’s work indicates, the New Zealand model is strong in relation to 
property, amenity and other activities; however, it is particularly weak when 
compared with most other countries with regard to social and public order 
activities. Missing from the New Zealand bundle of functions are any of the 
major social policy functions, such as policing, education, social services and 
health. The small range of decentralised services provided by local government 
in this country emphasises the Anglophone nature of the local government 
system (Norton 1994). Anglophone systems tend to take an instrumental view 
of local authorities as service providers, reflecting greater levels of central 
government oversight, minimal constitutional safeguards and, in many 
countries, strong agency roles. Councils in Anglophone regimes are seen in 
similar terms to the private or the not-for-profit sectors, whereas, in contrast, 
continental systems view local authorities as having general responsibility for 
local affairs (Banner 2002). This is illustrated in Figure 10, which compares 
autonomy and tasks in a range of cities. Christchurch, one of the largest cities in 
New Zealand, scores highly for autonomy but poorly for task profile. 
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Figure 10 Task profile for selected cities80 
 
 
 
(Source: adapted from Naschold 1996, p. 11) 
 
The discussion about functions is partly obscured by the difference between 
production and provision. Having a statutory responsibility to ensure a service is 
provided does not mean that councils should be the provider. Indeed, 
commentators like Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argue that the more that 
councils are forms of local administration (the functionalist perspective) the less 
able they will be to take a strategic governance approach. While their 
rowing/steering metaphor may have become clichéd, the suggestion that too 
much emphasis on ‘rowing’ rather than ‘steering’ can inhibit organisations from 
focusing on the ‘big picture’ has particular salience at the level of local 
government, where infrastructure and asset management contribute a 
significant part of an authority’s budget.  
 
Naschold’s (1997) solution to this issue is for councils to be ‘smart purchasers’, 
an idea that envisages an environment in which they have the freedom to 
reallocate resources to address strategic priorities without being bound to a 
                                                 
80
 Naschold 1997, p. 12. 
Broad task profile 
Weak 
autonomy 
Phoenix 
Delft 
Mitaka
Linkoping 
Germany 
Christchurch 
Narrow task profile 
Strong 
autonomy 
Braintree 
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particular bundle of services. In a similar vein, the New Local Government 
Network (2008) argues, with reference to the United Kingdom, that councils 
need to be sufficiently empowered in order to shape the service outcomes of 
other public organisations, such as the police and health authorities. This 
requires governments to reform “local democracy to empower councils to offer 
multi-functional democratic oversight of public services across the local place” 
(Filkin et al 2008, p. 4). It places more emphasis on their role directing 
development rather than necessarily providing services and highlights the need 
to be able to take a strategic view of governance.  
 
Internationally there is a high degree of convergence around a core set of local 
services (Table 30 describes these as minimalist) with many systems, for 
example the Northern and Southern European models, delivering a much 
broader range, particularly social services (maximalist). Table 30 defines both 
minimalist and maximalist systems. 
 
Table 30 Local government functions 
Minimalist  Maximalist 
Libraries 
Sports, recreation and cultural facilities 
Local physical planning 
Local roads 
Emergency services 
Drinking water 
Sewerage 
Drainage 
Public health services 
(In addition to the minimalist list) 
Primary education 
Secondary education 
Child care 
Hospitals 
Social services 
 
 
Maximalist systems, such as the Danish system, can directly influence local 
outcomes by adjusting expenditure or amending service levels for the activities 
for which they are responsible. Local authorities in minimalist systems have less 
ability to directly influence outcomes, as many of the major policy arenas, such 
as health, are the responsibility of central government. In practice, the 
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distinction between the two types of system is not a zero sum game. Maximalist 
systems, such as those in Denmark and the United Kingdom, while putatively 
responsible for a wide range of local services, also operate within national 
policy frameworks set by their national governments that limit local discretion, 
require national standards and limit councils’ tax-raising powers.  
 
Dimension assessment 
While the New Zealand framework enables councils to undertake a broad range 
of discretionary activities, this measure highlights the system’s minimalist range 
of mandatory functions and proportionally low share of public expenditure. It 
argues that both these factors limit the ability of councils to influence local 
outcomes (acknowledging that many councils have shown significant ability 
through collaborative arrangements or good advocacy; however, not all are able 
to exercise such choices). This dimension is assessed as having room for 
improvement.  
Strategy 
 
This dimension is concerned with the degree to which councils’ approaches to 
strategic planning have a community planning focus, that is, they are externally 
focused and provide a framework for a range of agencies to pursue common 
objectives set by citizens. The measure for this dimension uses the English and 
Irish approaches to community planning as comparators with which to evaluate 
the New Zealand approach. 
 
Traditional strategic planning seeks to place an organisation within its wider 
context and position it for the future. More recently, issues-based and inductive 
approaches to strategy have been recognised (Bryson 2004) that address 
‘wicked issues’, issues that require an inter-agency response. As an approach 
to strategy this new version extends beyond the organisation and involves a 
much broader range of actors, akin to what Reich describes as a process of 
social learning about public problems and possibilities (see Roberts 2000). 
Community planning is distinctive because it links vision to well-being and 
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seeks to achieve community buy-in to that vision in order to gain legitimacy 
(Moore 1995). There are three stylised models of strategy (see Table 31). 
 
Table 31 Strategy models 
 Council 
orientation 
Strategic 
focus 
Degree of 
feedback 
Linkages to 
citizens and 
other 
organisations 
National 
approaches 
Approach 
one 
Focus on 
service to 
community 
Primarily 
internal 
strategic 
alignment 
Councils 
periodically 
test strategy 
against 
community 
outcomes 
(primarily 
efficiency). 
Service delivery 
outputs 
consistent with 
citizen 
expectations 
(community 
outcomes reflect 
them) 
South 
Australia 
Norway 
Approach 
two 
Focus on 
services and 
other 
functions to 
support 
community 
well-being 
Focus on 
internal and 
external 
strategic 
alignment 
Ongoing 
testing for 
alignment 
between 
outputs and 
outcomes 
(efficiency and 
effectiveness) 
Community 
outcomes shape 
service delivery 
and other roles 
including 
collaboration 
with others. 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Approach 
three 
Community 
engagement 
and 
collaboration 
underpin 
strategic 
development. 
Focus on 
external 
alignment, 
outcomes, 
common 
purpose 
Feedback 
loops allow 
iterative 
strategy 
development. 
Councils and 
communities co-
produce 
outcomes (with 
others). 
New Zealand 
United 
Kingdom 
 
(Source: adapted from Scott 2008, unpublished paper prepared for Local 
Futures, 2008) 
 
The three approaches are distinguished by the degree to which they are 
internally or externally focused and how they link or align with other 
organisations. Approach three reflects the core premise of an outcomes-
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focused community strategy, in which the council works with other parts of the 
community to ‘co-produce’ outcomes, direction is set on the basis of community 
engagement and common purpose is built around agreed outcomes. 
Community strategies are processes for identifying community aspirations in 
order to provide goals around which locally and nationally based organisations 
can organise and establish common purpose. The concept underpins much of 
the writing about community governance (see Stewart and Clarke 1996, 
Considine 2006). As Darlow et al note: 
 
Increasingly community strategies are being assigned the role of the key 
strategic document in localities. As such they are intended to provide the 
vision and strategic framework for other local plans and strategies and, 
more recently, they have also been given a key role in relation to ‘place - 
shaping’ (Darlow et al, 2008, p. 9). 
 
In community planning the overall goal is not the success of the organisation 
itself, the local authority, but the well-being of the community it serves. This is 
one of the specific objectives of the Irish approach. Following the 
implementation of a public sector modernisation strategy in the late 1990s, the 
‘Strategic Management Initiative’, the Irish Government introduced a range of 
measures to maximise local government’s contribution to economic and social 
development, excellence in service delivery and more effective services. As a 
result of greater decentralisation, local government found itself playing a 
broader role in the integration and co-ordination of public services, a move 
described by that government as having “set a path which should enable local 
government to influence, to a much greater extent, the provisions of public 
services locally” (Department of Environment and Local Government (DELG) 
2000. p. 7). The Irish initiative was intended to address the siloed behaviour of 
public services and the perceived difficulty of delivering a joined-up approach 
for dealing with complex issues. The Department of Environment and Local 
Government (DELG) noted that the problem of co-ordination is felt most acutely 
at the local level “due to the relatively narrow range of functions entrusted to the 
local government system” (DELG 2003, p. 5). To achieve collaboration, the 
government established what it termed County/City Development Boards 
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(CDBs) as mechanisms for “local government, local development, state 
agencies and the social partners, to work out an agreed vision for their county 
or city” (DELG 2000, p. vii).  
 
The primary task of the boards is to produce a strategy to address the 
economic, social and cultural development issues within their jurisdictions and 
the first strategies were to be completed by the beginning of January 2002. 
Chaired by a nominee of the county/city councils the boards were set up to 
operate autonomously but under the local authority umbrella. The Minister of 
Local Government explained that the boards drew on the traditional Irish 
concept of Meitheal, or working together, and would bring together all players 
locally – the public sector agencies, the social partners and, most importantly, 
local communities and the voluntary sector to seek common cause in 
developing their counties and cities (Dempsey 2000). 
 
The CDBs, which were recognised within the government’s National 
Development Plan, were expected to deliver four objectives: 
 work towards an agreed county/city strategy for economic, social and 
cultural development 
 develop a vision at local level to encompass the various local and 
sectoral plans  
 provide for co-operation on a continuing basis at county/city level in the 
work of the various agencies, promote co-ordination and avoid overlap at 
this level 
 maximise the effectiveness of spending on programmes and projects at 
the local level by bringing together the various interests (ibid, p. 2). 
 
More specifically, the aim of the boards includes the joint development and 
monitoring of locally delivered public services; minimising overlaps and 
duplication; filling service gaps; achieving a more coherent and integrated 
approach to public and local development; and addressing the particular needs 
of local areas (DELG 2003). The government’s review of the first round of 
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strategies, undertaken in mid 2002, noted that all 34 integrated strategies for 
the delivery of local public services had been adopted and published and that 
they represented a new approach to the task of achieving more ‘joined-up’ 
government at the local level in Ireland. However, while the strategies were 
seen to make a positive contribution to improved public service co-ordination, 
success was still dependent on the willingness of central agencies to shift 
beyond token compliance and seriously resource the new strategies (DELG 
2003). As the review commented: 
 
The county/city level cannot go very far past where the central level 
wishes or allows it to go. So, for the central level, the key message of the 
strategies is that the local service integration mission will ultimately be as 
successful or unsuccessful as central government organisations wish it 
to be (ibid, p. 81). 
 
Although participating public agencies are required to commit resources to the 
achievement of the new strategies, compliance appears to vary according to the 
interest of each agency, a theme that would appear to be universal.  
 
Sustainable community strategies, introduced by the Local Government Act 
2000 (LGA 2000), played a critical role in the United Kingdom’s modernisation 
agenda. Local authorities, acting in association with other local agencies 
through Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), are required to prepare 
sustainable community strategies, the key strategic document for setting out 
area visions. This was announced early in the government’s reform programme: 
the “new duty to promote well-being will include a requirement for councils to 
secure the development of a comprehensive strategy for promoting the well-
being of the area” (DETR 1998,   ). The purpose of such strategising was 
intended to create local leadership that “joins-up the efforts and vision and 
commitment of others but does so by respecting and supporting the contribution 
of other stakeholders, citizens and providers” (Filkin et al 2000, p. 14). The 
statutory objective of sustainable community strategies is to promote or improve 
the well-being of the council’s area. They are required to include four key 
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components – a long-term vision, an action plan, commitment to improvement, 
and arrangements for monitoring and implementation – and are expected to: 
• enable communities (based upon geography and/or interest) to articulate 
their aspirations, needs and priorities  
• co-ordinate the actions of the council with those of the public, private, 
voluntary and community organisations that operate locally  
• influence the activities of those organisations so that they effectively 
meet community needs and aspirations 
• contribute to the achievement of sustainable development with local 
goals and priorities relating to appropriate regional, national and global 
objectives (DETR 1998).  
 
The strategies are described as the “overarching plan for promoting and 
improving the well-being of the area” (Communities and Local Government 
2008, p. 28). The structure is set out in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 The United Kingdom’s strategic framework 
Local Strategic Partnership 
Includes public, private, voluntary 
and community sector 
representatives 
  
  Consultation with users and 
different sectors 
Sustainable Community strategy 
Sets out vision, aims and objectives 
for area 
  
   
 
National menu of programmes 
Provides funding up to an agreed 
total 
Local area decides which to access 
 Local/regional/national priorities 
agreed 
   
 
Local public service agreement 
Sets out area-wide targets for public 
services and can include cross-
boundary targets 
  
  Single monitoring process for area-
wide outcomes 
Local area agreements 
Set out quality of life outcomes 
  
 
(Source: adapted from Audit Commission 2004) 
 
The United Kingdom’s approach to community planning sits within a framework 
of collaborative and inter-agency initiatives. In 2003 the Egan review (ODPM 
2003) recommended that community strategies be expanded into what are now 
known as sustainable community strategies. The councils’ lead role was to 
orchestrate the delivery of sustainable communities by bringing together service 
providers and other players within the local community.  
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The New Zealand approach to community planning is described in previous 
chapters. In essence, councils are required to facilitate a process to identify 
community outcomes and develop 10-year plans which indicate how they will 
contribute to those outcomes. The legislation is prescriptive in requiring councils 
to use their best endeavours to invite other agencies, those which contribute to 
the achievement of community outcomes, to take part in designing the process 
for essentially identifying them. Outcomes also feature in at least two other 
important aspects of the LGA 2002, notably the requirement to prepare a report 
every three years showing the degree to which the outcomes have been 
achieved and in the second instance they must show how certain kinds of 
decisions made by the council contribute to the achievement of community 
outcomes. The models used in Ireland and the United Kingdom provide a useful 
template against which to assess the New Zealand approach (see Table 32). 
 
Table 32 Approaches to strategy 
 Ireland England New Zealand 
Prescribed process High Medium Low/medium 
Involvement of public 
agencies mandatory 
Yes Yes No 
Involvement of non-
public agencies 
mandatory 
Yes Yes No 
Policy scope Limited Wide Wide 
Incentives to encourage 
joined-up governance 
Mandatory Yes No 
Citizen influence Moderate High Moderate 
Structures for joined-up 
governance 
Yes Yes No 
Influence of the 
strategies 
Individual 
agencies required 
to have regard to 
strategies 
Form the basis 
for LAA 
priorities 
Depends on 
individual 
agencies 
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The Irish model emphasises the co-ordination of public services on a regional 
basis. It brings together representatives from specified agencies, both public 
and non-public partners, in order to reduce duplication and enhance integration, 
providing a balance between national strategies and local issues. In contrast, 
the United Kingdom’s approach to developing and implementing sustainable 
community strategies tends to emphasise the articulation of local aspirations. 
These act as a mechanism to identify priorities that form the basis of a range of 
joined-up initiatives at the operational level. In the Irish Republic the local 
authority is required to develop the strategies, while in the United Kingdom 
responsibility sits with the LSP, although the council is still the default provider 
should local strategic partnerships not be established. Even where LSPs have 
been established, local authorities tend to be the major agency.
 
 
The New Zealand approach contains many similar elements to both Ireland and 
the United Kingdom; however, it lacks the high level national commitment to 
collaboration found in those countries, particularly with the voluntary nature of 
central government agency participation. Most efforts have focused on the 
process for identifying community outcomes. The approach taken to the 
identification of community outcomes has varied between councils and different 
approaches were also taken to the involvement of third party organisations and 
in the degree to which outcomes have been highly summarised. A study of 
community outcomes undertaken by the Department of Internal Affairs (see 
www.communityoutcomes.govt.nz) notes that most councils have identified 
between six and eight high level outcomes; however, some had more than 40 
outcomes, for example Wellington City and Ruapehu District. As an example of 
this diversity, some councils, such as Wellington City, have also developed their 
own council outcomes which act as intermediary outcomes to assist with their 
internal planning (see Chapter 5).  
 
Although the LTCCP is designed to be outcome-focused, questions exist as to 
the degree this has been achieved in practice: “New Zealanders have failed to 
fully grasp the opportunity that informed deliberative community-based 
engagement offers as a forum for community governance mandated under the 
LGA” (Leonard and Memon 2008, p. xi). Problems include: 
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• a failure by both local and central government to understand the full 
significance of the paradigm shift that was the LGA 2002. As a result the 
promise of the community outcomes process has not been realised 
• a failure to appreciate the importance of taking a participatory approach 
to the community outcomes process and to develop ‘intermediate’ 
outcomes which would better replicate the ‘managing for outcomes’ 
approach of central government departments 
• a failure to ensure those participating in the community outcomes 
process, such as elected members and staff, were adequately informed 
“of the substantive issues in the community” (ibid, p. xii) 
• the lack of understanding about the collective ownership of community 
outcomes by community and business sectors and a general lack of 
resourcing for such sectors, along with Maori, to adequately participate. 
 
A further issue is the effect of the audit regime. LTCCPs are subject to an audit 
opinion commenting on the underlying assumptions of the plan and the 
accuracy/quality of its performance management system. The result has been a 
greater focus on compliance and meeting the requirements of the audit than 
deliberative strategy. Underpinning many of concerns is a belief that councils 
were not given sufficient guidance to implement the new focus on outcomes 
adequately, as well as a lack of national leadership to champion the new 
community outcomes paradigm, both within the government and in the 
community and local government (see Leonard and Memon 2008). Other 
concerns have been raised by Local Futures, a research consortium, who 
suggested that the approach to framing outcomes taken by most councils 
resulted in “high level outcomes (which) cannot provide effective tools for 
guiding local decision-making” (Local Futures 2006, p. 208). Local Futures also 
expressed concern that the majority of councils tended to use passive methods 
for identifying outcomes, such as surveys, rather than deliberative processes 
involving extensive citizen engagement, the result being akin to a list of issues, 
rather than a considered vision of the future. In addition, the case studies (see 
Chapter 5) found that the New Zealand approach to identifying community 
outcomes fell short of the community governance approach for two reasons: the 
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difficulty of ensuring they reflect community-wide aspirations and the lack of any 
mandatory role of central government agencies and departments. 
 
Dimension assessment 
The New Zealand framework nominally meets the requirement that councils 
focus on community-wide outcomes rather than organisationally focused 
outputs. However, the value of outcomes-based strategy is overshadowed by 
the more compliance-focused expectations of the LTCCP, particularly its 
emphasis on being an accountability document, asset management plan and 
performance framework. This is also reinforced in the findings of Chapter 5, 
which highlight a divergence between those councils that see the LTCCP and 
community outcomes as a compliance matter and those that see it as providing 
an opportunity to enhance community governance.  
 
In effect the LTCCP’s broad range of statutory objectives has ‘crowded out’ 
strategy. In addition, the manner in which the framework has been interpreted 
and the lack of prescription around the framing of outcomes limit the potential 
for achieving effective collaboration. And compared with both the Irish and the 
English approaches to community planning the New Zealand framework was 
found wanting in some areas. Consequently, this dimension is assessed as 
showing room for improvement. 
Leadership 
 
The leadership dimension is one of the critical elements of community 
governance theory, particularly the leadership role played by local authorities in 
steering the strategic decisions of other sectors. The role of the mayor is critical 
to the nature of local leadership and the measure for this dimension asks 
whether or not the role of mayor in the New Zealand model has the authority to 
fulfil the leadership expectations found in community governance theory.  
 
Community governance theorists see councils as ‘first among equals’ and 
highlight the importance of their democratic base as providing legitimacy to their 
leadership aspirations. This extra-organisational model of leadership has been 
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conceptualised in a number of different ways. For example, in their publication 
on the future of local government, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in the 
United Kingdom (ODPM 2004) describes strong leadership as including:  
• being enablers of the community, which involves standing up for, 
learning from and empowering local people, including the most 
vulnerable 
• being champions of the area, which includes building a vision, setting a 
clear direction and ensuring it is delivered 
• being challengers and scrutineers of public services more generally 
• being shapers of services around the citizen, including forging local 
partnerships 
• making decisions and setting priorities as well as being accountable for 
making tough decisions when balancing competing demands. 
 
While the official advice from the United Kingdom government reflects a change 
in the way leadership is understood, so has the context changed. The modern 
policy context finds itself concerned with community fragmentation, a more 
demanding citizenry and a more challenging media. These have resulted in a 
different type of political leadership which is more facilitative (Greasley and 
Stoker 2008). Leaders as facilitators tend to have strong partnership skills, low 
partisanship (which means they would be able to work across political 
boundaries) and are visible and easy for citizens to engage with. Such 
politicians are outward looking and focused on streamlined decision-making to 
ensure momentum. Drawing on their own research Greasley and Stoker 
conclude that directly elected mayors in the United Kingdom are more likely to 
meet the criteria of facilitative leaders than mayors in leader-cabinet models, the 
traditional form of local government in the United Kingdom.81  
 
                                                 
81
 Councils in the United Kingdom have the choice of three governance models: directly elected mayors, 
leaders and cabinets in which the leader is chosen by colleagues, and the traditional committee structure 
with indirectly elected leaders. 
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The New Zealand system of local government contains what is generally known 
as the ‘weak mayor’ model (that is, mayors have no executive authority, with the 
exception of the new Auckland mayor) (see Table 33).  
 
Table 33 Weak/Strong mayors 
Weak model Strong model 
No executive authority Full executive authority 
No formal influence on senior 
staff appointments 
Right to appoint senior staff 
Strict separation of roles May also act as chief executive 
Deputy mayor and committee 
chairs appointed by majority 
council vote 
Can select deputy mayor and 
committee chairs 
Spokesperson roles often 
shared 
Council spokesperson 
 
In the New Zealand model, mayors gain their authority from the fact that they 
are directly elected more than from the powers conferred by statute. In fact the 
main statutory role that distinguishes mayors from councillors is their right to 
preside over council meetings, to be an ex officio member of council 
committees and, in some councils, to exercise a casting vote.82 In contrast, the 
strong mayor model, also known as the executive mayor model, is common in 
the United States and essentially combines the role of mayor and chief 
executive.  
 
On the basis of their democratic mandate New Zealand mayors wield 
considerable symbolic authority but can only exercise coercive powers when 
empowered by a decision of their council. Their success depends on their ability 
to craft coalitions of councillors around policy and topical issues. Unfortunately it 
is not uncommon for a mayor to be elected to a hostile council, in which they 
                                                 
82
 The LGA 2002 removed the automatic right of mayors to exercise casting votes. After vigorous 
lobbying by local government, the government amended the statute to make it discretionary. Most 
councils have amended their standing orders to provide for a casting vote. Mayors also have some 
specific powers under other legislation; for example, they are automatically Justices of the Peace and are 
entitled to declare a local emergency. 
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are a political minority, and for his or her term to be marked by ongoing conflict 
with councillors, leading to an inevitable erosion of credibility and effectiveness. 
Even when mayors succeed in building alliances, accountability is relatively 
opaque, unlike the strong mayor model. In her thesis on the role of a mayor, 
Margaret Evans, a former mayor of Hamilton in New Zealand, argues that the 
LGA 2002 should be amended to prescribe the specific roles mayors carry out, 
particularly their leadership roles in relation to governance, policy and the 
community (Evans 2003). Included in the changes Evans seeks are: 
• giving mayors the right to appoint their deputies and committee chair 
people 
• giving mayors the sole right to delegate their role as presiding member 
• allowing mayors to recommend governance structures and processes, 
memberships and delegations 
• giving mayors responsibility, on behalf of the council, to ensure chief 
executives implement council policy (ibid, p. 2003). 
 
Evans’ proposals would provide the mayor with greater responsibility for 
overseeing the operation of local authorities in a way that would shift the role of 
councillors to largely scrutinising the mayor’s performance, mirroring in a way 
the governance arrangements of the Greater London Authority.83 The 
suggestion that strong leadership needs to be based on more than simply 
popular support, and that it should also have the authority to ‘do things’, is 
popular in the debate surrounding the review of Auckland’s governance 
arrangements (see the Report of the Royal Commission on Auckland 
Governance 2009). In the view of the commission a strong leader for 
metropolitan Auckland is necessary to get the city moving (literally), provide a 
sense of direction and improve political accountability, although not in isolation. 
Whether such strong leadership will provide the answers to Auckland’s 
problems, with which the Royal Commission has been tasked, will be a matter 
of future record, as Hambleton notes: 
                                                 
83
 The Royal Commission’s report recommends that the new mayor of metropolitan Auckland should 
have all the powers recommended by Evans. 
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An important challenge for all political leaders is to develop their skills 
and effectiveness as facilitative leaders, rather than top down leaders. 
The importance of being able to reach out to other stakeholders and local 
people in an effort to influence decisions made by others in order to 
improve the local quality of life is difficult to over-estimate. Modern 
leaders … use the legitimacy of their elected position to orchestrate new 
approaches to metropolitan leadership (Hambleton 2008, p. 12). 
 
Given the nature of community governance, involving leadership and building 
alliances and networks with independent and quasi-independent sectors, it is 
not clear that having executive authority is a necessary factor of success. As 
Greasley and Stoker (2008) suggest, the necessary skills are more concerned 
with facilitation and trust building than the provision of direction. In some 
respects a weak regime may even be an advantage as strong mayor regimes 
tend to have fewer checks and balances on the exercise of their authority, are 
less transparent and can become characterised by a more traditional culture of 
hierarchical decision-making and nepotism.  
 
The New Zealand legislation is silent on the role of a mayor. Indeed, the review 
of the LGA 2002 was also silent on the much broader question of political 
leadership, with more emphasis being placed on providing citizens with the 
‘tools’ to limit the discretion of their local political representatives than 
strengthening them.84 One comment frequently heard in the wake of the 
passage of the LGA 2002 was that the Government was trying to weaken 
representative democracy by promoting participatory democracy, with 
councillors feeling that the changes, such as the role of citizens and other 
organisations in the identification of community outcomes, undermined their 
role. Seven years on, it is not clear that the role of elected members has been 
weakened although the political decision-making space has become 
considerably more complex.  
                                                 
84
 The ‘leadership’ word is almost invisible in the policy and discussion documents associated with the 
LGA 2002, in contrast with the similar review in the United Kingdom. 
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Dimension assessment 
With its tradition of directly elected mayors, New Zealand is still well placed to 
exercise the form of civic leadership espoused by community governance 
theorists; however, it is not a role that is as understood and valued as it might 
be. The lack of any articulation of the mayors’ community leadership function in 
the LGA 2002, coupled with the lack of any executive authority, means that this 
dimension is assessed as showing room for improvement. 
Collaboration 
 
This dimension is concerned with whether or not the legislative framework 
governing local government is conducive to strong collaboration. Collaboration 
is one of the central ideas underpinning the community governance paradigm in 
the sense that the art of governing includes managing relationships involving 
independent agencies and organisations. As a collective noun, ‘collaboration’ 
refers to a range of phenomena from “wide networks through loose alliances 
and tight federations to the creation of novel organisational entities, sometimes 
separate from the partner organisations, sometimes vested in one partner” 
(Cropper quoted in Sullivan et al 2006, p. 291). It also refers to behaviours as 
well as structures. The measure for this dimension is the existence or otherwise 
of formal or semi-formal structures for giving effect to joined-up initiatives at the 
local level. 
 
By the end of the 20th century the idea that joining up government was 
somehow necessary and desirable had become almost conventional wisdom in 
New Zealand, particularly with the publication of a number of critical reviews 
commenting on the problem of public sector silos (Schick 2001, Logan 1991). It 
was an idea that was given further elevation with the release of The Review of 
the Centre and its follow-up report, The Review of the Centre One Year On 
(SSC 2001 and 2002). These reports highlighted a lack of co-ordination and 
alignment between departments and public agencies which was regarded as a 
weakness in the New Zealand public sector model. The Review of the Centre 
noted that: 
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a number of stakeholders and commentators … emphasised the need for 
clarity on directions and expectations, particularly in relation to issues or 
intentions impacting across sectors or the whole of government. 
Weaknesses include … the fragmentation of the sector which makes it 
difficult to actively pursue cross cutting objectives (The Review of the 
Centre, SSC 2001, p. 14).  
 
The suggestion that strategy should be extended beyond the core public sector 
was developed in the Commission’s follow-up report (The Review of the Centre 
One Year On, SSC 2002). In this report the State Services Commissioner 
argued that the public service needs to get closer to citizens and the 
community, and agencies have to work together with communities outside 
Wellington (ibid). Similar themes were echoed in the review of the LGA 1974, 
where issues of collaboration and partnerships were underpinning themes, 
themes that extended beyond central and local government to include Maori 
organisations and the not-for-profit sector (DIA 2000 and 2001). 
 
Similar discussions had been taking place within local government circles some 
years before the Labour-Alliance Government was formed. The notion of a 
democratically legitimate system of local government working collaboratively 
with other systems of government and emphasising community resilience found 
a home in the pre-election manifestos of both parties. These manifestos 
emphasised the idea of ‘partnership’, particularly with reference to 
intergovernmental relationships. ‘Partnership’ provided both a familiar and 
politically important term for describing these desired relationships, including the 
goal of more integrated public decision-making. Thomas and Memon (2007) 
argue that the rise of a partnership discourse can be directly attributed to the 
influence of third way political thinking. Commenting on the New Zealand 
approach they argue that: 
 
third way leaders sought to address the breakdown of the social and 
spatial contract through the revitalisation of community, to balance the 
authority of central government, so that a measure of democratic 
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accountability might be returned to the local level. Naturally local 
government was a logical tool to form a partnership with local 
communities and thereby empower them. Thus there was a natural 
synergy between the turn to governance and the agenda of the Third 
Way (Thomas and Memon 2007 p. 20). 
 
In a similar vein, official documents preceding the enactment of the LGA 2002 
referred to central and local government as “two arms of our system of 
government with a shared focus on contributing positively to the well-being of 
communities”. The reasoning behind this view highlighted the need for 
collaborative government: 
 
The social, economic and environmental problems confronting New 
Zealand are not capable of being solved by central government alone. … 
The legislation needs to give local government sufficient scope for it to 
be able to work in partnership with central government, and with 
community and business … (DIA 2000, p. 3).  
 
The nature of the social, economic and environmental problems that would 
need local government’s help to solve was not explained, or a commitment 
made to sharing resources. The Government’s initial policy document 
introduced the notion that local authorities should play a role as community 
leaders, brokers and facilitators and was notable for declaring that “there is no 
intention on the part of the government to withdraw from areas for which central 
government is currently responsible, by passing over responsibility to local 
government” (DIA 2000, p. 8).  
 
Despite the rhetoric, there was a dearth of practical measures by which any 
partnership might be given effect. The British government, in contrast, 
introduced a number of statutory vehicles to give effect to their new focus on 
joined-up government, such as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local 
Area Agreements (LAAs). As mechanisms for horizontal co-ordination involving 
public and non-public agencies operating in localities, LSPs brought together 
agencies into an overarching local institution operating within a multi-level 
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governance framework. Decisions to establish LSPs are local decisions but they 
are mandatory for any local authority wishing to access certain national funding 
streams, particularly regeneration funding (Geddes 2005). LAAs, which bind 
agencies to achieve a set of common objectives and may involve joint budget 
holding, are another mechanism for negotiating priorities between central and 
local government and allow departments to better understand the local context 
faced by councils and their partners. While LAAs have a binding effect on 
participating agencies, the choice of whether or not to participate is voluntary. At 
least part of the Government’s intention in introducing LAAs was to “devolve 
decision-making, move away from a Whitehall knows best philosophy and 
reduce bureaucracy” (Local Government Chronicle, 5 June 2008, p. 18). The 
result is a form of meta-governance designed to deal with a “jungle of 
organisations and institutions” (Geddes 2006, p. 6).  
 
In New Zealand, examples of intergovernmental collaboration were in place well 
before the LGA 2002 gave it principled support. A particularly successful 
example was a monthly forum of departmental heads in the South Auckland 
area, which was convened by the chief executive of Manukau City Council. 
Their regular discussions enabled the various agencies to better co-ordinate 
programmes and address gaps and service overlaps. Another initiative was the 
Strengthening Families initiative, in which mayors were asked to play a co-
ordinating role with local social service agencies.  
 
The LGA 2002 gave these sorts of initiatives its moral blessing and, as noted in 
Chapter 1, the Government worked to improve relationships between 
departments and councils, particularly in relation to the community outcomes 
process. Yet it failed to take the next step, unlike the government of the United 
Kingdom, which was to provide collaborations with some form of legislative 
status. It stopped short of introducing any equivalent mechanism to the LAA, for 
example, despite its high level principles emphasising the need to work 
collaboratively. The New Zealand public sector continues to be vertically 
oriented with accountability cascading down from ministers to ‘on the ground’ 
departments. It is a model that makes it difficult to establish more horizontal and 
resource-sharing place-based approaches to public services.  
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Dimension assessment 
This dimension looked specifically at the existence or otherwise of formal 
mechanisms for establishing joint central-local government initiatives, noting 
that a number of successful ad hoc collaborations exist but that the legislative 
architecture was relatively silent on such relationships. Other than formal 
agreements, such as memoranda of understanding or contracts for service, the 
legislative framework lacks any vehicle to enable joined-up governance to occur 
in a comprehensive manner. This dimension is assessed as showing room for 
improvement. 
Decision-making 
 
This indicator is concerned with the degree to which citizens are able to 
influence local government decision-making outside the triennial election 
process. The measure concerns the existence or otherwise of statutory 
mechanisms that allow/encourage such influencing.  
 
Theoretical models of decision-making range from political, in which elected 
representatives make decisions based on their political intuition, to technocratic, 
in which decisions accord to explicitly stated values and are weighted according 
to impact. They also vary according to the degree to which decisions are made 
by representatives or by a broader range of actors, reflecting a more 
participatory style. Any discussion might also consider the institutional setting 
and whether or not it privileges political or policy considerations in the decision-
making process. Similar issues exist with regard to inclusiveness and the 
participation of elites, including how well the decision and policy-making 
frameworks provide for a contest of ideas. 
 
Theories of community governance value high levels of citizen participation. For 
example, the Swiss approach, echoed by many local governments in the United 
States, enables citizens to use referenda to direct their local authorities or to 
halt an unpopular decision. Referenda act both as a method for signalling 
community preferences and as a check and balance on the exercise of local 
     249 
power, particularly in systems with a history of low voter participation like the 
United States. Referenda can also be non-binding, in which cases they are 
used to signal community preferences.85 More deliberative approaches are 
typified by the use of focus groups, citizen juries and participatory budgeting. 
Strategies to enhance citizen involvement in decision-making may also focus on 
encouraging participation by marginalised and under-represented groups in 
order to increase voice, particularly migrant communities and indigenous 
peoples. Typical mechanisms involve the use of advisory boards, agreements 
with civic organisations representing particular sectors, and co-opting 
community representatives to decision-making bodies.  
 
The objective of involving citizens in the decision-making process is to ensure 
local authority services meet the preferences of local citizens. Without this, 
utility might be lost by over- or under-provision. Hirschman’s concept of exit and 
voice (see Bailey 1999) provides a framework to explain how influence occurs 
in different institutional environments. Exit is concerned with the ability of a 
consumer to shift between different suppliers of a similar product and in a local 
government context it suggests that citizens will leave a local government 
jurisdiction if the service quality deteriorates or the cost increases beyond their 
willingness to pay. Exit is an important (even virtual) constraint on the behaviour 
of local government politicians and managers as any loss of population 
translates directly into a loss of income and status. Voice, in contrast, is the way 
in which citizens inform the managers of businesses about their concerns 
regarding the quality or nature of services. In the political context, voice involves 
an individual or collective appeal to political representatives to change or protect 
a policy or programme. The mechanisms through which voice is expressed 
include voting, petitions, submissions, and direct representation to elected 
representatives. Local government, with its proximity to service users, is more 
favourable to the success of voice strategies than higher level governments. 
Voice has advantages over exit as the conditions for making exit a realistic 
                                                 
85
 The New Zealand framework allows citizens to demand a referendum in relation to a narrow range of 
matters, such as the choice of electoral system and Maori wards. It also gives councils discretion and as a 
result the use of referenda has been slowly growing. Whanganui District Council, for example, holds 
annual referenda to identify wish list items for annual council expenditure. 
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choice are almost impossible in practice (see the discussion on Tiebout in 
Chapter 4). 
 
The decision-making model in New Zealand local government has a strong 
rational-comprehensive character, which has increased progressively since 
1989. Much of it involves highly prescribed processes and, while arguably 
contributing to more consistent policy decisions, has cramped the decision-
making space of local politicians.86 In tandem with the consequential diminution 
of the decision-making realm historically undertaken by elected representatives 
(also diminished through the establishment of arm’s-length organisations to 
undertake trading activities), local government reformers have also attempted to 
increase the role of citizens in the decision-making process. The mechanism for 
achieving this has primarily involved mandatory consultation for certain kinds of 
decisions, especially those concerned with the annual budget and work plan as 
well as matters of significance, for example, decisions to sell strategic assets. It 
has also involved the establishment of sub-municipal authorities, community 
boards that were established to bring local governments closer to their 
communities and give greater opportunities for citizens to influence decisions.  
 
Consultation can be understood as a form of voice and, along with voting, it is 
one of the primary mechanisms by which citizens influence the behaviour of 
their elected representatives in the New Zealand model. Consultation was a 
critical part of the local government framework introduced by the LGA 
Amendment (No. 3) 1989 and within a relatively short period of time a judicial 
interpretation of consultation emerged (see Wellington International Airport v Air 
New Zealand [1993] 1 NZLR 671) which formed the basis for the introduction of 
consultation principles in the LGA 2002. These principles require councils to 
provide people affected by a council decision with relevant information, 
encourage such persons to present their views in a manner which is appropriate 
to them and consider the views of such parties with an open mind (s82 LGA 
2002). Councils also have some discretion about the level to which they comply 
with these principles, the level of compliance being proportional to the level of 
                                                 
86
 The Office of the Auditor-General’s Guide to Decision-Making (www.oag.govt.nz) lists seven 
principles which must be considered in any decision-making process. 
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significance of the issue(s) under consideration. In essence, decision-makers 
were required to be seen to have listened to community views and approached 
the decision-making process with an open (although not blank) mind.  
 
In the local government framework introduced in 2002, Parliament has 
essentially sought to ‘second guess’ the political judgement of councillors in two 
critical ways. The first is through the requirement to adopt significance policies 
(s90, LGA 2002); these detail how significance will be defined for the purpose of 
consultation (the majority of councils use a financial threshold) as well as 
establishing a set of consultation principles (s82, LGA 2002). The second was 
the decision to make consultation on certain kinds of issues mandatory, and 
going as far as to detail the type of consultation that should be undertaken, for 
example, adopting annual and long-term plans as well as decisions that might 
affect the ownership of ‘strategic assets’.87 The particular process to be followed 
is defined in the legislation as the Special Consultative Procedure (SCP) (see 
Chapter 1).  
 
Whether or not mandatory consultation has increased citizen influence on 
council decision-making is a matter that is strongly contested. The consultation 
provisions in particular have come in for ongoing criticism, with claims that few 
people make use of the opportunity (thus it is an expensive waste of time) and 
that those who do take the time and trouble reflect a minority of the community 
– the squeaky wheel syndrome. And the Government’s attitude has changed 
significantly since the 2008 elections, with the new Minister of Local 
Government, the Hon. Rodney Hide, promising to reduce the compliance costs 
caused by consultation, particularly the newer provisions the LGA 2002 had 
placed on councils (Illuminating Local Government, Hon. Rodney Hide, 
21/October 2009, www.beehive.govt.nz).
 
Similarly the Inquiry into Local Government Rates (2007) noted that “the 
consultation processes on LTCCPs is widely regarded as being inadequate and 
                                                 
87
 In addition to a small number of identified activities, for example, social housing stock, a strategic asset 
is any asset the council resolves to be a strategic asset. 
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many councils approached the process with predetermined views” (ibid, p. 253), 
and recommended that councils should make more use of a broader range of 
mechanisms to obtain community views, such as focus groups. The Local 
Government Commission’s Review of the LGA 2002 and LEA 2001 (Local 
Government Commission 2008) also addressed the quality of consultation and 
undertook a national survey of individuals who had made submissions to a local 
authority. In response to the question ‘How would you rate the public 
consultation process?’ 30 per cent of respondents said excellent or very good 
and another 29 per cent said the process was good (ibid, p.70). The proportion 
of respondents rating the process as poor was 21 per cent. Notably, 95 per cent 
said they would likely make another submission. The Local Government 
Commission recommended that additional good practice guidance be prepared 
for councils and that the effectiveness of council consultation procedures is 
monitored.  
 
Views on consultation practice tend, however, to be quite variable, possibly 
reflecting local or regional experience. Submissions received by the Royal 
Commission into Auckland Governance when undertaking their public 
consultation process on the future shape of Auckland documented considerable 
citizen disenchantment with existing council decision-making processes, 
particularly in relation to Auckland City itself: 
 
In the commission’s opinion, while there may be a need for changes in 
the way councils consult, and the matters on which councils choose to 
consult, there is a wider need for councils to engage with their public in 
other ways. The evidence of dissatisfaction about consultation suggests 
a need to reassess the balance between public participation and 
consultation on the one hand, and efficiency, effectiveness and 
responsiveness on the other (Royal Commission on Auckland 
Governance 2009, p. 298). 
 
Despite these concerns, the numbers of submissions councils have received 
when undertaking the special consultative procedure to adopt annual plans and 
the triennial LTCCP have grown substantially (see Table 34) and, since the 
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passage of the LGA 2002, improved in quality.88 Research undertaken by 
researchers from Massey University into the character of submitters and their 
feelings about the process found that regardless of whether or not they were 
successful in changing their council’s attitude submitters valued the process 
enough to indicate a willingness to participate in the future (Forgie 2002).   
Table 34 Average number of submissions received by councils  
Year Submissions 
1991/92 67 
1994/95 160 
1999/00 341 
2002/03 424 
2006/0789 507 
2009/10 951 
 
(Source: unpublished surveys undertaken by Local Government New Zealand 
and the Society of Local Government Managers) 
 
Within the local government legislative framework, consultation provides an 
important mechanism by which citizens can ensure their views are heard by 
decision-makers and one which New Zealand citizens continue to hold in high 
regard. However, questions exist about the inclusiveness of the process, 
particularly the SCP, with some critics suggesting the statutory provisions for 
decision-making are “excessively detailed, complex, and potentially confusing 
for the various parties involved” (New Zealand Government 2007, p. 247). 
Questions have also been raised about the representativeness of the 
individuals and groups who make use of the opportunity afforded by the SCP 
(ibid). The decision by the High Court to overturn Christchurch City Council’s 
decision to raise social housing rents (Council of Social Services in 
Christchurch/Outautahi Incorporated v Christchurch City Council, CIV-2008-
409-001383, 25 November 2008) was, however, significant. One of the grounds 
                                                 
88
 Private discussion with Mary Bourke, former Mayor of South Taranaki, who noted that the LTCCP had 
raised the quality of community submissions. 
89
 Years 2006/07 and 2009/10 are for submissions on the triennial LTCCP. Both figures represent a 
sample of 60 councils. 
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on which the decision was overturned was the council’s failure to consult 
properly with the affected parties (the tenants) and it highlights the potential 
degree of citizen power in relation to the way their councils make decisions and 
set policy.  
 
However, other institutional factors are potentially diminishing this level of 
influence. One is the gradual reduction in the number of elected members and 
the other concerns changes to the institutional structures by which councils 
make decisions. The ratio between citizens and their elected members is 
regarded as important for the purpose of access – the smaller the ratio the 
greater proximity between representatives and citizens and consequently the 
greater the access for influencing decisions (Drage 2008). Since 1989 there has 
been a growth in representation ratios as population increases have been 
accompanied by a reduction in the number of elected members (see Table 35). 
This issue is discussed in more depth in the next section of this chapter.90 
 
Table 35 Number of elected members 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 
1,082 1,054 1,024 995 936 
 
(Source: www.lgc.govt.nz) 
 
Historically, decision-making in councils involved a mix of delegated authority, 
exercised by standing committees and officials, and decisions made by the 
‘committee of the whole’, the council. Under conventional practice, policy issues 
would be raised for the first time at a standing committee meeting, options 
would be discussed and decisions were either made or recommendations sent 
to a meeting of the whole (the full council). Committee meetings tend to be less 
formal than full council meetings and enable interested members of the 
community, citizens and organisations to engage with councillors as they 
consider policy options. Standing committees provide an opportunity for citizens 
to place matters on the council agendas and ensure councillors, as decision-
                                                 
90
 If the government goes ahead with its plan to consolidate the councils of Auckland this figure will 
decline. 
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makers, receive access to a broader range of advice than what they would 
normally receive from their professional advisers.  
 
Following the LGA 2002, a trend developed in which many councils disbanded 
their standing committees and conducted all or most of their business directly 
through the committee of the whole, the full council. In many cases individual 
councillors were given specific policy portfolios, for example regulations, 
recreation or transport, and were expected to work directly with the appropriate 
council officer to bring recommendations directly to the council table. The 
advantages of this approach are seen to be its efficiency, the speed of decision-
making and the ability to be strategic, that is, to keep the council’s attention 
focused on a specific goal or objective. In some cases the reduction in 
councillor numbers – some councils have only six councillors – meant that 
committees in the traditional style were not even possible.91 From a community 
governance perspective, however, the down-side has been to limit the ability of 
citizens to talk directly to councillors in a decision-making process, reduce the 
amount of time taken to fully discuss issues, limit debate by increasing the 
ability of officials to effectively control the policy agenda, and reduce 
transparency. This is also influenced by the actual number of councillors in each 
local authority. In comparison with international norms, New Zealand councils 
are among the smallest (see Figure 12). Ultimately the emerging institutional 
forms with regard to representation have important implications for the degree 
to which alternative voices are able to influence the policy process and how well 
policy consistency is likely to be achieved.  
 
                                                 
91
 Under the LGA 2002, territorial authorities must have between six and 30 councillors, including the 
mayor. Auckland City Council is the only council with more than 20. 
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Figure 12 Number of councillors by council 
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Dimension assessment 
In relation to public participation in decision-making, the New Zealand model is 
finely balanced, with the legislative framework providing a broad range of 
opportunities for citizens to influence decision-making while still allowing 
considerable discretion as to how this might be applied ‘on the ground’. 
However, faced with declining rates of political representation and an increase 
in more ‘corporate’ style of decision-making practices, this dimension is 
assessed as having room for improvement.92  
Local democracy 
 
Perhaps the most important component of a bottom-up accountability 
framework, which underpins the community governance literature, concerns the 
electoral process and the degree to which it provides local voters with ‘tools’ to 
change the composition of their councils and their direction. The evidence in 
relation to local government in New Zealand is mixed. This dimension is 
concerned with what might be described as the ‘thickness’ of New Zealand’s 
local democratic institutions, thickness being a reflection of the level of 
representation and the opportunity for citizens to influence and change their 
                                                 
92
 As an example, a number of councils made media headlines in 2008 for their decisions to suspend the 
right of citizens to make presentations directly to councils prior to the start of their regular council 
meetings, namely Whangarei District Council and Dunedin City Council. 
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representatives. This dimension employs two measures: voter turnout and 
representation ratio.  
 
Voter turnout is likely to be a headline indicator in any discussion of a system’s 
democratic health and is frequently used to judge the legitimacy of political 
representation. Turnout in New Zealand council elections has been falling since 
2001 (see Figure 13), resulting in considerable public concern and discussion. 
Concern was such that select committee inquiries were held into the running of 
the local government elections following the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections – 
the last two inquiries recommending a number of largely technical changes to 
electoral processes and timetables. 
 
Figure 13 Average voter turnout 1989-2007  
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(Source: compiled from data sourced from www.lgc.govt.nz) 
 
Despite the views of officials and media commentators about lack of interest in 
local democracy, turnout rates are complex. While total turnout in local 
government elections has declined, the average turnout per council continues to 
sit at around 50 per cent, noticeably higher than experienced by similar local 
government jurisdictions, for example South Australia. However, the average 
figures hide a wide diversity of turnout rates, with the rates for the ten largest 
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cities sitting between 35 per cent and 40 per cent, significantly below turnout for 
rural and provincial centres.93  
 
Local government’s electoral arrangements are governed by explicit legislative 
requirements and the process of meeting those requirements is overseen by an 
independent body, the Local Government Commission. The Local Government 
Commission is relatively unique and consists of three commissioners appointed 
by the Government. The Commission was established in the 1940s with the 
intention of facilitating the consolidation of local government numbers, a task 
that took more than 40 years to accomplish. It was also given responsibility for 
hearing and ruling on objections and appeals to the representation reviews that 
councils must carry out at least once every six years to ensure their 
representation arrangements conform to the relevant statutes. In all cases the 
commission plays the role of independent arbiter with the right to make binding 
decisions. It is a role that contributes to public confidence by ensuring that 
electoral arrangements are fair and practices that might privilege particular 
groups of voters, such as the practice of redistricting, are prevented. 
 
When considered in an international context New Zealand’s local government 
turnout rate sits below the average of turnout rates in developed countries (see 
Table 36), although it is relatively consistent with rates in countries with Anglo-
American type local authorities (see Chapter 4).  
 
Table 36 Local government voter turnout (post 1995) 
Jurisdiction Turnout % 
Denmark 72 
Netherlands 47 
Germany 70 
United Kingdom 35 
South Australia 32 
British Columbia 30.7 
                                                 
93
 More than half the drop in turnout in 2007 can be explained by a fall in the turnout rate for Auckland 
City, where the mayoral race was fought by the same two candidates who contested it in 2004. 
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Ireland 50 
Western Australia 34 
New Zealand 49.7 
 
(Adapted from Kleinman et al 2002, p. 21) 
 
There are a range of problems in trying to compare turnout rates in different 
local government jurisdictions. For a start, not all local government systems 
provide the same services. Turnout is higher, for example, in the Nordic 
systems, where councils provide a wide range of social welfare functions in a 
decentralised environment. These countries appear in italics in Table 36. In 
addition, the number of elected positions differs significantly (see below) and 
there is some evidence to suggest that turnout has a positive correlation with 
lower representation ratios (Drage 2008). Also the ‘mechanics’ of local electoral 
systems differ, in relation, for example, to the use of wards or ‘at large’ systems 
or between booth and postal voting. Another factor is the degree to which 
council elections are held in isolation or are packaged with elections for other 
bodies, particularly higher level governments.  
 
There is a considerable degree of correlation in the turnout rates of Anglophile 
countries, such as New Zealand, Canada, Australia and Ireland. All tend to 
have minimalist forms of local government and much lower turnout levels. The 
United Kingdom itself is an interesting case as local government there 
undertakes a broader range of functions than the other Anglophile countries but 
in practice is largely an agent for government departments and councils have 
limited discretion over spending – possibly the cause of their poor levels of voter 
turnout. 
 
While turnout in New Zealand council elections increased markedly in 1989 as a 
result of amalgamation and the almost universal the shift to postal voting,94 from 
2001 onwards elections were expanded to include elections for District Health 
Boards. Three years later, in the 2004 elections, the 22 health boards also 
                                                 
94
 The last council to use booth voting was Hutt City in 1992. 
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changed to the Single Transferable Voting System (STV), which meant that 
voters were not only faced with a considerable number of candidates from 
which to choose but had to use two separate voting systems, STV for health 
boards and First Past the Post (FPP) for most councils. In fact the decline in 
voter turnout in 2001, 2004 and to a lesser degree 2007 is partly being credited 
as being caused by the complexity that resulted from such incremental changes 
(see the Report of the Justice and Electoral Select Committee, House of 
Representatives 2005). In summary, voter turnout statistics in New Zealand 
local government paint a mixed picture. Turnout rates for district councils and in 
particular rural councils are more than acceptable for this type of local 
government system; however, turnout rates of less than 40 per cent in the large 
cities result in some elected representatives who have relatively small 
mandates.  
 
The representation ratio is the number of elected positions in relation to the 
number of citizens in any jurisdiction and is perhaps the most important 
contributor to the concept of democratic thickness. The number of citizens each 
councillor represents bears directly on her or his ability to be responsive to 
individual and neigbourhood concerns as well as having a positive correlation 
with the willingness of citizens to vote (Drage 2008). In comparison with 
international norms, New Zealand representation ratios at the local level are 
high (see Table 37) and recent trends suggest that this ratio is increasing.  
Table 37 International representation ratios 
Country Ratio 
France 1:120 
Germany 1:250 
United Kingdom 1:2,600 
New Zealand 1:4,647 
Scotland 1:4,229 
Wales 1:2,376 
NSW 1:3,942 
South Australia 1:2,088 
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(Source: Local Government Centre, Auckland University of Technology, Briefing 
to the Incoming Minister, November 2008) 
 
New Zealand’s representation ratio is not only high by international standards, it 
is also increasing. Table 37 highlights the effect of the consolidation of councils 
in 1989 and subsequent representation reviews undertaken by councils and the 
Local Government Commission. While allowing for the significant reduction 
caused by consolidation, there has also been a steady reduction in the number 
of councillors, a trend that was accelerated between 2001 and 2004. 
Representation ratios are highest in the largest cities and in the regional 
councils and as regional councils find their role expanding, the high 
representation ratio may become a matter of concern.95 An example of a 
growing tension caused by perceived representation issues is the attempt by 
territorial authorities in South Canterbury to establish a break-away regional 
council in response to concerns that their part of the region is under-
represented in Environment Canterbury.96  
 
Decisions about numbers of councillors are taken by individual councils prior to 
elections or are made by the Local Government Commission, should it be 
considering either in an appeal or objection to a council’s draft representation 
scheme. The reduction in the total number of councillors (territorial councils may 
have between six and 30 councillors, with the average being 11) suggests a 
view of councils which sees them akin to a board of directors and has led to 
higher representation ratios (see Table 38). 
Table 38 Representation ratio in New Zealand local government 
Council type 1983 1992 2001 2004 
Regional 15,301 16,786 18,543 18,993 
City 4,467 4,818 6,622 7,570 
District 597 1,328 1,696 1,831 
 
(Source: Drage 2008, p. 10) 
                                                 
95
 For example, the Land Transport Reform Bill 2008 required the establishment of regional land 
transport committees to develop priorities for the allocation of road and transport funds. 
96
 See Stoush in the South, 1/1/2009 at www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/lifestyle/mainlander/150421. 
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Reducing the number of politicians and consequently increasing the 
representation ratio also impacts on the ability of councils to reflect the diversity 
of their particular communities (fewer positions therefore less ability for minority 
groups to get around the table) and potentially limits the ability of 
representatives to steer management. Smaller councils are less likely to contain 
diverse options and more likely to be subject to management capture. The 
question of a council’s ability to govern in the public interest, as these issues 
highlight, has led some lobby groups to argue that additional mechanisms are 
needed to ensure councils act in accordance with the views of their citizens. For 
example, the New Zealand Business Roundtable, a body which represents a 
number of the country’s major businesses, possibly spoke for a wider audience 
when it suggested “councils might be enabled to go beyond core public good 
services (only) if they obtained consent from their ratepayers through referenda” 
(Council Democracy and Performance Must Be Improved, Roger Kerr, 
Executive Director, New Zealand Business Roundtable, The Dominion Post, 19 
July 2010). The Roundtable’s ‘problem’ sums up one of the overriding themes 
since the reform and modernisation of local government in New Zealand since 
1989, namely the challenge of creating responsive local governments able to 
advance the local public interest while also ensuring the interests of specific 
communities, such as business, Maori and the elderly, are not diminished.  
 
The final aspect of this measure is whether or not the voting system itself is 
conducive to strong community governance. Milner (2002) argues that 
proportional voting systems outperform majoritarian systems in the quality of 
representation. New Zealand local elections have historically been run on a 
First Past the Post (FPP) system; however, since 2001 councils and citizens 
were given the choice of electoral systems between FPP and the Single 
Transferable Vote system (STV). Eleven councils either voluntarily, or forced by 
community referenda, adopted STV for the 2004 elections. Three years later the 
number of councils using STV had fallen to eight and only six will be using the 
system in 2010. The existence of STV, a system that is promoted on its ability 
to ensure the results of elections reflect the preferences of voters, strengthens 
the local democratic framework; however, the failure of the Government to 
promote the system and the small take-up rate has diminished its impact.  
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Dimension assessment 
The measures that constitute democratic thickness are mixed. New Zealand 
scores poorly with regard to representation ratios, is perhaps middling with 
regard to voter turnout and scores well with regard to the transparency of its 
electoral processes. However, the predominance of FPP as the voting system 
represents a negative factor. This dimension is assessed as showing room for 
improvement. 
Analysis 
 
The overall purpose of the assessment model is to assess the capacity of the 
current framework of local government in New Zealand to adopt a community 
governance approach. It does this by disaggregating the system into 
dimensions and assessing each dimension against a range of criteria. Most of 
the dimensions represent the necessary conditions for community governance 
to occur in the sense that they need to be in place if a council is to exercise 
community governance, while others, such as strategy and leadership, 
represent sufficient conditions. A summary of the dimensions and their rankings 
is provided in Table 39. 
 
Table 39 Summary of assessment  
Principles Dimensions Ranking 
Authority    
 Size and structure Room for improvement 
 Finance Adequate 
Autonomy   
 Empowerment Adequate 
 Supervision Adequate 
Outcomes 
orientation 
  
 Functions Room for improvement 
Community focus   
 Strategy Room for improvement 
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 Leadership Room for improvement 
Partnership   
 Collaboration Room for improvement 
Inclusiveness   
 Decision-making Room for improvement 
 Local democracy Room for improvement 
 
The assessment highlighted the following features for each of the six principles: 
 
• Authority: councils’ ability to raise and allocate resources to address 
local priorities was assessed positively, as was the general size and 
capacity of councils. The only qualifier to this assessment is the relatively 
large ‘tail’ of small councils, which raises questions about capacity as 
well as the relatively ‘diminished’ role of many regional councils in 
relation to community governance. The lack of an effective multi-level 
system of governance was seen to reduce opportunities for central 
government to devolve further responsibilities to the sub-national level. 
• Autonomy: the manner in which councils are empowered and the 
supervision approach used by central government both act to provide 
councils with sufficient autonomy to undertake effective community 
governance. 
• Outcomes orientation: in relation to functions the New Zealand system 
is at the minimalist end of the spectrum, although councils do have the 
flexibility to ‘top up’ or deliver services which complement those provided 
by central government. Consequently the assessment is ‘room for 
improvement’. 
• Community focus: strategy and leadership dimensions were also 
assessed as showing room for improvement, even though the LGA 2002 
introduced a requirement to identify community outcomes. This 
assessment reflects the lack of any formal requirements for central 
government agencies to participate in the outcomes process. The 
assessment of the leadership dimension, ‘room for improvement’, 
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reflected the failure of the LGA 2002 to address the issue of community 
leadership, particularly in comparison with other jurisdictions. 
• Partnership: although collaboration is included in the LGA 2002 as a 
principle, this dimension has been assessed as having room for 
improvement due to the lack of formal mechanisms, such as LAAs, to 
enable effective central-local government collaboration at the local level.  
• Inclusiveness: while decision-making and democracy highlighted both 
strengths and weaknesses, it was the declining level of representation 
and dominance of FPP that led to the assessment of ‘room for 
improvement’.  
 
The overall results of the assessment suggest that initiatives to strengthen 
community governance need to address a broad range of issues, such as the 
current limited role given to regional councils; the overall range of functions 
undertaken by the local government sector as a whole; the lack of any 
mandatory obligations on government agencies to collaborate; and limitations in 
existing mechanisms for encouraging inclusiveness. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined local government in New Zealand against a range of 
measures in order to assess the ability of the system to achieve community 
governance. The community governance assessment model found that in terms 
of the authority and autonomy principles the New Zealand system was relatively 
well placed. The major down-sides were the tail of small councils and the under-
developed nature of regional government. The principles that had the poorest 
assessment, and thus reflected areas which need to be strengthened the most, 
were outcomes orientation, community focus, and partnership. In particular, the 
dimension of community planning needs refinement; there is room for greater 
devolution and local leadership is generally not well recognised. 
 
On the basis of these assessments, Leonard and Memon’s (2008) view that the 
New Zealand system represents community governance in action is somewhat 
optimistic. There is certainly evidence that community governance theory has 
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influenced the LGA 2002 – both its design and the language that accompanied 
the review. Yet, ultimately, the LGA 2002 left the fundamental relationship 
between councils, the state and citizens relatively untouched, creating 
substantial room for further change if community governance is to be achieved. 
Particular options that might address areas where improvements might be 
made are outlined in the next, concluding, chapter. 
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Chapter 8 Pathways to stronger community 
governance 
 
This chapter summarises the research findings and proposes options for 
strengthening the ability of the New Zealand system to adopt a community 
governance approach. Areas for further research are identified.  
 
Governance, in its very broadest sense, is about how members of a society 
make decisions about their collective welfare. Effective governance reconciles 
national and local interests by providing institutions and processes for citizens 
and their representatives to make decisions affecting their localities, in a context 
of nationally negotiated values and priorities. The community governance 
literature is largely a normative literature that encourages local authorities to 
take an active interest in all issues affecting their localities (including those 
which are outside their administrative responsibilities) in an effort to achieve 
desired local outcomes. It is inherently suspicious of ‘top-down’ designed policy 
solutions, which it sees as undermining local democracy and citizen initiative. 
Local government is seen to play a critical role in this process as it provides the 
democratic legitimacy that allows citizens to make choices about the nature of 
their communities. This view of local government can be understood as a desire 
to rebalance political life by shifting authority from the centre towards the 
periphery. Local government as community governance also challenges the 
more traditional functionalist approach to local government, which defines 
councils primarily as service providers.  
 
There is, however, no universal template for the optimal distribution of decision-
making between spheres of government, as institutional development reflects 
the social and historical context of each country as well as the heterogeneity of 
society’s political institutions and the actions of particular political actors. The 
result is a patchwork quilt of local and national governance models, with 
patterns of similarity, overlap and difference that make it difficult to compare 
different local government systems, but some dominant trends can be 
observed. Most countries in the developed world have modernised their local 
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governments in pursuit of transparency, accountability and clarity in the 
relationship between politics and administration. Devolution has been a popular 
reform strategy in many countries (see Naschold 1997), as has the expansion 
of opportunities for citizen participation; but these reforms have proved to be the 
least successful. More recently, for example, in the United Kingdom, Norway 
and New Zealand, there has been a focus on integrating local and national 
governance and strengthening local government’s role in community 
governance, although the process is far from linear. The New Zealand example 
is a case in point. While this study has noted that community governance has 
been strengthened since 1989 it has also observed that some measures have 
had an undermining effect. Local government reform in New Zealand has been 
incremental, rather than purposeful; and Parliament seems to have developed 
an appetite for reforming the sector in an ad hoc manner, so more change is 
highly likely. 
Research findings 
 
The primary research question is concerned with how to strengthen local 
government and local governance in New Zealand. In order to evaluate the 
existing system of local government to identify areas for improvement, the 
following community governance principles were adopted: 
 
1. Authority: councils exercising community governance have sufficient 
authority to make decisions on matters of local public interest.  
2. Autonomy: councils exercising community governance can respond to 
citizens’ concerns without undue restrictions imposed by higher 
authorities. 
3. Outcome orientation: councils exercising community governance are 
concerned with broad intersectoral outcomes of concern to their citizens. 
4. Community focus: councils exercising community governance involve 
citizens and stakeholders when determining priorities and the 
community’s long-term direction. 
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5. Partnership: councils exercising community governance undertake policy 
and operational co-ordination with other organisations including other 
levels of government. 
6. Inclusiveness: councils exercising community governance implement 
mechanisms to allow citizens to participate in decision-making. 
 
The analysis of the New Zealand system highlighted the influence of community 
governance ideas, particularly in the design of the LGA 2002. It also revealed 
that many of the concepts incorporated into that legislation were far from 
compatible with each other. Any review of local government provides 
opportunities for agencies to push their own agendas and the LGA 2002 was no 
exception. While it was enshrined in many of the principles of the legislation, 
community governance was not pursued comprehensively. In particular, the 
LGA 2002 left the constitutional position of local government unchanged and 
failed to address the fundamental imbalance in the central-local government 
relationship.  
 
The case studies of councils undertaking the community outcome component of 
their LTCCPs examined whether councils used the process to try and take a 
community governance approach and whether horizontal alignment and co-
ordination were being achieved. Some councils appeared to place considerable 
emphasis on strategies to strengthen collaboration with other agencies, both 
statutory and community based, which resonated strongly with the community 
governance narrative, particularly Manukau, Waitakere and Porirua Cities, but 
they were not widely replicated. For some councils, particularly the smaller 
ones, community planning was largely a matter of compliance; the larger cities 
were more successful at exploiting the framework, particularly regarding the 
alignment of local and national priorities. However, in many ways their success 
had more to do with the attitude of the Government and its agencies than any 
specific mandate provided by the LGA 2002. The involvement of central 
government agencies was ultimately contingent on the preferences of individual 
officials or/and ministers, although there were efforts by some departments, 
such as the Department of Internal Affairs, to encourage engagement. 
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The research sought feedback on several governance scenarios. The 
responses were mixed, suggesting that each scenario had strengths and 
weaknesses, and involved difficult trade-offs. For example, while larger 
authorities were favoured for their greater capacity, concern was expressed at 
the diminished voice of their citizens. Participants supported more integration 
between local and central government but expressed concern about loss of 
autonomy and the risk of bureaucratic capture. Finally, localist models were 
supported but concerns were registered about lack of capacity and the need for 
economies of scale. In summary, there was perceived to be no perfect recipe. 
Ideally, governance systems should combine responsiveness to citizens’ 
concerns with economies of scale and capacity. Aligning services with higher 
level governments is important to achieve local aspirations, but somewhere a 
balance is needed to preserve local autonomy. It is argued that the failure of the 
New Zealand local government system to reconcile these purposes explains the 
lack of any systematic programme of devolution, particularly of social policy 
functions, a common frustration expressed by social reformers throughout the 
20th century. 
  
The assessment model was used to examine dimensions of the New Zealand 
system of local government to assess how well situated they were to implement 
a community governance approach. The research found that, compared with 
many systems of local government, the New Zealand model scored well on the 
authority and autonomy principles, which are concerned with freedom of action 
and popular mandate. Despite the lack of constitutional recognition, councils 
have a freedom of action that many other systems of local government still 
aspire to. The assessment was less positive in relation to the outcomes 
orientation and leadership principles, which are concerned with the capacity of 
councils to influence outcomes and steer the numerous organisations and 
agencies that contribute to their achievement. The New Zealand model was 
also seen as having room for improvement in relation to its minimal functional 
responsibilities and the lack of an effective mechanism to require other 
agencies, especially central government agencies, to participate in its 
community planning initiatives. Similarly, the New Zealand model showed room 
for improvement in relation to the partnership principle because of the lack of 
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effective statutory vehicles for inter-agency collaboration. Weaknesses were 
also found regarding the inclusiveness principle because of the growing 
representation ratio and the increasingly technical decision-making processes.  
 
While the strengthening community governance was arguably never an explicit 
goal of the 2002 local government reforms, many of the measures introduced in 
the LGA 2002 had that effect. Reform did not occur in a vacuum and much of 
the reform rhetoric owes much to the language that surrounded New Labour’s 
local government agenda in the UK. Not surprisingly the effect on the final 
legislation was always going to be partial. For example, requiring councils to 
facilitate a process so that communities could identify and prioritise their desired 
outcomes can be seen as an important acknowledgement of community 
governance; however, the failure to require government departments and 
agencies to take part in the process or ‘buy in’ to the outcomes suggested a 
task half done, particularly since most community outcomes addressed issues 
that were the principal domain of the centre. Although the provisions of the LGA 
2002 reflected many of the community governance themes in the academic and 
international literature, the result has been somewhat disappointing. Public 
sector reform has struggled to shift from its initial focus on vertical accountability 
and nationally determined targets, leaving departments with little discretion to 
consider local needs, although some exceptions need to be noted. Councils that 
believed facilitating community conversations to determine locally-desired 
outcomes would be a first step towards stronger action by the centre to address 
local concerns and achieve outcomes were generally, though not invariably, 
disappointed. Ultimately there was a lack of institutional reorientation, 
particularly by central government. This is unsurprising, since community 
governance was never an explicit objective of the LGA 2002; and its focus on 
accountability and transparency, which has been a major theme since 1989, 
continued to be a strong driver. Local government policy tends to be undertaken 
by parts of government with relatively little influence on overall government 
direction, so significant changes may not be reflected elsewhere in the 
bureaucracy –ironically, the concept of community governance arose in 
response to fragmentation and silos and they remain one of the main obstacles 
to its successful introduction.  
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Options for strengthening community governance 
 
The research found several areas where local government in New Zealand was 
under-performing regarding its ability to implement community governance. 
Room for improvement was identified in seven of the dimensions examined: 
size and structure; functions; strategy; leadership; collaboration; decision-
making; and local democracy. It is noteworthy that many of these were 
identified as issues in the policy papers prepared as part of the 2002 reforms 
and they remain unresolved. International practice can be used to strengthen 
performance in those dimensions. 
 
Structure and function 
The New Zealand system was assessed poorly in the functions dimension, with 
councils performing what can be considered to be a minimal range of functions. 
It was assessed similarly in the size and structure dimension, with the lack of an 
effective model of multi-level governance being assessed by the author as a 
limiting factor for the purpose of achieving community governance. The two 
issues are related. The current structure of local government in New Zealand 
inhibits systematic devolution, necessary if councils are to have more influence 
over local and regional outcomes. And New Zealand local government is 
unusual in the limited range of mandatory functions it is responsible for; indeed, 
The Economist described New Zealand as the most centralised nation in the 
OECD (31 October 2009, p. 59).  
 
To create structures that would allow for a broader range of functions, New 
Zealand local government would need a more robust multi-level governance 
structure, with stronger regions and unitary councils in large metropolitan areas, 
in order to provide the necessary capacity and allow for greater redistribution. 
This would require regional councils to have a wider range of functions thus 
creating truly regional government, whereas their current focus is primarily on 
environmental policy and regulation, a form of limited governance. This would 
require the transfer of functions from both central government and territorial 
local authorities to the regional level. The policy question is what functions to 
devolve, and to which level of government. Table 40 suggests a distribution of 
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functions that would shift New Zealand closer to the centre of the devolution 
spectrum. 
 
Table 40 Functions suitable for devolution 
Regional and city-
region level 
  
 Minor roles in • Education – regional planning 
(tertiary education) 
• Employment 
• Fire and rescue 
 Major roles in • Regional planning 
• Public health 
• Housing 
District and city 
level 
  
 Minor roles in • Education planning 
• Social services 
• Police – local planning 
• Fire and rescue 
 
The suggested changes to functions in Table 38 would allow councils at local 
and regional levels to provide more integrated services, and to influence service 
providers in order to address a much wider range of local issues. The rationale 
for the changes is as follows: 
• Education: both spheres of local government have an interest in 
education, to raise the skills and competence of citizens and to ensure 
an appropriately qualified workforce for local business. Councils could 
play a more significant role in related activities, such as after-school care 
programmes and recreation. Increasingly schools are closing down their 
swimming pools and making more use of council-owned facilities. Such 
related activities should be funded under contract by central government. 
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• Public health: the current distinction between councils’ environmental 
health responsibilities and district health boards’ public health 
responsibilities is arbitrary. Bringing these functions together under the 
local authority would allow more co-ordination and less duplication. 
Placing them at a regional level would ensure more capacity and 
consistency than is currently available at a territorial level. Many of these 
activities are funded through user charges or local levies; the additional 
responsibilities should be accompanied by the relevant share of funding 
allocated to district health boards. 
• Police: local authorities have an important role, through urban planning, 
in community safety. Providing councils with a statutory role to develop 
local policing plans would allow more integrated and targeted local 
services. 
• Fire and rescue: the current framework for these services is a mix of 
central and local provision. Allowing services to be tailored for local and 
regional needs has practical advantages. 
• Social services: district and city councils (including city regions) are well 
placed to manage services based in neighbourhoods, particularly 
services catering for children and older people. Councils should be 
responsible for allocating national funding for such programmes. Current 
funding spent on these programmes by government departments should 
be provided to councils to allocate according to local circumstances. 
• Employment: employment planning is undertaken mainly at a national 
level. To recognise the importance of city and regional economies, some 
regional capacity should be developed in association with national 
planning. 
• Housing: while local government is already the second-largest social 
housing provider in New Zealand, its mandate is weak and many 
territorial authorities are reluctant providers. A regional approach to social 
housing could result in much more efficient allocation by ensuring that 
stocks match expected demand. This might involve the Housing New 
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Zealand Corporation devolving responsibility for its housing stock to the 
local authority in some areas. 
 
Besides shifting activities up or down a level, a properly defined regional level of 
government could resolve the fragmentation of some governmental services. 
For example, New Zealand has 13 conservation boards, 21 district health 
boards, 12 Police districts, eight fire service regions, nine sub-national Historic 
Places Trust offices, 14 economic development regions, 11 Work and Income 
regions, and five Ministry of Education regions (see Gill 2008). A more 
comprehensive regional government would encourage horizontal integration, 
with regional authorities taking over some sub-national departmental functions, 
as well as aligning central government and regional government boundaries.  
 
These suggestions for additional or complementary responsibilities would 
represent only a small change in the distribution of functional responsibilities 
between local and central government. And even then councils’ role in the 
administration of government programmes would remain minor and they would 
still be largely self-funding. Although the additional responsibilities would 
operate primarily at the planning level (except for housing and public health), 
they would give councils more legitimacy for acting on and influencing local 
outcomes. 
 
Community planning 
Good community planning should enable citizens, local organisations, councils 
and central government agencies to agree some high level objectives for public 
investment to facilitate the achievement of local outcomes. Despite its statutory 
objectives, the New Zealand model of community planning has not brought 
about as much inter-agency planning or community engagement as might have 
been expected, given some of the official statements (see McKinlay 2006). 
Some of the reasons for this are explained in earlier chapters; they concern the 
lack of mandatory participation by direct central government agencies, and the 
fact that compliance has overshadowed strategy in the structure and 
development of the LTCCP.  
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Certain features of the Irish and English models might be employed to 
strengthen the New Zealand approach. The Irish model places emphasis on the 
regional co-ordination of public services. It brings together representatives of 
public agencies and partner organisations, to reduce duplication, improve 
integration and balance national strategies and local issues. In contrast, the 
English approach of seeking sustainable community strategies emphasises the 
articulation of local aspirations as a means of determining priorities for joined-up 
operational initiatives. In Ireland the local authority has responsibility for 
developing regional strategies, while in England this responsibility sits with the 
Local Strategic Partnership, of which the local authority is a lead agency (the 
council remains the default provider in the absence of such partnerships). The 
English approach is likely to fit more easily into the New Zealand local 
government framework given its similarities to the LTCCP regime, although 
some changes would be required. For example: 
• relevant central government departments and agencies would be 
required to participate in the development of local and regional 
community strategies, through legislation or direction by the State 
Services Commission 
• the community planning process would need better information as a 
basis for dialogue on setting goals and objectives for different localities. 
Such information might include, for example, a snapshot of public 
expenditure in each area 
• the existing LTCCP model might need modification to separate 
organisational and accountability elements from community and strategic 
planning elements. This would give councils more flexibility to be 
innovative and make use of opportunities for joint planning with other 
agencies 
• the level of compliance required for the community plan would have to be 
considerably reduced. The scale of the LTCCP and the fact that it is 
subject to an official audit reduce the freedom of local authorities to adapt 
their processes to connect with other agency frameworks. 
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A separation of the strategic and organisational parts of the LTCCP, 
accompanied by mechanisms to guarantee the involvement of central 
government agencies, would create a community planning instrument with more 
capacity to achieve community governance than the LGA 2002 model. 
 
Institutional governance arrangements 
One of the dimensions assessed as having room for improvement was 
leadership. Since 1989, local government reform has, intentionally or 
unintentionally, left many elected members feeling superfluous and created a 
perception that the sector had become more technocratic and managerial, 
impinging on the roles of mayors and councillors. For example, the shift to a 
more principled approach to decision-making in which costs and benefits are 
required to be taken into account has given policy advisers much more scope to 
‘frame’ issues and scope options. Even the shift to community outcomes, which 
was designed as a citizen-focused process, was regarded by some elected 
members as excluding them from the process and their rightful role to show 
leadership.  
 
The research highlighted the deficiencies of the New Zealand system of ‘weak’ 
mayors and questioned the ability of this model to achieve the same degree of 
community leadership as the stronger mayors found in many overseas 
jurisdictions. Effective leadership is often an essential feature of community 
governance regimes through its ability to bring others along and sell a common 
vision. To strengthen the capacity of mayoral leadership Evans’ (2003) 
recommendations should be examined, particularly allowing mayors to appoint 
their deputies and their committee chairs and play a larger role in the 
development of the annual budget. These measures would not only force 
mayors to lead from the front but also make them more accountable for 
decisions with regard to appointments and budget proposals, something that 
might increase public interest in local government.97  
 
                                                 
97
 Recent changes to the Queensland Local Government legislation have enhanced the role of directly 
elected mayors, including a decision to give them responsibility to oversee the preparation of the budget, 
which legislators believe will give the position greater public profile. (Interview between the author and 
the chief executive of the Queensland Local Government Association.)  
     278 
The democracy dimension was also assessed as showing room for 
improvement. Problem areas included the fact that the number of elected 
members relative to the number of citizens was decreasing, a trend likely to be 
exacerbated by the consolidation of Auckland. The solution is likely to be 
contentious. While improving representation will likely require increasing the 
number of elected members, setting a vision or goals and steering a course 
toward them can be easier with fewer decision-makers. However, small, 
focused decision-making groups pose a risk of policy capture or technocratic 
capture, particularly if political structures are weak and management relatively 
unsupervised.  
 
Options for improving the balance between representation and governance 
include allowing more variation in council structures to match the different size 
and circumstances of councils. The United Kingdom, for example, allows 
councils to hold community polls to choose one of three different governance 
models, including a cabinet model which creates two classes of councillors. 
Executive councillors are selected for the cabinet while the remainder are 
responsible for scrutinising the cabinet’s performance. Other approaches that 
might be considered are mandatory election of councillors by wards, mandatory 
proportional representation, and providing citizens with ‘call-in’ powers, for 
example, through local referenda. Each model has its strengths and 
weaknesses and policy consistency will need to be traded off against political 
diversity.  
 
Influencing national providers 
Much of community governance theory and practice involves increasing 
citizens’ ability to influence the decisions taken by their elected and appointed 
officials. While community strategies can ensure that local authority planning 
and decision-making take account of the aspirations of local populations, it is 
more difficult to ensure that nationally determined policies and programmes, 
which arguably affect local development more, are similarly aligned with local 
priorities. The LGA 2002 encouraged many in local government to believe that 
the community outcomes process could be a mechanism to reorient central 
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government spending in localities so as to focus on the unique issues of each 
place. As the case studies revealed, this expectation was largely unmet. 
 
Ensuring government policies and programmes are sensitive to local conditions, 
as opposed to offering a ‘one-size-fits-all’ response, is the purpose of the 
Sustainable Communities Act 2007 (SCA), enacted by the British Parliament in 
2007. The SCA creates a structured environment in which councils are invited 
to facilitate a process that allows citizens to make proposals for redirecting 
discretionary government spending in their communities. While it is too early to 
review the effectiveness of this initiative, New Zealand is well placed to 
introduce a similar approach as a pilot project, allowing for a structured 
evaluation. Interestingly, elements of this regime were reflected in the report of 
the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance in its recommendation that the 
Government detail the full extent of its social spending in the city. At the time of 
writing, it had not yet been endorsed by the Government. 
 
Joined-up government 
New Zealand local government was also assessed as having room for 
improvement on the collaboration indicator, reflecting the lack of formal or 
official mechanisms for facilitating joined-up government initiatives incorporating 
local approaches to planning. While a number of intergovernmental initiatives 
have been established, particularly since the passage of the LGA 2002, they 
vary considerably in form and structure and are limited in scope.    
 
The number and effectiveness of locally joined-up initiatives might be increased 
by the creation of some form of legal entity with authority to hold and allocate 
resources. For example, under the Local Area Agreements used in the United 
Kingdom government departments, local authorities and other agencies can 
pool budgets in order to achieve outcomes for localities. Such agreements 
provide legal protection for government departments, organisations and local 
governments that enter into them, as they are bound by the same disclosure 
rules as the public sector. Such approaches have been discussed in New 
Zealand (see SSC 2001, SSC 2002) but have yet to result in any effective 
mechanisms for aligning councils and departments. More recently, interest in 
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England has focused on the concept of ‘Total Place’, an initiative which has 
been undertaken in a number of pilot sites to bring together public and non-
public service providers around locally determined outcomes. It does not appear 
that this initiative has been supported up by the new Conservative Liberal 
Democrat administration. 
 
Decision-making 
The decision-making dimension was assessed as having room for improvement 
even though local government in New Zealand has been at the forefront in its 
use of consultative democracy. Although the number of submissions continues 
to increase annually, the process, particularly the special consultative 
procedure, is inflexible and has been criticised for discriminating against less 
well-educated groups (New Zealand Government 2007). Also the number of 
council committees has gradually declined, reducing opportunities for citizens 
and organisations to exercise influence. Further research is needed into the 
implications of the shift away from traditional committees in favour of portfolio 
systems and its effects on citizens’ access. Similarly, setting minimum 
representation standards for certain types of councils should also be 
considered. In addition, there are no public agencies concerned with promoting 
or monitoring the issue of civic participation or civics education; perhaps this is 
an issue the Human Rights Commission should examine and consider as part 
of its remit.  
Further research  
 
Community governance is a relatively new concept, yet to be accepted as 
mainstream local government. Examples of community governance in practice 
tend to be largely operational, focusing for example on inter-agency co-
ordination or networks, rather than complete governance systems. Should 
community governance be institutionalised, it will have implications for 
intergovernmental relationships, which have already begun to change in some 
places, shifting from hierarchy to partnerships. This area is worthy of further 
research to understand its implications for day-to-day interactions, ways of 
achieving alignment toward common strategic goals, and decision-making 
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about local government structures. Similarly, further investigation is required 
into the way successful partnerships can be established and sustained at the 
community level with the not-for-profit sector and business. As an approach to 
making public decisions, community governance has been developed to 
recognise and incorporate sectors that are often left out of the decision-making 
process so that a full place-based approach can be taken to managing the 
public domain. This has particular implications for Maori organisations, such as 
iwi, hapu and urban-based organisations, which have their own mandates and 
legitimacy. How the roles of iwi/Maori organisations are incorporated into a 
community governance approach is an area worthy of separate research. 
 
A related area of research might be the implications of community governance 
for the role of elected members and the way they attempt to balance 
governance, stewardship and representation roles. What might it mean for the 
decision-making structures of councils, the number of councillors, and the way 
their remuneration is set? Having answered these questions, a further challenge 
would be to propose a legislative framework that promotes community 
governance while accommodating the diversity of councils and communities. 
Finally, a better understanding is needed of the factors that drive local 
government policy and particularly local government reform. Current research 
tends to focus on the effects of consolidation, modernisation or democratisation; 
unfortunately, we have a much poorer picture of their causes. Questions that 
might be asked are whether the drive for reform reflects a rational 
comprehensive analysis of local government systems; whether it reflects a crisis 
in global capitalism; or whether it is simply a reflection of the preferences of 
dominant individuals. Without an understanding of the drivers of change and 
their interaction, the ability to influence the direction of reform in the future is 
limited. 
 
Two other issues are worthy of further research to determine their suitability for 
the New Zealand context. The first concerns whether or not New Zealand 
should adopt an equalisation policy for local government. Currently there is very 
little weighting to reflect socio-economic circumstances in the assistance 
councils receive from central government. This means that ‘better off’ 
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communities are able to afford a greater range of local public services than low 
socio-economic communities. It represents a significant equity issue as the 
quality and quantity of local infrastructure can have a major effect on inward 
investment. Strengthening ‘poor’ councils may be an important precondition to 
strengthening community governance. A second issue worthy of study would be 
the place, if any, of binding referenda. In order to strengthen community voice 
there may be value in providing a mechanism that allows citizens to organise 
and seek an early election. Such a measure might be an effective way of 
addressing criticism that New Zealand local democracy is weak and lacks 
mandate. Such measures would need a range of checks and balances to guard 
against their frivolous use. 
Conclusion 
 
The community governance literature recommends that local authorities take an 
active interest in all issues affecting their localities (including those which are 
outside their administrative responsibilities) in an effort to achieve desired local 
outcomes. Local government plays a critical role in this as it provides the 
democratic legitimacy that allows citizens to make choices about the nature of 
their communities. This view of local government can be understood as a desire 
to rebalance political life by shifting authority from the centre towards the 
periphery and challenges the more traditional functionalist approach to local 
government, which defines councils primarily as service providers.  
 
This thesis has identified a number of relatively instrumental changes that would 
better enable the local government system in New Zealand to adopt a 
community governance approach. These changes, by themselves, would 
gradually shift the balance of authority from central government towards the 
periphery by increasing the relevance of local authorities and thus public 
appreciation of their role. Broadly speaking, however, the reform of local 
government in New Zealand leaves the current constitutional arrangements 
untouched; councils still operate within the framework of parliamentary 
sovereignty and governments are perfectly able to change their minds about the 
role and function of the sector. The assessment in Chapter 7 suggests that 
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while the current way of empowering councils is sufficient for a community 
governance approach to be adopted, it does expose local authorities to some 
risk, as it takes only a simple majority to change the sector’s fundamental 
legislation. In the long term, if local government is to fully embrace a role of 
community governance and the locality is to be recognised as an important 
place in which public decisions should be made, a greater level of constitutional 
certainty around councils’ powers and their role is needed. In a Westminster 
system this poses a number of questions about how this might be achieved, 
questions beyond the scope of this study. Strengthening the ability of councils 
to implement community governance in New Zealand requires re-examining the 
efficacy of the existing frameworks for empowering local government, their 
range of responsibilities, the adequacy of the policy levers available to councils, 
and their relationships with higher level government. While the LGA 2002 was 
influenced by the principles of community governance (especially the new 
localist stream), there has never been an official commitment to the overall 
concept.  
 
The research results suggest that reform so far has been only partial in terms of 
achieving community governance and further suggestions have been made to 
address some of the gaps. In the meantime, efforts to strengthen community 
governance can be seen in some of the governance arrangements proposed by 
the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance (2009). The commission’s 
proposals are an explicit recognition that different types of communities require 
different types of governance arrangements, given that existing arrangements 
for Auckland are generally the same as for all other regions of the country, even 
those with small, dispersed populations. Indeed, we might speculate that the 
Royal Commission’s establishment itself signifies recognition that the idea of an 
undifferentiated system of local government is a thing of the past, and that 
demands for more locally and regionally differentiated governance solutions will 
occur increasingly.98 Most of all, however, the commission’s recommendation 
for an integrated social board, with local and central government 
                                                 
98
 At the time of writing, public calls have been made for the creation of a large unitary council in 
Hawke’s Bay, a petition has started to consolidate Nelson City and Tasman District, and the three mayors 
of Northland have called for each of their councils to be made unitary authorities and the Northland 
Regional Council to be removed. 
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representatives, to oversee the Government’s social spending in Auckland is a 
practical example of community governance in action. A community cannot 
effectively determine priorities for public investment if it lacks information about 
where current investment is allocated. The Government has initially rejected the 
model, proposing instead a regular social forum with the council, a suggestion 
that falls  short of the original proposal, although it recognises the need for a 
more integrated approach.  
 
The New Zealand system of local government is generally viewed as part of the 
Anglo tradition, characterised by a lack of constitutional status, minimal 
functions and a generally instrumental role. What then are the chances for 
achieving community governance? It would ultimately require a major shift in 
the relative responsibilities and authority of the state and local government. The 
state would need to change its perception of local government and reorient its 
policy-making and service delivery towards locally specific matters. Change 
may be inevitable; whether it occurs as a result of an ideological conversion 
(unlikely) or in recognition that the centre cannot deliver services to meet the 
needs and expectations of an increasingly diverse citizenry, the locality seems 
likely to play a bigger part in the governance of the country. 
 
Recent local government reforms represent an ambitious project, and it is not 
clear that they have lived up to the more ambitious claims made for them, 
particularly the suggestion that they represent a shift from government to 
governance. This is a project still to be completed and, should the legislators be 
so inclined, international practice affords a few examples that could be 
considered as useful models. 
Postscript 
 
At the time of writing, the New Zealand Parliament is soon to debate the final bill 
in a legislative programme for the establishment of a new Auckland Council, 
covering a city region of over 1.4 million residents, more than a third of the 
nation’s population. The Local Government Amendment (Auckland Law 
Reform) Bill has caused some controversy, as the Government has signalled an 
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intention to create stand-alone Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs) to 
operate many of the major infrastructure services historically provided by the 
local authorities. The seven planned CCOs include Auckland Transport, 
responsible for all matters relating to roads and transport, and Auckland Water, 
responsible for waste water and potable water. In addition, CCOs will be 
established to undertake economic development, the operation of major 
facilities, the inner city and waterfront, and the council’s commercial property 
portfolio. 
 
Concern has been expressed that in solving the problem of territorial 
fragmentation the Government has introduced a new problem which might be 
described as functional fragmentation; 20 or so local boards, which will be given 
local decision-making powers, are included. The resulting challenge seems 
similar to that encountered by local authorities in Britain in the mid eighties with 
the beginning of a differentiated polity. The new council must devise a way to 
steer this mix of public and semi-public agencies, each with its specific 
objectives. The solutions so far proposed include a 20- to 30-year spatial plan to 
provide direction for the future development of Auckland and its infrastructure 
providers. In the social policy arena a Social Issues Forum, bringing together 
metropolitan and central government representatives, is under consideration. 
Faced with a greatly reduced range of operational levers, the new council will 
have little choice but to see its primary task as governance and ensuring 
agencies are working in the same direction, a direction established with the 
active participation of citizens. 
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Appendix 1: List of New Zealand local authorities99 
 
City Councils Population Regional Councils  Population 
Auckland City  
North Shore City  
Waitakere City  
Manukau City  
Hamilton City  
Tauranga City 
Napier City  
Palmerston North City 
Porirua City  
Upper Hutt City  
Hutt City  
Wellington City  
Nelson City  
Christchurch City 
Dunedin City  
Invercargill City  
438,100 
223,000 
201,300 
361,900 
138,500 
110,500 
57,000 
79,300 
51,000 
40,200 
101,700 
192,800 
44,700 
369,000 
123,000 
51,600 
Northland Regional  
Auckland Regional  
Bay of Plenty Regional  
Waikato Regional  
Hawke’s Bay Regional  
Taranaki Regional  
Manawatu Wanganui 
Regional  
Wellington Regional  
Canterbury Regional  
Otago Regional 
Southland Regional  
Westland Regional  
  
154,700 
1,414,700 
269,900 
402,200 
152,800 
107,500 
229,200 
 
473,800 
552,900 
203,500 
93,000 
32,400 
 
District Councils  District Councils  
Far North District 
Kaipara District  
Whangarei District  
Rodney District  
Papakura District  
Franklin District  
Thames Coromandel 
District  
Hauraki District 
Matamata Piako 
District  
57,900 
18,600 
78,200 
92,400 
48,300 
63,200 
 
26,800 
17,700 
 
31,400 
Kapiti Coast District 
Tasman District 
Marlborough District 
Kaikoura District 
Chatham Islands 
Hurunui District  
Waimakariri District  
Selwyn District  
Ashburton District  
Timaru District  
MacKenzie District  
48,400 
46,500 
44,500 
3,770 
640 
10,900 
46,100 
37,500 
28,700 
43,900 
3,950 
                                                 
99
 Estimates for 2008; source www.stats.govt.nz, accessed 26 September 2009. 
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Western Bay of Plenty 
District  
Kawerau District  
Whakatane District  
Opotiki District  
Gisborne District  
Wairoa District  
Waikato District  
Waipa District  
South Waikato District 
Rotorua District  
Otorohanga District 
Waitomo District  
Taupo District  
New Plymouth District  
Stratford District  
South Taranaki 
District 
Ruapehu District  
Wanganui District  
Rangitikei District  
Hastings District  
Central Hawke’s Bay 
District 
Tararua District  
Masterton District 
Carterton District  
South Wairarapa 
District  
Manawatu District 
Horowhenua District 
 
44,400 
7,150 
34,400 
9,060 
45,900 
8,480 
46,800 
44,700 
22,800 
68,100 
9,220 
9,600 
33,400 
71,800 
9,100 
 
26,800 
13,650 
43,400 
14,950 
73,900 
 
13,300 
17,750 
23,200 
7,360 
 
9,190 
29,300 
30,600 
Waimate District  
Waitaki District  
Buller District  
Grey District 
Westland District  
Queenstown Lakes 
District  
Central Otago District  
Clutha District  
Gore District  
Southland District 
7,450 
20,700 
9,960 
13,650 
8,770 
 
26,400 
17,700 
17,350 
12,250 
29,100 
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Appendix 2: Map of local government boundaries 
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Appendix 3: The Royal Commission on Auckland 
Governance  
 
 
Below are the key recommendations proposed by the Royal Commission on 
Auckland Governance: 
• The Auckland Council should include a vision for the region in its spatial 
plan. 
• The Mayor of Auckland’s annual ‘State of the Region’ address should 
describe progress towards the attainment of the vision. 
• The Auckland Council should adopt a comprehensive regional economic 
development plan and an associated funding plan. 
• The Auckland Councils should establish … a high level, regional cross-
sectoral board comprising representatives of central government, local 
councils, business, education and not-for-profit organisations. 
• A Social Issues Board should be established as the main governance 
body for social issues, with central government membership. 
• The Social Issues Board should develop a Social Well-Being strategy 
and implementation/funding plan. 
• A Social Issues Advisory Group of officials should be established to 
support the Social Issues Board. It should be co-funded by central and 
local government with responsibilities as described (in Chapter 9). 
• The Auckland Council should centre on providing leadership and 
facilitating improved social well-being outcomes. Direct delivery of social 
well-being services by Auckland Council should not duplicate central 
government responsibilities and should be part of the Social Well-being 
Strategy and implementation/funding plan. 
• The Government should give consideration to aligning geographic 
boundaries of local government and central government agencies 
responsible for the delivery of social well-being services. 
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• The Auckland City Council should establish two advisory panels, one 
relating to the arts and the other to recreation. With the assistance of the 
advisory panels it should develop strategies for regional arts and 
recreation activities and their associated funding. 
• The Government should give consideration to the introduction of a four-
year electoral term for local authorities in New Zealand. 
• A unitary authority, to be called the Auckland Council, should be formed 
to assume all local government responsibilities for the Auckland region. 
• When the Auckland Council is established, the following existing local 
authorities should be abolished: Rodney District Council; North Shore 
City Council; Waitakere City Council; Auckland City Council; Manukau 
City Council; Papakura District Council; Franklin District Council; 
Auckland Regional Council. 
• The Auckland Council should operate and have representation at two 
levels: the elected Auckland Council and six local councils. 
• The staff from the eight abolished councils should be transferred to the 
Auckland Council, at least initially. 
• The Establishment Board should develop the proposed structure of the 
elected Auckland Council and local councils (including the committee 
structure and advisory panels and groups). 
• That the Auckland Council should comprise 23 councillors elected or 
appointed as follows: 
o 10 councillors elected at large  
o eight councillors elected in four urban wards 
o two councillors elected in two rural wards 
o two councillors elected at large by voters on the Maori elected roll 
o one councillor appointed by the Mana Whenua Forum. 
• The role and functions of the Auckland Council should be prescribed for 
unitary authorities under the LGA 2002 and other legislation, and as may 
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be additionally prescribed in any future legislation referring specifically to 
the Auckland Council or any of the abolished local authorities. 
• The relationship between Auckland Council and each local council 
should be governed by a three-yearly governance agreement negotiated 
in the year following each local election. 
• The Government should enter into a partnership agreement with the 
Auckland Council and appoint a senior Cabinet Minister as Minister for 
Auckland: in addition it should appoint a Cabinet Committee for Auckland 
comprising ministers with portfolios of significance to Auckland. The 
Cabinet Committee should be supported by an officials committee. 
• The functions of the Cabinet Committee for Auckland should include: 
o consulting with the Auckland Council through the Minister for 
Auckland 
o setting priorities for Government spending in Auckland and 
deciding on the allocation of discretionary spending 
o overseeing events of international significance affecting Auckland. 
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 Appendix 4: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenarios for Discussion 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH 
Project Title: 
An Assessment of Alternative Institutional Arrangements 
 to Promote Strategic Local Governance in New Zealand 
I have been given and understood the explanation of this research 
project. I had an opportunity to ask questions and have them 
answered to my satisfaction. 
I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have 
provided) from this project before [date], when data collection will 
complete, without having to give reasons. 
I understand that the information I provide will be kept confidential 
to the researcher and his supervisors. The published results will not 
use my name and no opinions will be attributed to me in any way 
that will identify me. I understand that the notes from my interview 
will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other 
purpose or released to others without my written consent. 
I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research 
when it is completed. 
 
I agree to take part in this research: 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………. 
Name of participant: …………………………………………… Date: 
………………………. 
Please circle the 
appropriate 
answer: 
 
 
YES                 NO 
 
 
 
 
YES                 NO 
 
 
 
 
 
YES  NO 
 
 
 
YES  NO 
     323 
Information Sheet 
 
 
Dear Participant 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey which will assist me to complete my 
PhD thesis. The title is “An Assessment of Alternative Institutional Arrangements to 
Promote Strategic Local Governance in NZ”. The thesis involves an analysis of the New 
Zealand approach to local governance and an assessment of options for its 
enhancement, and your participation will assist me to identify potential enhancements. 
The outcomes of this research will be made available to officials so they can gain 
further information and influence the future shape of local government policy.  
 
Your participation is expected to take between 45 and 60 minutes all together. This 
involves reading: 
• a one page outline about the nature of community governance (Attachment 1);  
• a summary of three options for different community governance arrangements 
(Attachment 2);  
• a detailed breakdown of the three options (Attachment 3) 
• a questionnaire (Attachment 4). 
 
A further 30 minutes will be required to participate in a discussion, facilitated by the 
researcher. Following this discussion you will be able to add further information to your 
written replies. Your names will not be recorded. The only information required for the 
survey is information on the type of council you come from and your role, that is, 
whether you are an elected member or an official.  
 
My PhD will be completed by mid 2009. I will be providing an electronic copy of my 
thesis to anyone who requests it. If you wish to acquire a copy of the completed thesis, 
or a copy of the aggregated research results, or need any further information please 
contact me directly.  
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Please note: 
• This research has received approval from the University’s Pipitea Human Ethics 
Committee.  
• Participants may withdraw from the research at any stage.  
• Individual responses to the survey will be kept completely confidential, only the 
aggregated results will be used in the research.  
 
 
Researcher: 
Mike Reid 
palmer.family@paradise.net.nz 
 
 
Supervisor 
Prof. Claudia Scott 
Claudia.scott@vuw.ac.nz 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
 
An Assessment of Alternative Institutional Arrangements to Promote 
Strategic Local Governance in New Zealand  
 
Background  
 
What will local government be like in the 21st century? Can we assume that the way 
communities have been governed for the last 150 years will work as well in the new 
millennium? Confronted with these questions governments throughout the world have 
been engaged in a policy debate which has ongoing implications about the manner in 
which their towns, cities and regions are governed.  
 
Emerging from these debates has been a range of new approaches towards local and 
regional governance, such as the idea of ‘community governance’, which places 
emphasis on local government’s leadership role and the achievement of outcomes, 
rather than purely service provision. Community governance is seen as offering a new 
approach to local government – one that recognises that councils must work with other 
agencies in order to create sustainable communities.  
 
Community governance provides a ‘joined-up’ response to local and regional issues and 
is driven by outcomes defined by citizens rather than higher level government. Councils 
that adopt the concept of community governance tend to have: 
 
• a willingness to focus on outcomes for the complete jurisdiction over which the 
authority has responsibility 
• a focus on the development of a community vision able to bring together 
multiple organisations which contribute to local outcomes 
• approaches to decision-making that are participatory and inclusive 
• a willingness to employ a diversity of roles beyond that of service provider 
• a focus on issues of co-ordination. 
 
You are invited to fill in this questionnaire and take part in a discussion about this new 
approach and how it might be strengthened in New Zealand and in particular any 
obstacles that might need to be addressed. 
 
I am completing a PhD at the School of Government at Victoria University and your 
views will assist me with my research. In addition, the research will be made public and 
I will be sharing my findings on local government reform with the full local government 
sector. 
 
 
Mike Reid 
PhD Student 
School of Government 
Victoria University 
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ATTACHMENT 2 
 
Option Summaries 
Option 1 (Athens) 
 
This option is categorised by the creation of consolidated unitary local authorities 
(bringing together the functions of territorial and regional councils). Recognising the 
larger scale and thus competence of the new authorities the Government has pursued an 
active policy of devolution to local government, passing down many of its public health 
functions, responsibility for child and youth services, and support for the elderly. To 
reflect their new responsibilities councils have been given access to a local income tax 
to supplement rates. ‘Equalisation’ grants are provided to councils representing low 
socio-economic communities.  
 
Councils continue to operate according to the decision-making rules outlined in the 
LGA 2002 except for the introduction of mandatory referenda through which voters can 
overturn council decisions or trigger another election. This additional accountability has 
been welcomed and was introduced after concerns were expressed that the local income 
tax would be too costly. More contentiously, however, the practice of adopting national 
policy statements has been extended to include more areas of council activity.  
 
Option 2 (Sparta) 
 
In this scenario council boundaries have been largely retained however, following 
concerns about accountability and lack of representation some de-amalgamation has 
taken place. Elected regional councils were replaced by regional organisations of 
councils made up of council representatives and which are being given responsibility for 
territorial functions that benefit from the economies of scale, such as the provision of 
potable water and wastewater services. This has led to greater diversity in the nature of 
services provided by local authorities. 
 
To strengthen the responsiveness of councils the minimum number of elected members 
on a council has been increased to 10 and community boards are mandatory for any 
council with a population larger than 20,000. To ensure government programmes reflect 
local priorities all government departments providing services to localities must provide 
councils with the opportunity to comment on their proposed work programmes and give 
reasons for not adopting council proposals.  
 
Option 3 (Rome) 
 
The structure of local government remains much the same, gradually changing over 
time in response to local and regional pressures. In recognition of the complex and 
difficult issues facing communities the Government has moved to align the boundaries 
of its departments and agencies with those of local and regional councils. This was the 
first step in a process of stronger ‘joined-up’ government that has also seen the 
development of a comprehensive national plan to better steer local authorities and other 
agencies delivering public services. 
 
In response to concerns over the adequacy of their taxing powers the Government has 
addressed councils’ concerns by allowing them to submit bids for project/discretionary 
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spending as formal part of its annual budget process, in competition with government 
departments. Also reflecting new responsibilities allocated to councils the Government 
has introduced a new model for joined-up services which it calls Local Area 
Agreements (LAAs). These are place-based mechanisms which bring together local and 
national agencies acting to achieve the same outcomes in order to agree common 
targets. They may also involve ‘pooled’ funding. In addition, the Government is 
considering a proposal to appoint its own representatives on to each council in order to 
assist with alignment. 
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ATTACHMENT 4 
Questions 
 
Bearing in mind the discussion about community governance outlined above and the 
proposed options can you please answer the following questions: 
 
1 Please list what you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the Athens option. 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Please list what you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the Sparta option.  
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Please list what you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the Rome option. 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
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4 Please rank the Options for their ability to strengthen community governance 
with your most favoured option at the top, explaining why. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Please list any other changes you believe are necessary to strengthen the ability 
of the New Zealand local government system to achieve community governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of this survey will be treated with strict confidentiality. To assist me analyse 
the results can you please fill in the following information. 
 
Respondent Profile 
 
Position Tick  Council tick 
Elected 
Member 
  Territorial/unitary  
 
Official 
   
Regional 
 
 
District/City/Regional Population 
 
 Tick 
Large  
Medium  
Small  
 
 
PS If you would like to email me any further comments please do. My email is 
palmer.family@paradise.net.nz 
 
